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Abstract 
This research examined whether value similarity between a person and another 
individual elicits more positive attitudes towards the individual. Chapter 1 provides a review 
of the interpersonal similarity-liking effect, which has been studied primarily in research on 
attitudes and personality, and it raises some issues that might be particularly relevant to 
examining effects of value similarity. Chapter 2 tested the similarity-liking effect by 
manipulating actual similarity in reported values, and found that value similarity increased 
liking in both a between and within-subjects design (Studies 1 and 2).  Chapter 3 described 
four experiments testing the similarity-liking effect using trait-like descriptions to manipulate 
the extent to which a target individual is perceived as possessing similar values to the 
participant.  Results indicated that perceived similarity predicts liking in a positive direction, 
and that this relationship is mediated by the perception of the target individual’s warmth and 
competence.  Finally, Chapter 4 reviews the contribution of this research, discussing findings 
and implications.  Overall, data from the six experiments provides novel and robust evidence 
that value similarity increases liking, while providing provocative evidence about the 
mechanisms underpinning this effect. 
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Chapter 1 
A Review of the Similarity-Liking Effect and its Relevance to Social Values 
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General Introduction 
According to an article by the Pew Research Center, one in five people in the US, 
aged between 25 and 34 years old, have used online dating (Smith & Anderson, 2015).  This 
appears to be a fast growing industry with numerous websites and mobile apps promising to 
help people find a soulmate.  What factors do these websites take into account? Popular 
dating websites such as Match and eHarmony claim that their algorithms use science to find 
the best match according to personality, values and interests.  Match says “Whether that's 
someone with similar values, the same taste in music or simply someone tall, dark and 
handsome, we can help you find them on our site” (“Need more persuasion match.com 
works”, n.d.).  In contrast, eHarmony is more specific, advising that “shared values are more 
important than shared interests” (Creffield, n.d).  Millions of users each year are persuaded 
by these claims, and our contemporary definitions of values make it easy to see why.  Values 
are conceptualized as trans-situational goals and principles that guide human behaviour 
(Schwartz, 1992).  They help people decide whether actions, events, and people are desirable 
or not; therefore, they influence how people interpret and process information (Manfredo et 
al., 2016).  This causal role makes them seem pivotal for behaviour, which may make values 
particularly important in predicting harmony between partners who must act jointly on a 
frequent basis.   
Nonetheless, this assumption about the special role of values merits scrutiny.  
Research has not yet discovered whether values are special in attraction and interpersonal 
attitudes.  Before addressing more specifically the question whether values are special in 
attraction, it is important to consider the broader question of whether similarity between 
people elicits more liking between them than complementarity.  What makes a good match?  
Whilst some people might defend the idea that “opposites attract”, others may say that “birds 
of a feather flock together”. One of the most well-established and consistent findings in social 
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psychology is that positivity toward a person can be predicted from the similar and dissimilar 
attributes shared between that person and the person forming an impression (Ajzen, 1974, 
Byrne & Nelson, 1965, Montoy & Horton, 2012, Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008).  This 
finding has been described as “the similarity effect” (Byrne, 1961, Byrne & Nelson, 1965, 
Ajzen, 1974). Byrne’s (1971) book on this effect, The Attraction Paradigm, has over five 
thousand citations as reported by Google Scholar (retrieved on the 20th June of 2015), 
showing the high interest in this effect.  
This chapter reviews research on similarity and attraction in social psychology, 
beginning with research looking at similarity in attitudes and traits, before considering 
research on similarity in values.  All three constructs are important in social psychological 
research.  This chapter will describe these constructs, how they are distinct, and how they 
relate to interpersonal attitudes.  At the same time, I will describe two important perspectives 
that attempt to explain effects of similarity on interpersonal attraction: Byrne’s (1961, 1971) 
reinforcement model and the information processing approach from research on social 
cognition (Ajzen, 1974; Kaplan & Anderson, 1973).  It is not my intention to debate the best 
or worst model, although two meta-analyses by Montoya and colleagues (Montoya & Horton, 
2012; Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner, 2008) will be presented to clarify the conditions 
wherein such effects produce more robust findings.  My principal aim is to adapt the 
similarity-attraction (liking) paradigm to study effects of similarity in social values.  
Similarity and Interpersonal Attraction in Past Research 
 The study of effects of similarity between people on interpersonal attitudes has a long 
history.  This section reviews this research.  It begins by considering definitions of 
interpersonal attraction.  Next, I focus on the two perspectives that have been applied to 
understanding these effects.  I outline two meta-analyses that have helped to understand 
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which assumptions of each model have received empirical support.  I also identify 
moderators of the effects of similarity on attraction. 
Definition of interpersonal attraction 
As a field boasting over 70 years of research, it is not a surprise that researchers do 
not always agree about the conceptualization and measurement of attraction.  In physics, 
attraction is a force exerted by one object which attracts another object, such as magnetic and 
gravitational forces.  This definition is maintained by some researchers in psychology (e.g., 
Schachter, 1959).  In this view, attraction refers to the capacity to draw another person 
towards oneself, and there is a focus on behaviour implicit in this view (Schachter, 1959). In 
contrast, other researchers emphasize affective aspects, such as feeling positively toward 
someone (e.g., Zajonc, 1958), and additional researchers emphasize cognitive aspects, which 
indicate that attraction subsumes positive beliefs about another person (e.g., Berscheid, 
1985).  
The two models discussed below also emphasise different components of attraction.  
The reinforcement model, for instance, focuses on affective aspects - defining attraction as a 
continuum subsuming one person’s affection towards another, varying from strongly positive 
to strongly negative (Byrne, 1961).  Behavioural aspects are also taken into account by the 
reinforcement model, but it neglects the role of cognitive processes.  The information 
integration model emphasises the cognitive aspects, which are seen as an antecedent of 
attraction (Montoya & Horton, 2014).  
Importantly, these views of attraction can be distinguished from other constructs that 
emphasize either the emotional or behavioural aspects in longer-term interpersonal 
experiences and relationships - constructs such as romantic love, kinship, or attachment. In 
the extant research on similarity effects (e.g., Ajzen, 1974; Byrne, 1961; Tidwell, Eastwick, 
& Finkel, 2013) attraction refers to a more immediate evaluation of a person and not to solely 
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the emotional and behavioural patterns of responding implied by the latter constructs 
(Montoya & Horton, 2014).  
I would argue that, notwithstanding the differences in emphasis by different scientists, 
the term attraction is virtually a synonym for liking in most of the research considered in this 
thesis, because attraction focuses on an affection that is considered positive or negative 
(Byrne, 1961), and it is an immediate evaluation of a person. When we like someone, we 
have positive feelings, beliefs, and actions toward the person.  This perspective echoes 
contemporary tri-partite definitions of attitude (Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Maio & Haddock, 
2015).  These suggest that attitudes are tendencies to evaluate an object (e.g., person, thing, 
idea) with some degree of favourability and/or unfavourability and that these general 
evaluations have affective, cognitive, and behavioural components.  This perspective is more 
inclusive of diverse research looking at the effects of similarity on attraction, as it does not 
attempt to separate components that may be synergistic and inextricably linked (see Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1998). 
Thus, although most of the research reported here uses the term attraction, my studies 
adopt the term liking, defined as the degree of favourability towards the target. Even though 
both terms are used interchangeably in most studies, I consider liking to be a more accurate 
representation of the measures employed as dependent variables.  These measures often focus 
on attitudes toward people who are not being considered for intimate, close relationships 
(e.g., friends, strangers who will never be encountered), whereas the term attraction is often 
used in everyday dialogue to refer more specifically to romantic attraction.  Liking is 
therefore the more inclusive term for the interpersonal attitudes assessed in most research, 
because a person can like an individual in or out of a close relationship.  
Amongst the many possible determinants of liking, similarity would appear to be the 
most prominent and successful. It is the focus of the most investigations due to its robustness 
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and generalization across different populations and psychological aspects, such as 
personality, attitudes, preferences and interests.  Below I present the two dominant models in 
research on the effects of similarity on liking (attraction), then I present some examples of 
past research on the effects of similarity on attraction. 
The Reinforcement Model 
Byrne (1961, 1971) developed a framework of interpersonal attitude formation based 
on concepts from cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) and reinforcement 
(Newcomb, 1956), which he called reinforcement model.  In this model, individuals have a 
need for a logical and consistent view of the world.  Disagreement with other people creates 
feelings of inconsistency, which is associated with anxiety and confusion.  People who agree 
with our world views act as reinforcers, leading to positive feelings and positivity to them.  
Byrne (1961) suggested that interpersonal attraction flows directly from affective 
states we experience when we interact with other people.  Specifically, based on Newcomb’s 
(1956) work, Byrne (1961) assumed that a crucial factor for interaction is reciprocal reward.  
This reward comes from interaction with another person if the person not only fulfils our 
need for affiliation, but also our need to perceive the world in a consistent way.  Byrne 
labelled the latter need as the effectance motive (Byrne & Clore, 1967).  This motive helps 
ensure that our views are logical and correct, by seeking confirmation through other people. 
Thus, the need for propinquity derives from this basic need for a logical world.  
Accordingly, perceiving similarities (or dissimilarities) is crucial for interaction and 
for liking another person.  Similarity provides validation, resulting in a rewarding interaction 
and a positive relationship.  Conversely, dissimilarity and disagreement give a sense that one 
might be wrong or illogical, resulting in a punishing interaction and a negative relationship. 
Although similarity on several dimensions (e.g. personality, interests, beliefs) was relevant to 
Byrne’s (1961) model, he considered similarity of attitudes as a special sub-class of variables 
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that are important for our interactions.  Consequently, Byrne’s tests of reinforcement model 
focused on the effect of attitudes similarity on attraction. 
To examine this effect, Byrne (1961) developed a paradigm that would later be 
successfully employed in many studies.  This paradigm involves manipulating similarity and 
then assessing interpersonal attraction.  The manipulation is implemented through the 
phantom-other paradigm, and the measure of attraction is implemented using the 
Interpersonal Judgment Scale (IJS).  The phantom-other paradigm consists of two 
experimental sessions.  In the first session, participants express their attitudes on 26 issues, 
which were pre-tested and considered either very important for most subjects (e.g. God, 
premarital sex, integration) or not very important (e.g. classical music, western movies, 
politics).  The second session usually occurs two weeks after the first session.  Participants 
return to the lab and are informed that students from another class also participated in the first 
part of the study.  They are given a booklet containing the answers of a particular student to 
the attitudes questionnaire, but these are bogus answers manipulated by the experimenter.  
The bogus answers make the target seem either similar or dissimilar to the participant. 
After examining the target’s attitudes questionnaire, participants complete the IJS. 
The first four items in this six-item measure are fillers; they ask about the other’s intelligence, 
knowledge of current events, morality, and adjustment. According to Byrne (1971), these 
items were speculations about the way individuals might respond to others who agree or 
disagree to them, based on pilot studies he conducted with undergraduate students.  More 
important, the last two items of the IJS evaluate interpersonal attraction by asking the 
participant to rate the extent to which they would like or dislike the person, and whether they 
would enjoy or dislike working with the person.  Participants respond to all six items using a 
7-point scale, which varies for each item.  For example, beliefs about the target’s intelligence 
were rated on a scale with labels from “I believe this person is very much above average in 
8 
 
intelligence” (1) to “I believe this person is very much below average in intelligence” (7).  
Similarly, favourability toward the target was rated on a scale with labels from “I feel that I 
would probably like this person very much” (1) to “I feel that I would probably dislike this 
person very much” (7), and favourability toward working with the target was rated on a scale 
with labels from “I believe I would very much dislike working with this person in an 
experiment” (1) to “I believe I would very much enjoy working with this person in an 
experiment” (7).  The average of the last two items is used as the index of attraction in the 
IJS. 
Byrne (1961) first tested this paradigm by assigning participants to one of four 
conditions.  Participants received the attitude scale with responses that were exactly as their 
own, exactly the opposite of their own, similar on the most important issues, or similar on the 
least important issues.  Analyses of responses to the IJS revealed an effect of general 
similarity, that is, participants exhibited more liking for the stranger possessing exactly the 
same attitudes as their own than for the stranger possessing the opposite attitudes.  There was 
no difference in attraction regarding agreement on important or unimportant issues. 
Even though other studies (Byrne & Nelson, 1964, 1965) also failed to find a 
significant effect of agreement on important versus unimportant attitudes, Byrne, London and 
Griffitt (1968) noticed some design issues that were potentially inhibiting this effect.  For 
instance, in Byrne and Nelson’s (1964) first study, participants answered 56 attitudes items, 
and were later presented with only 14 of the 56 attitudes, ostensibly filled out by the stranger. 
Agreement and topic importance were manipulated between-subjects.  Byrne et al. (1968) 
suggested that adaptation was the most likely limitation to the lack of support of topic 
importance effects, because participants could have assumed that the stranger would have the 
same level of similarity on the remaining items, that is, participants would have adapted to 
the level of the importance presented to them.  The second study by Byrne and Nelson (1965) 
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repeated this study, but presented each participant with four strangers’ attitudes on 14 of the 
56 items. Each of the four strangers represented similarity or dissimilarity on one level of 
topic importance.  Despite this alteration, there was again only a significant effect of 
similarity on attitudes, but not of topic importance.  
One possible explanation for these results is that subjects inferred the same degree of 
similarity on the remaining items (42 attitude items) that were not revealed to the 
participants. Another possibility speculated by Byrne et al. (1968) is that individual 
differences on judgments of topic importance could be nullifying the manipulation.  These 
two issues were addressed in another study (Byrne et al., 1968).  In this experiment, the 
researchers showed participants the stranger’s attitudes on all 56 items, manipulating the 
proportion that were similar (.25 vs .75).  In addition, the researchers estimated topic 
importance on an individual basis for half of the participants, and on a group basis (scaled 
values used in previous studies) for the other half of the participants.  This time, the analyses 
of attitude revealed main effects of attitude similarity and of topic importance.  The higher 
the proportion of similarity, the higher was the attraction toward the stranger.  Moreover, 
agreement on important items led to higher attraction than agreement in less important items, 
regardless of whether importance was estimated on the individual or group level. 
Nevertheless, some researchers have failed to obtain empirical support for the 
reinforcement model (e.g., Aronson & Worchel, 1966; Rosenbaum, 1986).  Byrne, Clore, and 
Smearton (1986) attempted to address some critiques from Rosenbaum’s (1986) studies, 
which did not corroborate the positive relationship between similarity and attraction.  His 
main conclusion was that only dissimilar attitudes have an influence on attraction.  That is, 
Rosembaum suggested that dissimilarity may decrease liking, but similarity does not increase 
liking (compared to positive non-attitudinal information).  This raised some methodological 
questions that are relevant to any study investigating similarity and attraction.  The starting 
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point of this debate is whether it is possible to have a no-attitude control, while testing if 
similar attitudes lead to more attraction than dissimilar attitudes lead to less attraction.  The 
authors found in three of the four studies that the neutral control was actually positive instead 
of neutral in attitudes, because it included positive traits from Anderson’s (1968) scaling of 
likeability items, and this should be sufficient for participants to form a positive, instead of a 
neutral, impression.  People will always try to fill in the gaps in whatever information is 
available to them, and in this process, there is a tendency to assume some relatively high level 
of similarity with a stranger.  For instance, even White students with high levels of prejudice 
assumed 62% of similarity on attitudes items from a Black stranger (Byrne & Wong, 1962). 
Notwithstanding this controversy, the balance of findings to date provides evidence 
for effects of attitude similarity on liking, and some provocative evidence that agreement on 
important attitudes is relevant (evidence which requires replication).  Later in this chapter, I 
will revisit the fact that most of the studies conducted by Byrne and his colleagues examined 
the formation of attitudes toward a stranger with whom there was no expectation of actual 
interaction.  Hence, the external validity of these effects must be considered cautiously.  
The Information Processing Model 
 Another perspective is based on an information processing approach.  This viewpoint 
does not contradict the propositions of the reinforcement model (Ajzen, 1974; Kaplan & 
Anderson, 1973; Tesser, 1971), but outlines a different starting point for understanding 
interpersonal attitudes.  The information processing approach regards attraction as being 
determined by the information one has about another person.  From this perspective, we use 
the attributes of a stranger to form our beliefs.  These attributes can have a positive or 
negative valence, vary in importance and degree of attention allocated to them.  Similarity is 
a separate piece of information, which is relevant to the extent that similar attitudes are  
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evaluated more positively than dissimilar attitudes, controlling for the other factors (i.e., 
valence, weight, salience). 
Unlike the reinforcement model, which is mainly based on the research carried out by 
Byrne and his collaborators, the information processing model has many contributors.  
Although recognizing the robustness of Byrne’s work in establishing the effect of similarity 
on attractiveness, Ajzen (1974) proposed that studies of the similarity-attraction effect should 
also account for subjective values regarding the attributes establishing similarity. 
Specifically, when we find out about a person’s opinions, we form beliefs about the person’s 
attributes and designate positive or negative valence to such attributes. For example, finding 
out that someone believes in God might induce the belief that this person is religious, and this 
trait expectation will influence the formation of a positive or negative attitude towards this 
person. 
 In a similar vein, Montoya and Horton (2004) proposed that cognitive evaluation is 
the primary determinant of interpersonal attraction.  This suggestion is based on the 
reinforcement model’s inability to explain weak or non-existent effects of similarity in 
personality traits (Montoya et al., 2008), peripheral attitudes (Byrne et al., 1968), and field 
studies (Montoya et al., 2008).  They propose a model of interpersonal attraction stressing 
that another person’s attitudes imply information, which leads to cognitive evaluations 
regarding the quality of the person.  In turn, this cognitive evaluation shapes attitudes towards 
the target.  In other words, Montoya and Horton (2004) argue that the cognitive evaluation of 
a person mediates the effect of similarity on attraction. 
In two of their studies, Montoya and Horton (2004) demonstrated that cognitive 
evaluation is a proximal determinant of attraction.  The first study manipulated attitude 
similarity using the phantom-other paradigm.  Cognitive evaluation was assessed by seven 
items expressing an evaluation of the target’s capacities (e.g., “In general, how good a person 
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do you think your partner is?”, and “My future interaction partner is probably good at 
everything that s/he does”), and attitudes were measured with an adapted version of the IJS, 
containing nine items to express general liking for the target (e.g., “This person would 
probably not make a good friend to me” and “I think I would enjoy interacting with this 
person”). The researchers tested two mediational models to verify the temporal relationship 
between cognitive evaluation and attraction. The first model tested the effect of similarity on 
attraction via cognitive evaluation, and results indicated that cognitive evaluation mediated 
the effect of similarity on interpersonal attraction.  The second model tested the opposite 
mediational pattern, whether similarity affects cognitive evaluation via interpersonal 
attraction. The results of this analysis were not significant; thus, similarity appears to affect 
the cognitive evaluation, which affects interpersonal attraction. The results of the second 
model also failed to support the assumption of a direct relationship between similarity and 
interpersonal attraction. Montoya and Horton interpreted this pattern as support for their 
conclusion that cognitive evaluation is a proximal determinant of attraction.   
The second study addressed the limitation of Study 1, investigating the role of 
information implied by similar and dissimilar attitudes, and testing whether the similarity 
effect is doubly mediated by the valence of the information and by the cognitive evaluation of 
the quality of the target.  This study was conducted in two sessions, the first session being 
identical to the previous study.  Participants first rated their own attitudes, then received an 
attitude survey that was ostensibly completed by a partner, and finally rated attraction and 
cognitive evaluation for the partner.  One third of the participants were assigned to the similar 
condition, one third to the dissimilar condition, and one third to the control condition, which 
did not provide the partner attitudes survey.  The second session happened two weeks later.  
Each participant received an attitudes questionnaire that was exactly the same as the partner’s 
questionnaire in the first session, with five filler items irrelevant for the experiment. 
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Participants were asked to write information they could infer from each attitude and then 
attribute a valence for each set of information.  Control participants were randomly assigned 
to write information about attitudes that were either similar or dissimilar to their own.  Both 
cognitive evaluation and information valence mediated the effect of similarity on attraction.  
In sum, these studies suggest that the similarity provides additional positive information 
about a target, and this positive information leads to a favourable cognitive evaluation, and, 
consequently, to attraction. 
Ajzen (1974) also aimed at separating the effects of similarity and of information’s 
affective value.  He found more support in favour of the information processing explanation 
than for the reinforcement model.  Ajzen’s study was designed to demonstrate how 
information about another person’s opinion is used to form beliefs about this person’s 
characteristics.  This study applied the expectancy-value formulation of attitudes, ! =	∑%&'( SP+V+, where A is the attitude toward a person, SP is the subjective probability that the 
person possesses attribute i, Vi is the subjective attribute of i, and n is the number of 
attributes.  In this mathematical description, attitudes are the average of the valence 
associated with each attribute of an attitude object.  In this context, the attitude object is a 
person, and the attributes are the person’s traits.  These traits, in turn, can be inferred from the 
person’s opinions.  To test this perspective, three groups of participants received a set of 12 
items regarding opinions about religion, college life, foreign policy, domestic politics and 
racial relations.  Participants were told that the questionnaire contained the opinions of 
another student, and, on the basis of these responses (for each item researchers threw a die to 
place the answer on the response scale), participants were asked to answer questions about 
the other person’s personality traits and likeability.  The list of adjectives about the person’s 
personality was scored attributing +1 for yes, -1 for no, and zero for undecided, and then the 
scores for each trait were multiplied by Anderson’s (1968) likeability values for the same 
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traits.  The sum of the resulting product was an estimate of the participant’s attitude toward 
the other person, which correlated significantly with the IJS and the same semantic 
differential measure of the first study.  Thus, participants used the information about a 
person’s opinions to form beliefs about the person’s characteristics, which in turn predicted 
attitudes.  For Ajzen, this is demonstration of the superiority of the information’s value over 
similarity.  Similarity is important and relevant to the extent that it provides information 
about the person’s attributes.  
 Of interest, the reinforcement model assumes an effect of proportion of similar 
attitudes, regardless of set-size (Byrne, 1997, Byrne & Nelson, 1965).  This prediction is 
consistent with some experimental evidence (Byrne, Griffitt, & Stefaniak, 1967; Byrne & 
Nelson, 1965).  However, Kaplan (1981) argues that the set-size effect is negligible only 
when subjects are not aware that they could be receiving more or less information, and he 
obtained support for this view in two experiments.  In one of the experiments, participants 
were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with 6 attitude statements read by a 
pollster, who also answered the questions after the participant gave his/her answer.  Half of 
the participants were informed that the pollster was instructed to answer all six questions, and 
the other half of the participants were informed that the pollster was only allowed to answer 
three of the six questions.  In the second experiment, participants received a booklet with 
descriptions of four different people.  In one condition, participants were told that they were 
receiving more information than most other subjects, and, in the second condition, 
participants were told that they were receiving less information than others.  Across these two 
experiments, Kaplan (1981) found that a larger set-size produced more confidence in the 
provided ratings when information about the available set-size was made salient than when it 
was not; this effect was absent when information about available set-size was not made 
salient.  The increased set-size also led to greater extremity for liking judgements in the 
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condition wherein the available set size was salient than when this information was not 
salient.  That is, a set size of six positive attributes led to more positive evaluations than a set 
size of three positive attributes, and a set size of six negative attributes led to more negative 
evaluations than a set size of three negative attributes.  The main conclusion of these studies 
is that more information does not increase information weight by itself, unless the evaluator 
is aware of the amount of information that is being presented.  
 Montoya and Horton (2014) re-examined many studies testing the similarity-
attraction effect and proposed that interpersonal attraction can be understood using a two-
dimensional model.  According to these authors, there is consensus in the literature about two 
fundamental dimensions in social judgements – one dimension subsumes judgements of the 
other’s competence and capabilities, and the other subsumes judgments of the other’s 
willingness to benefit the perceiver’s goals or interests.  In other words, one dimension is an 
evaluation of the target’s competence and skills, and the other is an evaluation of the target’s 
trustworthiness and warmth.  These dimensions are also cited within the Stereotype Content 
Model, which regards competence and warmth as two fundamental dimensions for evaluating 
social groups (see Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). 
 According to Montoya and Horton’s (2014) model, the two dimensions are important 
because perceivers’ goals can vary according to time and situation.  Unless a situation-
specific goal has priority in a given moment, people will use their chronic/core goals to 
evaluate others.  Individuals will integrate cues and information about the target person’s 
competence and warmth.  This information will be weighted subjectively based on the 
activated goals, and the result of this integration affects attitudes toward the person.  This 
model might be able to provide more consistent results in the cases where similarity effects 
are weaker, as in studies examining personality traits, negative attributes, or field contexts 
(Montoya & Horton, 2004). 
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 In sum, the information processing model is presented as a different perspective to 
understand the similarity-liking effect.  It focuses on the information that similarity provides, 
and how this information is used to form an impression.  Considering the importance of 
understanding the differences and similarities between the two models, I present below a 
summary, and two meta-analysis studies that will clarify the evidences supporting 
reinforcement model and the information processing model. 
Summary of the reinforcement model and of the information processing model 
Two different models have originated most of the research conducted to test the 
similarity-liking effect.  The reinforcement model, proposed by Byrne (1961), assumes that 
people tend to like more similar others because this perception increases the sense of being 
logical and correct.  Thus, this model assumes a direct effect of the proportion of similarity 
on liking, disregarding possible moderators of this relationship.  In a different perspective, the 
information processing model attaches less importance to similarity, focusing on how the 
information is processed. In other words, this model assumes that similarity provides specific 
information that is used to form positive or negative impressions.  
Although these two models do not exclude each other, they make different 
assumptions about how similarity affects liking. Montoya and Horton (2012) synthesized the 
differences in four categories: type of stimuli (central or peripheral attitudes/attitude 
importance, attitude or personality), set size, information salience and proportion of 
similarity.  Specifically, the reinforcement model does not assume an effect of attitude 
importance, and does not make a prediction whether attitudes or personality similarity is 
stronger.  The information processing model, on the other hand, predicts that attitude 
importance affects liking because more information is implied, and that similarity of attitudes 
should have greater effects than similarity of personality, because attitudes might provide 
more information than personality.  The two models also make different assumptions about 
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the set size, whilst the reinforcement model predicts no effects (only of the proportion of 
similarity), the reinforcement model predicts that a larger set provides more information, thus 
affecting the estimation of liking.  Finally, the influence of information salience is predicted 
differently by the two models.  The reinforcement model predicts no effect, whilst the 
information processing model assumes that salient information should have greater influence.  
In sum, both models have been used in investigations of the similarity-liking effect, 
with each possessing supportive evidence.  This evidence is discussed below in the context of 
two meta-analyses, which help to understand the conditions under which the similarity-liking 
effect is more robust. 
Meta-analysis of the Similarity-Attraction Effect 
Two meta-analyses have helped to clarify the nature of the similarity-attraction effect. 
First, information about the reliability of the effect was obtained in a meta-analysis by 
Montoya et al. (2008).  They reviewed 313 studies investigating the impact of actual and 
perceived similarity on attraction.  In this meta-analysis, actual similarity was identified 
within manipulations or measures of actual similarity information, whereas perceived 
similarity was identified within participants’ self-reports of similarity (e.g., after the 
information was presented).  Montoya et al. considered laboratory and field studies (e.g., 
computer dating, actual dating, marital relationships), the amount of interaction (no-
interaction, short and existing relationships), and whether the research examined similarity in 
attitudes or personality.  (Value similarity was not the focus of any of the studies they 
reviewed).  Regarding the effects of actual similarity, the overall effect size for laboratory 
studies was large (r = .59), and the similarity effect was larger when there was no interaction 
(r = .54) than when there was a short interaction (r =.21), but there was no difference 
between short interactions and existing relationships.  Regarding field studies, the effect size 
was small (r = .12), and all the studies that had large samples (making them more 
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representative of the true population) had a mean near zero.  The amount of interaction did 
not significantly moderate the effect of actual similarity in the field studies.  
The overall effect size for perceived similarity was also large (r = .39).  Specifically, a 
large effect size was found for laboratory studies (r = .39), and a moderate effect size was 
found for field studies (r = .32).  The amount of interaction also moderated the similarity-
attraction effect.  The similarity effect was larger for no-interaction studies (r = .54), than for 
short-interaction studies (r = .21) in laboratory studies. 
In sum, Montoya et al.’s (2008) meta-analysis provided strong support for effects of 
actual and perceived similarity on attraction.  The effect of actual similarity gets weaker with 
short-interaction, and is not detected in existing relationships.  In contrast, perceived 
similarity was strongly associated with attraction across short interactions and existing 
relationships in field studies. 
Another important meta-analysis compared the ability of the reinforcement model 
(Byrne, 1971) and the information processing model (Ajzen, 1974) to explain the effect of 
similarity on interpersonal attitude.  Montoya and Horton (2012) synthesized the predictions 
of both models in four categories: type of stimuli (central or peripheral attitudes/attitude 
importance, attitude or personality), set size, information salience and proportion of 
similarity.  
Regarding the type of stimuli, the reinforcement model predicts that attitude 
importance has no effect, and it does not make a prediction regarding the effect of similarity 
of personality traits or attitudes.  The information processing model predicts that attitude 
centrality (importance) influences the weight of this stimuli, therefore affecting liking 
because more information is implied.  It also predicts that similarity of attitudes should have 
greater effects than similarity of personality, based on the assumption that attitudes provide 
more information than personality.  Results of the meta-analysis for this moderator indicated 
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that similarity on central attitudes has a stronger effect than peripheral attitudes, 
corroborating the prediction of the information processing model and refuting the prediction 
of the reinforcement model.  Similarity of attitudes also exhibited a stronger effect than 
similarity of personality traits, as predicted only by the information processing model. 
The effect of set size is predicted differently by both models.  The reinforcement 
model predicts no effect, whilst the information processing model predicts an effect, 
assuming that a larger set provides more information.  Results indicated that there was no 
significant difference for the set size, corroborating the prediction of the reinforcement 
model.  Regarding the effect of information salience, the reinforcement model predicts that it 
does not affect attraction, whilst the information model predicts that salient information has 
greater influence on attraction.  Results favoured the prediction of the information processing 
model, showing that more salient information increased liking.  Finally, both models predict 
that proportion of similarity has an effect on liking, and this result was obtained. 
Collectively, results from the analysed studies supported two of the four effects 
proposed by the reinforcement model, and four of the five effects proposed by the 
information processing perspective.  This meta-analysis also tested the effects of gender, 
finding interesting results.  Specifically, female-female interactions elicited stronger effects 
of similarity than male-male interactions, and unspecified-matched interactions elicited 
weaker effects of similarity than a combination of all gender-specified interactions.  
 It is important to consider why the effects of similarity in lab studies are stronger than 
in field investigations.  Montoya et al. (2008) suggested the influence of several factors.  The 
cognitive processing of environmental cues in field investigations could dilute the impact of 
similarity on attraction (e.g. room temperature, background music, target race, physical 
attractiveness).  They also questioned the appropriateness of the assessment of similarity for 
field studies, suggesting that similarity on core traits might produce attraction in established 
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relationships.  Thus if the studies fail to tap core traits or attitudes, they would not capture the 
effects.  Another difference between laboratory and field studies relates to the salience of the 
information.  Attraction is evaluated immediately after participants see the target’s attributes 
in the lab, whereas the partner’s attitudes are often collected separately from the participant’s 
attitudes in field studies.  Moreover, it is also possible that participants are unaware of some 
of the partner’s attitudes regarding many topics (e.g. abortion, discotheques or novels) in the 
field.  Finally, it is also possible that the reinforcement of similar attributes tends to decrease 
over time. 
 The differences between the effects of perceived and actual similarity can be 
influenced by factors such as cognitive biases (Sillars, 1985), self-esteem maintaining forces 
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977), or beliefs that the partner is similar to oneself (Morry, 2007). 
People might inflate their perceptions of similarity in order to facilitate the consonance of 
cognitions, and because people assume that similarity increases agreement and avoids 
conflicts, resulting in better relationships.  
In sum, two important meta-analysis provided information about some specific 
aspects of the similarity-liking effect.  Studies reveal stronger effects when there is no 
interaction, the focus is on attitude similarity rather than personality similarity, and the 
information is salient.  Furthermore, the proportion of similarity in a set of traits is 
consistently important in attraction, and that this effect is different for men and women. 
Personality Factors and Attraction 
 In the previous sections I have discussed how the reinforcement model and the 
information processing model explain the similarity-attraction effect.  The reinforcement 
model makes the assumption that the proportion of similarity increases liking because 
similarity reinforces one’s world views and sense of correctness. This model assumes a direct 
effect of the proportion of similarity on liking (Byrne, 1971). The information processing 
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model, on the other hand, proposes that similarity provides information, which shapes the 
formation of attitudes (e.g., Ajzen, 1974), indicating that cognitive information processing 
mediates the effect of similarity on liking (Montoya & Horton, 2004). Therefore, both models 
predict that higher similarity increases liking, but they make different assumptions about how 
this effect occurs. In either case, whether the similarity-liking effect is direct or mediated by 
cognitive processes, it is likely that other factors can influence it, such as individual 
differences (e.g., self-monitoring, preference for consistency, self-esteem).   
For instance, do we like similar people because we see ourselves in positive terms?  A 
study conducted by Brown and Brown (2015) found that people with high self-esteem were 
more likely to describe their ideal partner in a similar way to their self-evaluations.  Another 
study found that similarity is a stronger determinant of attraction when discrepancies between 
actual and ideal self-concept are small (LaPrelle, Hoyle, Insko, & Bernthal, 1990; Wetzel & 
Insko, 1982).  These two studies are an indication that we might like similar people because 
we like ourselves, that is, we have a high self-esteem, or because we perceive ourselves as 
holding ideal characteristics.  Alternatively, people with lower self-esteem or who feel their 
actual self is different from their ideal self might experience less positive attitudes towards 
someone similar. 
 Some people value reliability and predictability for themselves and for others.  This 
personal characteristic is known as Preference for Consistency (PFC), and refers to the desire 
to appear consistent to others and to perceive others as consistent (Cialdini, Trost, & 
Newsom, 1995).  This motivation, especially for internal consistency, might influence 
individuals’ expressions of attitudes, values and behaviours.  Hence, people who desire 
consistency tend to vary less in their self-presentation.  For instance, PFC moderated the 
relationship between perceived value differences and dehumanization of asylum seekers 
(Greenhalgh & Watt, 2015).  Although this moderation effect was anticipated by the 
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researchers, the direction of the results was surprising.  For low-PFC participants, perceiving 
smaller differences in conservation values (i.e., security and tradition focused values) 
predicted higher levels of dehumanization.  It would have been expected that people high in 
PFC would experience high levels of discomfort when presented with dissimilarities, because 
they could feel less able to predict someone else’s actions, also experiencing threat and 
uncertainty.  In order to adjust for this discomfort, high PFC participants would therefore 
present higher levels of dehumanization.  In contrast, the results suggest another potential 
effect of the preference for consistency: high-PFC participants may minimize perceptions of 
value differences in order to alleviate inconsistency. 
 Another personality factor that could potentially influence the similarity-liking effect 
is self-monitoring.  It refers to the monitoring and control of behaviours and public image 
(Fuglestad & Snyder, 2009).  Low self-monitors rely on internal cues, such as their attitudes, 
to guide their behaviours, whilst high self-monitors use situational cues.  In this sense, low 
self-monitors tend to show higher attitude-behaviour consistency than high self-monitors 
(Kraus, 1995).  Jamieson, Lydon and Zanna (1987) were interested in determining whether 
effects of attitude similarity are stronger for low self-monitors than high self-monitors and 
whether effects of activity similarity are stronger for high self-monitors than for low self-
monitors.  Results showed the effects of activity similarity on attraction were stronger for 
high self-monitors than for low self-monitors, whilst the effects of attitudes similarity were 
stronger for low self-monitors than for high self-monitors. 
 It is important to consider that the similarity-liking effect might be moderated by 
personality factors, such as those previously mentioned.  Nevertheless, exploring personality 
factors is a secondary objective of the present thesis, which primarily focuses in adapting and 
developing a paradigm to investigate the similarity-liking effect for human values. 
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Warmth and competence  
 As previously mentioned, Montoya and Horton’s (2014) analysis of the similarity-
liking effect highlighted two dimensions that are important in the literature on social 
judgments. One dimension refers to the other person’s capabilities and competence, whilst 
the other dimension refers to the other’s trustworthiness and warmth.  
The Stereotype Content Model is probably the most successful application of these 
two dimensions. This model regards competence and warmth as two fundamental dimensions 
for evaluating social groups (Fiske et al., 2007), which have been replicated across many 
studies, accounting for 82% of the variance in perceptions of everyday social behaviours 
(Wojciszke et al., 1998).  The primary dimension is often defined as warmth, it is an 
indication of the other person’s intentions for good or ill.  Therefore, it captures the other 
person’s intentions, friendliness, trustworthiness, and helpfulness.  The secondary dimension 
is referred to as competence, which captures a person’s capability for acting according to 
his/her intent, being an indication of one’s ability, intelligence, efficacy, and skill. It is argued 
that warmth judgments are dominant in affective and behavioural reactions, and have a 
primacy over competence ones (Fiske et al., 2007). 
In personality research, these dimensions are represented in the interpersonal 
circumplex model (Gurtman, 2009; Wiggins, 1979).  According to this model, there are two 
dimensions that define a given interpersonal space, which can be represented in a circumplex 
model. Thus, there is a continuous order, where the two dimensions serve as Cartesian 
coordinates for the variables to be organized. These two dimensions are named Agency and 
Communion. Agency reflects characteristics such as dominance, power, status, and control. 
The second dimension, communion, expresses ideas such as love, affiliation, union, and 
friendliness.  
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Based on the interpersonal circumplex model, Trapnell and Paulhus (2012) outlined a 
two-dimensional model of values that predicts links between values and the dimensions of 
warmth and competence.  The researchers demonstrated that communion and agency 
emerged as dimensions in four data sets with different measures of values.  Communion 
reflects the motives of “getting along”, thus being related to warmth, whilst agency reflects 
the motives of “getting ahead”, congruent with the competence dimension. 
Given the links between warmth and competence and values (Trapnell & Paulhus, 
2012), and the importance of these two dimensions for interpersonal perception (Fiske et al., 
2007; Montoya & Horton, 2014), these variables were included in the research programme 
described in this thesis as potential mediators of the relationship between value similarity and 
liking.  
Value Similarity in Interpersonal Attitudes 
The research reviewed above shows that years of research have demonstrated the 
robustness and reliability of the similarity-attraction effect.  This effect has emerged across a 
series of person attributes, such as attitudes, personality, and interests.  Although many 
studies have been carried out on similarity in attitudes and traits, tests focusing on social 
values are scarce.  It is rather intuitive to assume that value similarity would also be crucial to 
attraction.  Although there was interest in this question in some early research (Hill & Stull, 
1981; Newcomb, 1961; Curry & Emerson, 1960), few studies have used contemporary 
measures of values to understand the effect of value similarity on attraction.  The remaining 
question is, therefore, whether we are attracted to people with the same values, or do 
opposites actually attract?  
To address this question, it is helpful to first consider the contemporary social 
psychological definitions of values and how the perceptions of others’ values influence 
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attitudes and behaviours towards them.  I will then propose an investigation of the similarity-
attraction effect with a contemporary model of social values. 
Definition of Values and Their Relation to Attitudes and Personality 
Values are a common topic in our social life, typically mentioned by politicians, 
education and health care guidelines.  For example, Jeremy Corbyn said on his speech at the 
2015 Labour Conference “let's get on with bringing values back into politics”, David 
Cameron mentioned values in his Christmas speech in 2015, “…it is because of these 
important religious roots and Christian values that Britain has been such a successful home to 
people of all faiths and none”.  The NHS website says that everything it does is inspired by 
the values of “working together”, “respect and dignity”, and “compassion”, “improving 
lives”, “everyone cares”, and “commitment to quality of care”. Thus, values are present in 
many different sectors and aspects of people’s lives, justifying their important contribution 
for the comprehension of social interaction. 
Social values are relevant to understanding diverse social psychological phenomena 
and human actions (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003).  Contemporary definitions define values as 
concepts or categories that express human needs and goals, serve as guiding principles for a 
person or group, varying in importance and transcending situations (Gouveia, 2013, Schwartz 
et al., 2012).  The most important contemporary model of values was proposed by Schwartz 
(1992).  He defined values as trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as 
guiding principles in people’s lives. His theory suggests that human existence is grounded in 
three universal requirements: (1) biological needs from the organism to guarantee survival, 
(2) needs that regulate social interactions, and (3) social institutional needs of well-being and 
group survival. Schwartz (1992) proposed that ten basic motives are expressed by values: 
self-direction, benevolence, conformity, stimulation, hedonism, power, achievement, 
security, tradition and universalism. 
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These ten motivational types are structured in a motivational continuum in the shape 
of a circle; they express and predict motivational conflict and compatibility between the 
values. More specifically, adjacent values share similar motives, and ratings of their 
importance are positively correlated (e.g., power-achievement or achievement-hedonism). 
Values situated on opposed sides of the circle serve opposing motives, and ratings of their 
importance are negatively correlated (e.g., conformity-hedonism or hedonism-benevolence). 
Values at orthogonal positions in the circle are not expected to correlate (e.g., universalism-
stimulation or power-conformity).  The ten motivational types can be grouped in four higher 
order dimensions.  Values serving power and achievement goals are said to be self-
enhancement values, which are opposed to self-transcendence values, a combination of the 
universalism and benevolence types.  The other opposition is represented by the dimensions 
of openness, and conservation.  The first dimension groups stimulation, hedonism and self-
direction values, and the second dimension correspond to the combination of security, 
tradition and conformity values. 
Traditionally, researchers have used two different scales to measure values of the 
Schwartz model, the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS), and the Portrait Values Questionnaire 
(PVQ). Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000).  The 
SVS (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2000) consists in a list of 56 values with a short 
description (e.g., RESPECT FOR TRADITION. Preservation of time honoured customs).  
Each value is rated in a 9-point scale from –1 (opposed to my principles) to 0 (not important) 
to 7 (extremely important), according to the extent to which it is a guiding principle in the 
individual’s life. The PVQ is most commonly used in the 21-item version, also used in the 
European Social Survey (Schwartz et al., 2001).  This measure was developed to tap the ten 
values dimensions proposed by Schwartz (Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz et al., 2001).  The aim 
was to provide a concrete measure of values, able to be used in younger samples and low 
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educational levels (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, & Harris, 2001).  Each item 
describes a person in terms of goals, aspirations or wishes regarding a single value (Schwartz, 
2007).  Participants responded using a scale from 1 (“not like me at all”) to 6 (“very much 
like me”).   
Although values may be important for our own behaviour (see also Maio, 2010), it is 
prudent to ask how we might learn about another person’s values.  Values are desirable goals 
with an underlying motivation, thus they do not refer directly to action.  This makes it 
difficult for others to infer a person’s values based on observation, especially because one’s 
value may be expressed through many different behaviours and a single behaviour can 
express more than one value (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003, Rokeach, 1973).  McAdams and Pals 
(2006) suggest that personality traits are the starting point in the process of getting to know 
someone else.  In order to infer and get information about attitudes and values, it is necessary 
to have more interaction. 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that we are accurate in estimating the values of a 
close acquaintance.  Dobell, Aavik, Konstabel, Schwartz and Realo (2014) examined self-
other agreement of values and personality. They observed substantial level of convergence 
for Schwartz’s higher-order values and for personality dimensions.  Thus, the evidence 
contradicted the assumption that values are too privately held for accurate inferences 
(McAdams & Pals, 2006).  The researchers argued that familiarity with the target may play 
an important role on the accuracy of a judgement.  In addition, even when the targets are 
unfamiliar, people’s mere assumptions of similarity may be accurate in contexts where 
people share similar environments and background.  
Differentiating values from other psychological constructs 
 In order to support the claim that values might play a special role in the similarity-
attraction effect, it is important to differentiate them from other important variables such as 
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attitudes, personality and interests. In this section, I consider attitudes, personality and 
interests in turn. 
Regarding the difference between values and attitudes, Rokeach (1973) suggested that 
values play a more central role in people’s cognitive structure.  This assumption is based on 
the fact that attitudes are related to specific objects, whereas values transcend specific 
elements when guiding actions.  Values are also more stable than attitudes (Milfont, Duckitt, 
& Wagner, 2010).  Many researchers suggest that attitudes, values and behaviour form a 
hierarchy (Hauser, Nussbeck, & Jonas, 2013; Homer & Kahle, 1988; McCarty & Shrum, 
1994).  Values precede attitudes to influence behaviour.  In other words, the values held by 
one person will affect the person’s attitudes, therefore influencing behaviours related to such 
attitudes.  
 Insofar as values shape behaviour in a stable manner, values should also relate to 
personality.  Personality can be defined as enduring dispositions that cause specific patterns 
of interaction (Goldberg, 1993).  It is often represented by a five-factor structure, which 
defines traits that are considered the basic dimensions of normal personality (McCrae & 
Costa, 1997).  Personality relates to what we naturally tend to do, whilst values relate to what 
we believe we should do (Parks & Guay, 2009).  Moreover, the five dimensions of 
personality do not seem to conflict with one another, as it is the case for values, which might 
be important for interpersonal evaluation. 
 Finally, it is important to differentiate values from interests.  The main distinction is 
probably that the latter are not normative patterns or ideals that guide people’s behaviour. 
Thus, interests do not aim at goal attainment, but at experiencing what is preferable, 
influencing the choice of activities (Sagiv, 2002). 
 In sum, specific characteristics of values, such as their trans-situational condition, 
patterns of conflict, and links to goal attainment make them important in people’s cognitive 
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self-concept and representation of the social world.  This distinctiveness further justifies the 
present interest in investigating their role in the similarity-liking effect.  Below I present how 
values might influence judgements of others. 
Perceived values influence judgements and evaluation of known and unknown others 
 To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies investigating directly the 
relationship between value similarity and liking.  However, some studies investigate other 
implications of perceptions of a target’s values.  These studies are relevant to understanding 
how values are used to form impressions and are useful as information before examining 
effects of value similarity. 
The effects of perceived similarity with a specific group was investigated by Haddock 
and Zanna (1998).  They observed (study 3) an effect of perceived value dissimilarity in 
attitudes toward homosexuals.  More specifically, persons with higher scores on 
authoritarianism perceived homosexuals as less similar and held more negative attitudes. 
Further analyses also showed that for high authoritarians the perceived value dissimilarity 
was strongly related with negative symbolic beliefs, and not significant for low 
authoritarians. 
Another relevant study investigated the perception of a specific group.  Although 
Greenhalgh and Watt (2015) did not examine the similarity-attraction effect, they 
investigated whether perceived differences in values, especially self-transcendence values, 
would lead to dehumanization of asylum seekers in Australia.  The study was conducted 
online, using scales to assess personal values (own values and estimation of values of asylum 
seekers), dehumanization, preference for consistency and attitudes toward asylum seekers.  It 
was observed that participants’ emphasis on conservation and self-enhancement values was 
associated with higher dehumanization and more negative attitudes toward asylum seekers, 
while stronger endorsement of self-transcendence values was negative correlated with these 
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variables. Perceiving differences (absolute difference between own values and asylum 
seekers’ values) between personal and outgroup self-enhancement and self-transcendence 
values predicted dehumanization, and perceived differences on self-transcendence also 
predicted negative attitudes toward asylum seekers.  Together, these results support the 
hypothesis that dehumanization of and attitudes toward asylum seekers are potentially 
influenced by perceptions of the similarity of the asylum seekers’ values to one’s own values, 
although causal arguments are weakened by the cross-sectional nature of this study. 
Greenhalgh and Watt also suggested that the role of value similarity may depend on 
the perceiver’s personality.  Specifically, they found a moderating role of preference for 
consistency (PFC; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995).  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
this personality trait reflects individuals’ desire to see themselves as stable, holding consistent 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviours, while appearing consistent to others and being motivated to 
perceive others as consistent.  The investigators found that low-PFC and lower perceived 
differences in conservation values predicted higher levels of dehumanization.  These 
unexpected results highlight the importance of considering personality variables as 
moderators of the effects of value similarity.  Although it is not clear why differences in 
conservation values were moderated by PFC, but other value differences were not, the 
findings indicate that value differences may not operate in the same way for everyone.  
It remains to be seen whether a similar moderating role occurs for attitudes toward 
individuals.  An investigation by Sortheix and Lönnqvist (2015) looked at the effect of value 
congruence in interpersonal relationships, while also illustrating an important potential 
consequence of this similarity.  These scientists examined value similarity, satisfaction from 
interpersonal relationships, and the well-being of university students from Argentina, 
Bulgaria and Finland.  Value similarity was computed as the correlation between a 
participant’s personal values and the average profile related by the other students from same 
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degree major and country.  The results yielded several interesting observations.  Particularly 
relevant here, the similarity-attraction effect was corroborated by an association between 
value similarity and satisfaction with interpersonal relationships, even though participants 
were not explicitly comparing their own values to a target, as in the classic paradigm.  In 
addition, value similarity was significantly associated with subjective well-being, and this 
relationship was statistically mediated by satisfaction with interpersonal relationships.  The 
authors therefore concluded that value similarity facilitates positive social relationships, 
leading to increase in well-being.  
 Perhaps the most relevant study for the present research was one that investigated the 
role of value similarity as a mediator of the relationship between similar music preference 
and attraction (Boer et al., 2011).  Participants were music fans of four different genres; they 
were first instructed to imagine meeting a person with certain music preference, which was 
manipulated to be similar or dissimilar to the participant’s own music preference.  Next, 
participants indicated the values that they believed the target person considered to be 
important (using 14-bipolar value instrument developed by Strack (2004) to assess 
Schwartz’s (1992) two value dimensions; self-transcendence versus self-enhancement and 
openness to change versus conservation values, on a 5-point Likert-type scale), the person’s 
likability, and willingness to get to know the person.  Finally, participants rated their own 
values and musical preferences.  Regardless of the participants’ musical preferences, similar 
music preferences increased favourability toward the other person, and this relation was 
statistically mediated by perceived value similarity.  In a second study, the authors replicated 
these findings while also finding that similarity in personality did not explain the effect of 
music preference on liking. 
In sum, the extant research provides interesting evidence that the perception of other 
people’s values has important implication for the formation of attitudes toward those people, 
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interactions with them, behavioural intentions, and well-being.  However, none of these 
studies aimed at directly testing the effect of value similarity on liking, as the main objective. 
The findings are cross-sectional, leaving causal interpretations equivocal.  Thus, this question 
remains an important topic for investigation.  
 To address this question, a number of issues must be considered.  Although the 
similarity-attraction effect is one of the most robust findings in social psychology, values 
similarity in a dyad may not be as straightforward as attitude or personality similarity.  Due to 
the connections between values and different motives, values are highly susceptible to the 
normative-desirability confound (NDC, Wood & Furr, 2016).  NDC refers to a spurious 
effect from having a normative psychological profile, that is, a mathematically average 
profile.  People tend to find all values important (Gouveia, 2013); that is, all values assessed 
in contemporary measures are desirable to some degree (Gouveia, Milfont, & Guerra, 2014).  
In addition, there is substantial similarity in which values are rated most and least important, 
even across nations: most participants consider benevolence and universalism to be the most 
important values, whereas power and conformity tend to be the least important (e.g., Bardi, 
Lee, Hofmann-Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009).  Thus, even values of relatively low importance 
may be similar between individuals.  
 Even if the values are dissimilar between people, this may not inevitably imply that 
they should dislike each other.  Consider a person who does not attribute great importance to 
benevolence, but knows someone who does.  This difference in values might cause lower 
favourability toward the relatively benevolent person or it might cause admiration for the 
person.  Because values are consensually important to some degree across people, differences 
in values may not cause as much tension as differences in other constructs where social 
desirability varies a great deal more.  Ironically, this would work against claims that value 
similarity is of special, unique importance in interpersonal relationships. 
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A related complication is that values are relatively abstract.  They can be construed in 
different ways that imply different actions (Maio, 2010).  For one person, protecting the 
environment may mean avoiding all airplane flights; for another person, protecting the 
environment may mean recycling plastic goods.  As a result, even if people disagree about a 
value’s importance, they might harbour suspicions that they are simply not agreeing on what 
the value means.  In contrast, the attitudes examined in past research are relatively specific 
and somewhat less open to differences in construal. 
 Yet another complication is that a value might be more desirable or attractive 
depending on specific situations.  For instance, if one is choosing a partner to work on a 
project, one might find a person who values power and achievement more beneficial in that 
situation (to the extent that these values foster harder work and success on the project).  As a 
result, that person may seem more likeable than someone who is lower in these values.  
However, if one is choosing a person for a long-term relationship or a friendship, this same 
person may be perceived as less attractive.  Such a person may seem unwilling to make 
personal sacrifices for a relationship, making him or her less than ideal as a long-term 
partner.  Furthermore, there may be individual differences in what we look for in the short-
term and long-term situations, depending on other variables such as gender, age, 
socioeconomic status, and personality. 
 Together, these issues illustrate why the examination of the effects of value similarity 
on interpersonal attitudes has basic, theoretical relevance, in addition to the practical 
importance discussed at the outset of this chapter.  These issues also foreshadow the 
possibility of examining the effects of value similarity in different ways.  For instance, we 
could apply the phantom-other design to values by presenting people with the values profile 
of a target whose values are similar or dissimilar and then recording attitudes toward this 
target person.  In addition, we could consider how people might use value similarities in real 
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life, by looking at how people infer values from another person’s traits, and then whether the 
degree of similarity between own values and the other person’s values predicts favourability 
to the person.  At the same time, we could manipulate the perceived traits to influence values 
in a systematic way.  These approaches foreshadow some of the choices I have made in this 
thesis.  As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, I have endeavoured to stretch the well-
established phantom-other paradigm to include values, while also constructing a new 
paradigm to look at the role of value similarity vis-à-vis traits.  
Chapter Summary 
One of the most robust findings in social psychology is the similarity-attraction effect. 
This effect has been revealed across a variety of populations and countries, using different 
manipulations of similarity (e.g., attitudes, personality, interests).  This chapter presented a 
review of the theory and evidence regarding this effect, while outlining the main 
contributions of two major models accounting for the effect: the reinforcement model and the 
information-processing model.  An interesting omission in this literature is a rigorous 
examination of the role of similarity in social values in facilitating attraction.  It may be the 
case that the role of value similarity is less potent than is frequently assumed, because of the 
social desirability of values (even when different from our own) and the variety of ways in 
which they may be construed.  The remainder of this thesis tackles this issue.  
  
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Effects of Actual Value Similarity on Liking 
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Chapter 2 Summary 
There has been abundant theory and conjecture suggesting that people like other 
individuals who share their own values more than they like individuals with dissimilar values, 
but there has been surprisingly little research testing this hypothesis.  The present research 
provides the first direct investigation of the effect of value similarity on liking by using the 
classic phantom-other paradigm.  In Study 1, after completing a measure of their values in a 
pre-test session, participants took part in a lab session that presented a target person’s 
responses to the same measure of values.  The target person’s value ratings were identical, 
82% similar, or 64% similar to the participant’s values.  Participants then completed 
measures of their perceptions of the target and attitudes to the target.  Results indicated that 
the target with identical values was liked more and rated as warmer than the target with 64% 
value similarity.  Moreover, perceptions of the target’s warmth mediated the effect of 
similarity on liking.  Using a within-subjects design that described targets who possessed 
identical values or 62% similar values, Study 2 obtained further support for the hypothesis 
that value similarity increases attraction.  Thus, results across both studies provide the first 
direct evidence that value similarity elicits positive interpersonal attitudes.  
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The literature described in the previous chapter demonstrated a robust effect of 
perceived similarity on liking.  Across many studies, participants liked targets who reported 
attitudes similar to their own more than targets with dissimilar attitudes (e.g. Byrne & 
Nelson, 1965, Byrne et al., 1986).  Byrne concluded that attitude similarity increases liking 
because it validates personal worldviews, providing a sense of being correct.  In theory, 
values are more central to the self-concept and personal worldviews than most attitudes 
(Rokeach, 1973).  This makes it important to verify that value similarity influences liking in 
the same manner as attitude similarity.  The present chapter aims to test the similarity-liking 
effect for values, and to test possible mediators of this effect.  
Past Evidence of the Similarity-Liking Effect 
The past research demonstrating the similarity-liking effect in attitudes used a simple 
but elegant experimental design known as the phantom-other paradigm (Byrne, 1961).  In the 
first part of the paradigm, participants provide self-ratings.  For example, participants may 
rate their attitudes or interests regarding a number of topics.  In the second part, participants 
are informed that they will see the self-ratings of another participant and that they will be 
asked about their impressions of this person.  Participants are then shown a booklet like the 
one they had completed in the first part of the study, but containing bogus answers 
manipulated by the experimenter.  These answers are manipulated in a way that makes the 
target seem either similar or dissimilar to the participant.  After examining these answers, 
participants complete a measure assessing their liking for the target.  The results of over 200 
such experiments have found that similarity increases liking for the target (Montoya & 
Horton, 2012, Montoya et al., 2008).  
While Byrne (1961, 1971) suggested that similarity increases liking because it 
validates personal worldviews, other researchers propose that the effect of similarity occurs 
due to the information that it provides about another person (Ajzen, 1974; Montoya & 
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Horton, 2004).  For instance, an important claim was made by Montoya and Horton (2014), 
who proposed that the similarity-liking effect is an underlying process of person perception 
and social judgement based on the estimation of two dimensions: capability and willingness. 
The first is related to the judgement of the target’s competence to facilitate (or thwart) 
perceiver’s goals, and the second covers the perception of target’s willingness to facilitate (or 
thwart) perceiver’s goals.  There is also important claim that the similarity does not have a 
direct effect on liking, it rather provides information that will be used to estimate liking 
(Ajzen, 1974; Montoya & Horton, 2004). 
Researchers supporting this latter perspective suggest that similarity provides positive 
information about a target, and this positive information leads to a favourable cognitive 
evaluation, and, consequently, to favourable attitudes.  As noted in the prior chapter Montoya 
and Horton (2004) tested this hypothesis by developing a measure of cognitive evaluation, 
which assessed mainly the target’s capacities (e.g., “My future interaction partner is probably 
good at everything that s/he does”).  Half of the participants answered this scale before 
providing rating of interpersonal attraction, and half of the participants rated cognitive 
evaluation after rating liking for the target.  Results indicated that similarity influenced 
interpersonal attraction only when cognitive evaluation was assessed before the evaluation of 
attraction, while similarity had no effect when the cognitive assessment happened after the 
assessment of attraction. 
This similarity-as-information perspective has been invoked to explain why some 
studies have observed weaker or non-existent effects of similarity in personality traits 
(Montoya et al., 2008), peripheral attitudes (Byrne et al., 1968), and in field studies (Montoya 
et al., 2008).  For example, similarity in traits is presumably a positive contributor to attitudes 
because it signals the potential to relate to another person, but it is less important than 
cognitive evaluation of the traits per se:  Being similar to another person in 
39 
 
conscientiousness, neuroticism, and other traits matters less than knowing that the other 
person is conscientious and not neurotic.  Together with Byrne’s cultural worldview 
argument, this perspective on similarity-as-information shows that there are open questions 
relevant to how similarity affects liking. 
The Similarity-Liking Effect and Values 
 It is ironic that value similarity is often touted as particularly crucial to interpersonal 
attraction, and yet the effect of similarity in values on liking has not been investigated.  As 
shown in Table 1, searches on Google Scholar using the terms “similarity effect” and “human 
values” yielded 26 results.  This indicates that the similarity-liking effect has neglected the 
importance of values to understand social interaction.  An examination of titles and abstracts 
showed that none of the studies investigated the similarity-liking effect directly or indirectly.  
Table 1. Results of the search on Google Scholar with the terms “similarity effect” and “human 
values” 
Reference Study information 
Allen et al. (2002) Similarity between humans and animals 
Bao, Dolan, & Tzafrir (2012) Literature review of value congruence between 
person and organization 
Billsberry (2004) Test of the proposition that organisations select 
people who share their values 
Bohns & Higgins (2011) Compatibility between partners for in preference for 
joint tasks 
Bull & Rumse (2012) Book about the social psychology of facial 
appearance 
Caprara, Vecchione & Barbaranelli 
(2011) 
Book chapter about personality and politics 
Dieterich (2015) Friendships in adolescence and school outcomes 
Douglas (2006) Gender identity and women’s response to adverts 
Eck & Waltman (2009) Similarity measures for data normalization 
Erdogan & Liden (2002) Book chapter about social exchanges in the 
workplace 
Feiereisen, Broderick, & Douglas 
(2009)  
Same as Douglas (2006) 
Hadjar et al. (2012) Parent and child value similarity and wellbeing in 
the context of immigration 
Hoekman, Frenken, & Tijssen, (2010) Bias a physical (geographical) distance in scientific 
collaboration 
Jepsen et al. (2009) Similarity between employee and supervisor in 
ethical dilemmas 
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Continuation Table 1  
Jepsen, Hine, & Cooksey (2009) Ethical attitudes and leadership relationships 
Lambert & Chasteen (1997) Attitudes towards elderly and blacks 
Lee & Jeong (2014) Online brand experience 
Maio et al. (2014) Value relatedness in argument persuasiveness 
Martini (1977) PhD dissertation about value congruence between 
patient and therapist 
Pfeffer (2013) Theories of power 
Potipiroon (2014) Social orientation and behaviour in the workplace 
Romanovsky, Gren, & Knysh (2015) Leadership and management 
Van de Bunt & Groenewegen (2007) Development of interorganizational collaboration 
networks 
Van Lange & Kuhlman (1994) Partner collaboration in social dilemma 
Zhang & Bloemer (2008) How value congruence affects consumer-brand 
relationship  
 
As stated in the introductory chapter, values are trans-situational goals that guide 
human actions (Schwartz, 1992).  They are abstract and desirable goals that people strive to 
attain.  Although different theoretical models have been suggested to explain the structure 
and content of values (Gouveia, 2003; Hofstede, 1984; Inglehart, 1977; Rokeach, 1973, 
Schwartz, 1992, Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012), Schwartz’s (1992) model has received most 
attention, and gathered most evidence for its suitability (e.g., Maio, 2010; Schwartz et al., 
2012).  In this model, values can be classified according to the goals they express.  Schwartz 
(1992) groups 56 values (e.g., freedom, helpfulness) into ten motivational types: power, 
achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, 
conformity, or security.  As shown in Figure 1, these values are organized in a motivational 
continuum forming a quasi-circumplex structure, such that values serving the same or 
congruent motives are adjacent in the circle and values serving conflicting motives are in 
opposing positions. 
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Figure 1. Structure of Schwartz's (1992) basic values 
How might value similarity influence liking?  Following Byrne’s (1971) theoretical 
perspective, value similarity may lead to positive reinforcement through affirmation of 
personal worldviews.  Alternatively, value similarity may provide important information that 
is considered for interpersonal judgement, through the cognitive evaluation mechanism 
described by Montoya and Horton (2004).  At the same time, there are a number of reasons 
why the effects of values may stronger or weaker than those seen for attitude and trait 
similarity.  On the one hand, values are relatively central to the self-concept, and for this 
reason are used in abundant research that seeks to manipulate whether people feel self-
affirmed, by asking them to write about values that are important to them (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006).  This centrality to the self may lead to stronger effects of value similarity on 
interpersonal attitudes.  On the other hand, all values are positively evaluated.  Whereas 
people might express directly opposing attitudes on contentious issues, they are very unlikely 
to oppose another person’s values.  People merely vary in degrees of value importance, rather 
than assuming opposing value positions.  This makes it difficult to elicit strong dissimilarity 
in values, which may undermine an impact of value similarity on interpersonal attitudes. 
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter, some personality factors are suggested to 
moderate the relationship between similarity liking.  Individual differences have been 
neglected in past research on the similarity-liking effect.  Yet, there may be some traits that 
shape the way similarity is perceived and transformed into an attitude, such as self-esteem, 
self-ideal discrepancy, preference for consistency, and self-monitoring.  The latter, for 
instance, is a concept proposed by Snyder (1974) to express a conscious effort to control and 
monitor self-presentation.  Self-monitoring can serve different goals, such as intensifying the 
expression of an emotional state in order to communicate it accurately, concealing an 
emotional state to appear unresponsive, or appearing to express an appropriate emotion when 
being nonresponsive is inappropriate.  Therefore, high self-monitors regulate their expressive 
self-presentation using situational cues to have a desired public appearance.  In contrast, low 
self-monitors lack the ability or the motivation to regulate their expressive self-presentation, 
and their behaviours are more likely to reflect their true attitudes, traits, and feelings.  As a 
result, low self-monitors’ interpersonal attitudes may be more influenced by self-other 
similarity in these internal attributes.  Consistent with this view, low self-monitors have been 
shown to be more attracted than high self-monitors to a person with similar attitudes, whereas 
high self-monitors were more attracted than low-self-monitors to a person with preferences 
for similar activities (Jamieson, Lydon, & Zanna, 1987).   
As noted above, no prior evidence has directly examined the role of value similarity in 
interpersonal attitudes or the role of putative moderators like self-monitoring.  However, 
some relevant research has examined the role of value similarity in attitudes toward other 
groups.  Specifically, in the 1960s, many studies revealed correlations between perceptions of 
value, belief, and attitude differences and prejudice (Byrne & Wong, 1962; Rokeach & 
Mezei, 1966; Rokeach & Rothman, 1965).  Subsequent research replicated these findings 
with different methods and measures of values (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; 
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Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996; Insko, Nacoste, & Moe, 1983; Struch & Schwartz, 
1989).  For instance, greater perceived dissimilarity to asylum seekers on self-transcendence 
and self-enhancement values predicts more prejudice toward them (Greenhalgh & Watt, 
2015).  Nevertheless, although the dominant trend across studies of intergroup value and 
attitude similarity suggests that similarity is associated with less prejudice, the belief that an 
outgroup is similar to one’s own group is not a guarantee that attitudes to the group will be 
positive.  The tendency for similarity to decrease liking may be higher among those who 
more strongly identify with their in-group (Roccas & Schwartz, 1993).  
The impact of value similarity in interpersonal attitudes is separable from the effects 
for intergroup attitudes.  One important reason (among many, such as identification, 
abstractness of groups, and relevance to the relationships) is that attitudes toward groups can 
be influenced by stereotypes, which may cause people to perceive differences in values that 
are larger or smaller than in reality.  Furthermore, these stereotypes can cause people to 
believe that particular values are relevant to perceptions of other groups (cf. Chambers, 
Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013).  For example, prejudice toward homosexuals is linked to a 
perceived threat to family values (Vescio & Biernat, 2003), and Whites’ prejudice toward 
Blacks is associated with beliefs that Blacks do not value hard work and self-discipline (Katz 
& Hass, 1988).  Particular values have been identified as relevant to prejudice against other 
groups as well, including Germans (Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 1990) and obese individuals 
(Crandall et al., 2001).  For interpersonal attitudes, an individual’s group membership may 
also play a role, but if this information is controlled (e.g., statistically or by experimental 
design), then attitudes have to be formed on another basis.  This makes it perilous to 
extrapolate from the evidence about intergroup to interpersonal attitudes. 
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The Present Study 
My review of the literature makes clear there are still underexplored questions about 
the role of value similarities in interpersonal attitudes, even though research on similarity-
liking effect has been gathering evidence for over 70 years.  The present research tested 
whether value similarity affects liking.  As secondary objectives, it also aimed at testing (a) 
Montoya and Horton’s (2004) mediation model, which postulates that similarity affects liking 
through a cognitive evaluation, and (b) whether the similarity-liking effect is affected by self-
monitoring.  In addition, for exploratory purposes, I tested whether perceptions of warmth 
and competence mediates the effects of value similarity on interpersonal attraction.  This 
latter aim was chosen because of conceptual overlap between the cognitive evaluations 
proposed by Montoya and Horton and judgments of target warmth and competence, 
mentioned in the introductory chapter.   
Thus, I anticipate that the effect of similarity on liking is not direct, assuming that 
similarity implies information about the target, which influences the attitudes towards this 
target.  In order to assess the content of this information, I assess it in terms of perceptions of 
warmth and competence, considering their relevance for the person perception literature.  I 
also anticipate that self-monitoring will moderate the similarity-liking effect. This variable 
was chosen to explore the effect of individual differences, although other moderators could 
have been chosen (e.g., preference for consistency; Snyder, 1974), I chose self-monitoring 
because the design is explicitly about impression formation.  Thus, participants could feel 
free to react to the information in whichever way suits their own self-monitoring style, 
without feeling that attention is being drawn to them. 
To perform these empirical tests, I adapted the well-established phantom-other 
paradigm.  This method’s high control over extraneous factors makes it an ideal departure 
point for testing whether value similarity is potentially important in interpersonal attitudes.  
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In the present research, the method consisted of first pre-testing participants on their own 
value priorities, then, in a second session, they were presented with the ostensible values 
scores of another student.  After studying the student’s values, participants responded to 
items assessing attitudes toward the target, the individual’s warmth and competence, their 
intrapersonal attraction to the target, cognitive evaluations of the target, and their own self-
monitoring.  Study 1 followed a between-subjects design, manipulating three levels of actual 
value similarity, whereas Study 2 followed a within-subjects design, manipulating two levels 
of similarity. 
Study 1 
To manipulate value similarity in Study 1, three levels of value similarity were 
employed: identical, 82% similar, and 64% similar.  This manipulation was designed to look 
at a plausible range of value similarity, wherein the targets were not shown blanket rejections 
of values in a way that would suggest complete alienation from societal values.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 138 psychology undergraduate students of a university in the UK, 
who participated for course credits. They were aged between 18 and 40 years (M = 18.8, SD 
= 1.89), and most were women (90%). The inclusion criterion for considering a participant 
for the analyses was based on the median of their value priorities, assessed in a pre-test 
session. Only participants with a median value of 5, 6, 7 or 8 on the 9-point (1 to 9) value 
scale were included, leaving a sample of 115 participants. This criterion is explained in detail 
in the procedure.  
Using g*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), a power analysis was 
conducted prior the experiment.  Assuming a medium effect size (.25) and power of .80, a 
sample of 160 participants was intended. However, I was unable to recruit this number of 
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participants prior to the end of the participant panel’s testing term.  The issue of statistical 
power is revisited in the description of the results.  
Design and Procedure 
 The experiment investigated the effect of three levels of value similarity on liking. 
Participants indicated their values priorities in the 56-item Schwartz Values Survey in a pre-
test session. In a second session, between six and eight weeks later, participants were 
presented with the ostensible values scores of another student, who had either an identical 
value profile (same value scores for the 56 items), a somewhat dissimilar value profile (10 
different items), or a moderately dissimilar value profile (20 different items). Therefore, 
value similarity was manipulated in three proportions: 100% identical, 82% identical, or 64% 
identical.  
Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition after completing 
the pre-test.  The phantom-other profile was created by the experimenter for a total of 198 
participants who took part in the pre-test.  The first stage of generating this profile entailed 
calculating the participant’s median value rating.  Next, the experimenter reversed particular 
value scores around the median, depending on the participant’s assigned condition. For 
example, if a participant had a median of 7 and was assigned to the 82% similar profile (i.e., 
10 items differing from the participant’s), five human values above and five human values 
below the median were reversed using the median as middle point (e.g., 8 became 6, 9 
became 5).  The values with scores immediately above and below the median were reversed 
first (a score of 8 or 6 in the example used), and the subsequent scores (9 or 5) would only be 
reversed if there were not enough scores immediately above or below the median. All 
reversals were applied symmetrically (i.e., equal number above and below the median), and 
human values were randomly selected when more were available for reversal than the 
condition specified (e.g., by choosing 10 reversals among 14 candidates for reversal).  This 
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procedure was only applicable for participants whose median was 5, 6, 7, or 8.  Some 
participants had higher or lower medians and were therefore assigned to the 100 % identical 
condition, for the purpose of not excluding them from the opportunity to take part (which was 
important for ethical purposes because of the award of course credit), but these participants 
were not considered in the analysis.  In this design, the final sample could potentially include 
176 participants for whom the 100%, 82%, or 64% profiles could be assigned at random.  
Each experimental session was carried out with one to ten participants at the same 
time. Participants were informed they would study another student’s values and form an 
impression about the student, who was ostensibly matched in age and gender, but studying in 
a different class. After being presented with the 56 values of the phantom-other, participants 
completed measures assessing general attitudes to the target, the target’s warmth and 
competence, cognitive evaluations of the target, and interpersonal attraction to the target, and 
self-monitoring, in this order. Participation took 10 minutes on average. 
Measures 
Manipulation check 
Participants rated how similar they were to the other person using a 9-point scale from 
-4 (Not similar at all) to +4 (Extremely similar).  This item provides a global estimate of 
perceived similarity. 
Values 
 Values were measured using the Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz, 
Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000).  This instrument lists 56 values with a short description beside 
each one (e.g., RESPECT FOR TRADITION. Preservation of time honoured customs).  Each 
value is rated in a 9-point scale from –1 (opposed to my principles) to 0 (not important) to 7 
(extremely important), according to the extent to which it is a guiding principle in the 
individual’s life.  For the purpose of our manipulation, these responses were recoded to 
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scores from 1 to 9 prior to using the medians for assignment to condition (and then recoded 
back again for the presented materials). 
Liking 
Attitudes toward the phantom-other were assessed with four items.  One item asked 
participants to indicate, “To what extent do you feel favourable towards this person?”, and 
responses were provided on a 9-point scale from -4 (Unfavourable) to +4 (Favourable).  
Three additional items were 9-point semantic differential items from -4 
(Dislike/Bad/Negative) to +4 (Like/Good/Positive).  Responses were averaged to form a total 
index of attitudes (α = .83).  
Warmth and competence 
Participants’ perceptions of the phantom-other’s warmth were recorded with three 
semantic-differential scales from -4 (Cold/Unfriendly/Insincere) to +4 
(Warm/Friendly/Sincere).  The same approach was used to assess competence, using scales 
from -4 (Incompetent/Incapable/Unintelligent) to +4 (Competent/Capable/Intelligent).  Both 
sets of scales exhibited high internal consistency (warmth α = .87; competence α = .93). 
Cognitive Evaluation Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was developed by Montoya and Horton (2004).  It contains seven 
items to assess a cognitive evaluation of the target person.  Examples are “My future 
interaction partner would probably be successful in life,” and “My future interaction partner 
is probably well-respected.” Minor modifications were made to all of the items in order to 
make the scale more congruent with the cover story.  Instead of “my future interaction 
partner,” we referred to the target as “this person.” Participants responded to each item using 
a 9-point scale from -4 (Strongly disagree) to +4 (Strongly agree).  One item was excluded, 
“My future interaction partner could help me accomplish my goals,” because it did not fit 
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with the cover story for the experiment.  The internal consistency of the scale was high (α = 
.85). 
Interpersonal Attraction Questionnaire 
 Attraction towards the phantom-other was evaluated using nine items adapted from 
Byrne and Wong’s (1962) Interpersonal Judgment Scale by Montoya and Horton (2004). 
Example items are “This person would probably not make a good friend to me” and “I think I 
would enjoy interacting with this person”.  Participants responded to the items using a 9-point 
scale from -4 (Strongly disagree) to +4 (Strongly agree).  The internal consistency of the 
scale was high (α = .92). 
Self-Monitoring Scale 
 The revised version of the Self-monitoring scale was used. This measure is composed 
of 18 items (e.g., “In different situations and with different people, I often act like very 
different persons.”) taken from the original scales (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).  Participants 
answered with either “False” or “True” (α = .54).  
Results 
Manipulation check 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test whether the manipulation was effective in 
differentiating the three levels of similarity to the self.  The results yielded a significant effect 
of similarity, F(2, 112) = 4.67, p = .011, ηp2 = .08.  However, Tukey post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that only the identical (M = 7.7, SD = 1.02) and 64% similar (M = 6.6, SD = 2.02) 
profiles elicited significantly different perceptions of similarity to the self.  Both profiles 
elicited ratings of similarity that were not statistically different from the 82% similar profile 
(M = 7.2, SD = 1.5).  Therefore, the subsequent analyses compare only the 100% identical 
and the 64% similar conditions. 
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Correlations between dependent measures 
 Table 2 displays the correlations between the measures assessing perceptions of the 
target other for the 100% identical (upper diagonal) and the 64% similar condition (lower 
diagonal).  For the identical condition, the highest correlation was found between attitudes 
and perceived similarity (r = .57), and the lowest correlation was between perceived 
competence and perceived similarity (r = .35).  Cognitive evaluation correlated only with 
competence. Self-monitoring was not significantly correlated with any of the variables. 
Regarding the 64% similar condition, most correlations were significant. The strongest 
correlation was between interpersonal attraction and perceived similarity (r = .81), and the 
weakest between cognitive evaluation and self-monitoring (r = -.32). Self-monitoring was 
only not correlated with interpersonal attraction and competence, there was also no 
significant correlation between warmth and competence.  
Table 2. Correlations between dependent measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1      -   .20    .17    .08 .35*      .13  -.02 
2 .61***     - .47** .47** .44**     -.09   .62 
3 .58*** .78***      - .48**    .35*     -.05 .57*** 
4   .44** .69*** .76*** - .47**       .01   .48** 
5 .58***   .53**   .35*    .26      -      .16   .34* 
6  -.32*  -.26 -.45* -.56***   -.21       -  -.13 
7 .45** .81***  .69***    .57*** .46** -.44**     - 
1 = Cognitive Evaluation, 2 = Interpersonal Attraction, 3 = Liking, 4 = Warmth, 5 = 
Competence, 6 = Self-monitoring, 7 = Manipulation check/perceived similarity 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Effect of actual similarity on liking 
 An independent samples t test revealed no significant difference between the 100% 
identical (M = 7.5, SD = 1.18) and the 64% similar condition (M = 7.3, SD = 1.13) in liking  
the target, t (71) = .57, p = .571. 
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Effect of actual similarity on warmth 
An independent samples t test found that the 100% identical target was rated as 
warmer (M = 7.3, SD = 1.26) than the 64% similar target (M = 6.6, SD = 1.39), t (71) = 2.10, 
p = .039.  
Effect of actual similarity on competence 
 A t test revealed no significant difference in perceptions of the target’s competence 
between the 100% identical (M = 7.5, SD = 1.40) and the 64% similar condition (M = 7.5, SD 
= 1.39), t (71) = .01, p = .990. 
Effect of actual similarity on interpersonal attraction 
A t test indicated that participants reported higher interpersonal attraction to the 100% 
identical target (M = 7.2, SD = .95) than to the 64% similar target (M = 6.3, SD = 1.54) in 
interpersonal attraction, t (62.165)1 = 3.10, p = .003.  
Effect of actual similarity on cognitive evaluation 
An independent samples t test revealed no significant difference between the 100% 
identical target (M = 7.1, SD = .70) and the 64% similar target (M = 6.9, SD = .94) in 
cognitive evaluation of the target, t (71) = .92, p = .360.   
Cognitive evaluation as a mediator of interpersonal attraction from similarity 
Because value similarity did not predict cognitive evaluation (above), I did not test 
whether cognitive evaluation mediated the effect of value similarity on interpersonal 
attraction, as suggested by Montoya and Horton (2004).  However, there were associations 
between perceived similarity (manipulation check) and cognitive evaluation and interpersonal 
attraction (above).  Consequently, I tested whether cognitive evaluation mediated the 
association between perceived similarity and interpersonal attraction, with the average of the 
interpersonal attraction items as the outcome variable.  The PROCESS procedure for SPSS 
                                                
1 Equal variances were not assumed. 
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(Hayes, 2013, model 4) was used.  The significance of the indirect path was determined using 
95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstrap resamples.  
Perceived similarity predicted cognitive evaluation (B = .17, SE = .05, p = .003).  
Both the direct (B = .57, SE = .06, p < .001) and indirect effect (B = .63, SE = .06, p < .001) 
on attraction via cognitive evaluation were significant, and cognitive evaluation significantly 
predicted interpersonal attraction (B = .36, SE = .12, p = .004).  Consequently, the indirect 
effect did not include zero, IC 95% [.01, .16].  This result supports Montoya and Horton’s 
(2004) prediction that perceived similarity produces a more positive cognitive evaluation, 
which, in turn, is associated with increased interpersonal attraction.  
Figure 2. Cognitive evaluation as mediator of perceived similarity and attraction 
Warmth and competence as mediators of interpersonal attraction from similarity 
For exploratory purposes, I considered whether perceptions of warmth mediated the 
effects of value similarity on interpersonal attraction.  This analysis considered manipulated 
value similarity as a dummy coded variable (0 = 64%, 1 = 100%).  Value similarity predicted 
warmth (B = .65, SE = .31, p = .039), and warmth significantly predicted interpersonal 
attraction (B = .59, SE = .09, p < .001).  The direct effect of similarity on personal attraction 
was significant (B = .54, SE = .25, p = .036), as was the indirect effect through warmth (B = 
.92, SE = .30, p = .003).  The indirect effect confidence interval did not include zero, IC 95% 
[.03, .88], indicating significant mediation.  Higher similarity predicted higher estimation of 
warmth, and warmth positively predicted interpersonal attraction.  Because the manipulation 
Cognitive	
Evaluation		
Perceived		
Similarity	
Interpersonal	
Attraction	
B = .63*** (SE = .06) 
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of value similarity did not influence perceived competence of the target (above), I did not test 
whether perceived competence mediated the effect of value similarity on interpersonal 
attraction. 
Finally, I considered whether the effect of perceived similarity on interpersonal 
attraction would be mediated by warmth and competence judgments.  Perceived similarity 
predicted warmth (B = .45, SE = .08, p < .001), and warmth significantly predicted 
interpersonal attraction (B = .25, SE = .08, p = .004).  Perceived similarity also predicted 
competence (B = .21, SE = .07, p = .005), but competence did not predict interpersonal 
attraction (B = .14, SE = .09, p = .103).  The direct effect of perceived similarity on 
interpersonal attraction was significant (B = .49, SE = .07, p < .001), as was the total effect (B 
= .63, SE = .06, p < .001) through warmth and competence.  Consequently, the confidence 
interval of the indirect effect through warmth did not include zero, IC 95% [.05, .23], but the 
interval of the indirect effect through competence included zero, IC 95% [-.01, .10]. In the 
same direction as actual value similarity, perceiving the target as more similar increased 
estimation of warmth and, consequently, led to higher interpersonal attraction.   
The role of self-monitoring on interpersonal evaluations 
 A moderated regression analysis was conducted to test the effect of self-monitoring 
on interpersonal evaluation.  In the first block, self-monitoring (mean-centred) was entered as 
a continuous predictor, and similarity condition was dummy coded, with 0 representing the 
64% similar condition, and 1 representing the identical condition.  In the second block, the 
cross-product self-monitoring X condition was entered to model the interaction. 
 Regarding the effects on liking, although neither the first, F(2, 70) = 2.49, p = .09, nor 
the second, Fchange(1, 69) = 3.10, p = .083, regression models were significant, there was an 
effect of self-monitoring (β = -.25, p = .035) in the first block, indicating that a higher score 
on self-monitoring produced lower levels of liking towards the target. 
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 Warmth was significantly predicted by self-monitoring (β = -.29, p = .011) and 
condition (β = .22, p = .049).  This effect was qualified by the interaction, β = .41, p = .008. 
As shown in Figure 3, high self-monitors estimated lower levels of warmth for the dissimilar 
target.  There was no difference between low and high-self-monitors for the identical target. 
 
 
Figure 3. Interaction between similarity and self-monitoring on warmth 
There was no effect of self-monitoring or interaction between self-monitoring and 
condition on the perception of target’s competence and interpersonal attraction.  Regarding 
cognitive evaluation, there was a significant interaction between self-monitoring and 
condition, β = -.34, p = .044.  Figure 4 shows the simple slopes for this interaction.  High 
self-monitors, but not low self-monitors formed a less positive cognitive evaluation of the 
dissimilar target. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Low Self-
monitoring
High Self-
monitoring
W
ar
m
th
64% 
Identical
100% 
Identical
55 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between similarity and self-monitoring on cognitive evaluation 
Discussion 
 Study 1 aimed at testing the similarity-liking effect by manipulating value similarity. 
Results of the manipulation check revealed that participants only differentiated two of the 
three levels of similarity.  Specifically, participants were only able to distinguish the most 
extreme levels, identical and 64% similar.  The intermediary level (82% similar) only had ten 
items different from the identical and the 64% similar profiles, and this amount was probably 
not sufficient to produce significant effects.  Byrne and Nelson (1965) argued that it is the 
proportion of similarity that produces the effects, regardless of the number of items.  In the 
present study, the intermediary proportion failed to produced differentiated levels of liking.  I 
therefore focused on the identical vs 64% comparison.  This comparison revealed no 
significant effect of value similarity on the attitude measure, but there was a significant effect 
on the intrapersonal attraction scale.  
Given this finding, I then pursued my secondary objective: to test Montoya and 
Horton’s (2004) prediction that the effect of similarity on interpersonal attraction is mediated 
by cognitive evaluation.  This model was not supported in the analysis that included 
manipulated value similarity as the predictor.  The mediation model was significant only 
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when perceived global self-other similarity was used as the predictor of cognitive evaluation 
and, in turn, attraction.  
 Finally, an additional contribution of this study was to provide evidence that 
individual differences should be considered when analysing the similarity-liking effect. 
Moderated regression analyses revealed an interaction between self-monitoring and value 
similarity in the prediction of attitudes target’s warmth and cognitive evaluation.  High self-
monitors expressed more negative liking, judgments of target warmth, and cognitive 
evaluation towards the non-identical target than did low self-monitors, but high and low self-
monitors did not differ in how they evaluate the identical target.  Overall, the effect of 
similarity was stronger for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors, which fits the 
pattern that Jamieson et al. (1987) found for similarities in activity preferences, but not their 
pattern for attitude preferences. 
 In sum, the support for an effect of value similarity on liking was modest.  The effect 
emerged in a reliable manner for the measure of interpersonal attraction, but not in the 
measure of liking.  In contrast, the influence on attitude was moderated by individual 
differences in self-monitoring.  At the same time, the influence on interpersonal attraction 
was mediated by cognitive evaluation only when perceived self-other similarity was used as 
the predictor. 
 This study also encountered a limitation regarding participants’ perception about the 
different levels of similarity and aims of the study.  In the debriefing, most participants 
mentioned that similarity was involved when asked what they thought the study was about. 
Fewer mentioned similarity and liking.  One participant said “is it about how much we like 
someone who looks like us?” Another commented “I thought I was reading my own values 
profile and you wanted to know how much we like ourselves.”  These comments represented 
the thoughts of most of the suspicious participants, and may have been reflected in the 
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manipulation check, where they only seemed to differentiate between two levels.  When 
using the experimental condition that the participants thought they were, instead of the group 
they were actually allocated, the results remain almost the same, only the 64% similar and the 
100% identical targets are significantly differentiated regarding warmth, interpersonal 
attraction, and cognitive evaluation.   
Given this supportive, but mixed, pattern of results, and the limitations encountered, it 
was prudent to replicate this design in another experiment.  The second experiment adopted a 
within-subjects design in order to increase power, and used a different cover story, which was 
potentially more credible. 
Study 2 
The feedback from participants in the debriefing within Study 1 indicated that, 
although the phantom-other paradigm provides high control over extraneous variables, its 
artificiality might attenuate the similarity-liking effect.  In Study 2, I intended to address this 
issue by using a modified version the cover story and a different value measure for 
participants and the phantom-other.  Specifically, the cover story introduced information that 
participants were able to check.  The values of the phantom-other were presented in a 
different values measure, but the level of similarity was kept similar to the two conditions 
that were effective in Study 1.  One profile was manipulated to be identical, and the other 
profile was 62% similar.  Both profiles were presented in a within-subjects design.  Self-
monitoring was retained in this design.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 19 psychology undergraduate students who participated either for 
course credit (n = 16) or for a £4 cash payment (n = 3). 12 participants were women and 7 
were men.  Their ages ranged from 18 to 21 (M = 18.8, SD = 1.37). 
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Experiment 1 found a medium-to-large effect size when comparing interpersonal 
attraction between the identical and 64% similarity conditions (Cohen’s d = 0.7).  Using 
g*power (Faul et al., 2007), the advisable sample size for this effect size in a within-subjects 
design is 15 participants, given the recommended power of .80.  
This experiment took part in the semester after Study 1.  The participants could only 
sign-up for the study if they had participated in the pre-test the prior autumn (which was the 
same one as in Study 1) and had not participated in the previous experiment.  There were 60 
participants who could have signed-up for this experiment.  I stopped the experiment at the 
end of the academic term, relying on those participants who had signed up to this point. 
Design and Procedure 
 Participants indicated their value priorities in the 56-item Schwartz Values Survey in 
the pre-test session, which occurred between 4 and 6 months earlier.  Participants came to the 
lab individually.  They were told that this study was part of a collaboration with another 
university, which aimed at investigating potential issues with exchange students’ adaptation 
to a new university and culture.  Participants were asked to search the internet about the 
partnership between the two universities, and become familiar with it.  They were given 
search terms that pointed them to the (real) exchange program.  This search helped to ensure 
the plausibility of the cover story.  After getting familiar with the partnership, participants 
were told that the aim was to look for characteristics that might help predict whether 
exchange students will fit into the Cardiff University environment and that the best way to 
address this issue is to look at how Cardiff students evaluate prospective students based on 
information they provide.  Participants were further told that, in this particular study, we were 
presenting information about the others students’ values.  Participants were then presented 
with an example profile of an exchange student, in order to get familiar with the format of the 
profiles and response scale that they would use.  They were not asked to pay attention to the 
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answers in the example, the experimenter explained the format of the response scale and how 
the answers should be interpreted.  Each participant then evaluated the profile of two 
ostensible exchange candidates from the other university: one profile was intended to be 
similar to participants’ own values, and the other profile was intended to be dissimilar to 
participants’ values.  The order of presentation of similar and dissimilar exchange candidate 
was counterbalanced between participants.  They were presented with one profile at the time. 
After studying the person’s values, participants completed the measures of general attitudes, 
warmth, competence, cognitive evaluation, and interpersonal attraction, in this order, and 
then repeated this sequence of tasks for the second student.  Participation took 10 minutes on 
average, and participants were then debriefed and probed for suspicion. 
 To create the profile of the phantom-others, I first computed the average scores of 
participants’ pre-test values on the SVS.  I then multiplied the score of each value type by 1.5 
in order to have the same scale range as the PVQ (Schwartz et al., 2001), which was used to 
generate the phantom-other values profile.  Therefore, the scores for the PVQ items were 
based on the participants’ scores on the SVS for the ten dimensions.  After transforming SVS 
scores in PVQ scores, the next step involved calculating the answers for each PVQ item. 
Unlike the SVS, the PVQ presents values as brief descriptions.  For example, self-direction is 
assessed using two items: “Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him.  He 
likes to do things in his own original way” and “It is important to him to make his 
own decisions about what he does. He likes to be free and not depend on others”.  The 
average of responses to both items represents the score for the value.  For the similar 
phantom-other, the initial score of the items for each value were identical (or as proximate as 
possible) to the computed score.  For the dissimilar phantom-other, I subtracted 1 or 2 from 
the scores of the items of the two most important values, and added 1 or 2 to the scores of the 
two least important values.  Therefore, the dissimilar target was different in four values, 
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giving less importance to two values that the participant considered important, and giving 
more importance to two values that the participant considered less important. 
Measures 
 The measures of liking, warmth, competence, cognitive evaluation (Montoya & 
Horton, 2004), interpersonal attraction (Montoya & Horton, 2004), and self-monitoring 
(Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) were the same as in Study 1.  Additional items were included as 
part of the cover story.  These items asked which student would (a) fit in better at the 
university, (b) make more friends, (c) have a better academic performance, (d) be more likely 
to be friends with the participant, and (e) be more similar to the participant.  The response 
options for these questions were “Student 1” or “Student 2”.  Internal consistency for the 
measures were acceptable to good in the assessment of liking (α = .82), warmth (α = .74), 
competence (α = .82), interpersonal attraction (α = .84), and cognitive evaluation (α = .83), 
but low for self-monitoring (α = .55). 
Results 
Manipulation check 
 A paired samples t test on the item assessing perceived similarity (“To what extent are 
you similar to this person?”) revealed that the similar student (M = 6.7, SD = 1.78) was 
perceived as significantly more similar than the dissimilar student (M = 5.3, SD = 2.09), t 
(17) = 2.16, p = .045. 
Correlation between dependent measures 
In Table 3, the upper diagonal refers to the correlations for the similar target, and the 
bottom diagonal refers to the correlations between the measures for the dissimilar target. 
Regarding the similar target, liking correlated positively with warmth, attraction, cognitive 
evaluation, and perceived similarity.  Warmth also correlated positively with attraction, 
cognitive evaluation, and perceived similarity; and attraction correlated positively with 
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cognitive evaluation, and perceived similarity.  The highest correlation was observed between 
attraction and perceived similarity, and attraction and warmth (r = .90), whilst the lowest 
correlation was between cognitive evaluation and attraction (r = .49).  Regarding the 
dissimilar target, all variables were positively correlated to each other, except for a non-
significant negative relationship between self-monitoring and attraction.  The highest 
correlation was observed between warmth and perceived similarity (r = .87), and the lowest 
correlation was between competence and attraction (r = .49). 
Table 3. Correlations between the dependent measures 
* p < .05, ** p < .10, *** p < .001 
Effect of actual similarity on liking 
 Means, standard deviations and t tests comparing the similar and dissimilar student 
regarding liking, warmth, competence, attraction, and cognitive evaluation are displayed in 
Table 4.  Although all the trends were in the predicted directions, results from paired-samples 
t tests indicated only a significant difference for competence: the similar student was 
perceived as more competent than the dissimilar student.  
Table 4. Means, SDs and t tests for similar and dissimilar student 
 Similar Dissimilar  
 M SD M SD t (df) 
Liking 6.9 1.17 6.4 1.49 1.33 (17) 
Warmth 6.6 1.06 6.4 1.49 .63 (17) 
Competence 7.6 .76 6.9 1.21 2.28 (17)* 
Attraction 6.6 1.18 5.9 1.32 1.73 (17) 
Cognitive evaluation 6.9 .85 6.4 1.28 1.76 (17) 
* p < .05 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Liking     - .73*   .39    .75*** .55* -.29   .73** 
2. Warmth .84*** -   .21   .90*** .53* -.17  .89*** 
3. Competence  .51* .53* -   -.03   .35  .02   .11 
4. Attraction .83***   .85**  .49* - .49* -.29   .90** 
5. Cognitive evaluation .73*** .75*** .84*** .70** - -.35   .63** 
6. Self-monitoring  .05   .02  .08  -.10   .24 - -.32 
7. Perceived similarity .77*** .87***  .36 .86*** .62** .01    - 
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 Considering the results from these analyses and the strong and significant correlations 
between variables, I decided to compute a new variable averaging the scores of all the 
measures into a single variable (α = .92), indicating general liking, and then repeated the t 
test.  Results of this analysis revealed that the similar target (M = 6.9, SD = .80) was liked 
more than the dissimilar target (M = 6.4, SD = 1.19), t (17) = 2.11, p = .050. 
Effect of self-monitoring 
 Considering the results of the previous experiment, which showed that self-
monitoring only had an effect for the dissimilar target, this effect was once again explored. 
However, due to the small sample size, I examined only the correlations between self-
monitoring and liking for each target, rather than performing a moderated regression analysis.  
Results revealed trends in the same direction as in the previous study, but neither the 
correlation between self-monitoring and liking for the similar target (r = -.29, p = .242), nor 
the correlation of self-monitoring and liking for the dissimilar target (r =.06, p = .802) were 
significant. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 aimed at replicating the findings from the previous study, while making three 
modifications to Study 1.  Specifically, Study 2 used a more credible cover story, a different 
measure of values, and a within-subjects design instead of a between-subjects design.  These 
modifications appear to have significantly reduced the issue of artificiality that arose in Study 
1: only three participants revealed a minor level of suspicion, and removing them from the 
analyses does not affect the results.  The results indicated that the manipulation of value 
similarity was also effective, because the similar and a dissimilar target were rated as 
significantly different in similarity to the self.  The effect of value similarity on liking for the 
targets was similar to Study 1.  That is, although there were no significant differences when 
the measures of liking were analysed separately, the measures exhibited high intercorrelations 
63 
 
and a global measure of liking based on all of the measures revealed replicated the similarity-
liking effect found in Study 1.  
Nonetheless, this approach meant that the measure of cognitive evaluation was 
intrinsic to the measure of liking, making it impossible to test the mediating role of cognitive 
evaluation.  Furthermore, the moderating role of self-monitoring was not replicated in this 
study, although the trends were in the same direction as in Study 1.  This issue is revisited in 
the Chapter Discussion.  
Chapter Discussion 
Using the classic phantom-other paradigm developed by Byrne (1961), two 
experiments tested the effects of value similarity on liking.  Although the effect of value 
similarity on liking was reliable only for some measures in each experiment, both studies 
found evidence for more liking of targets with similar values than of targets with dissimilar 
values.  Study 1 found a medium-to-large effect size (Cohen’s d = .70), which is congruent 
with the prior literature examining effects of other manipulations of similarity on other 
variables (Montoya et al. 2008).  In Study 2, value similarity exerted a medium-sized effect 
on the global measure of liking (Cohen’s d = .48).  Together, these effects are provocative 
evidence that the effect of similarity on liking can be obtained for attitudes based on values. 
 Another aim of the studies was to explore mediators of the relationship between value 
similarity and liking.  Of particular interest was the role of cognitive evaluation.  The 
information processing perspective on similarity effects suggests that similarity shapes 
attitudes through its effect on cognitive evaluations of a target (Ajzen, 1974; Kaplan & 
Anderson, 1973; Montoya and Horton, 2004).  Study 1 found support for this mechanism 
only in the analysis of effects of perceived global similarity and not for value similarity. 
Therefore, these results only partially corroborate the model proposed by Montoya and 
Horton (2004).  However, perceived similarity influenced the perception of target’s warmth 
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and competence, which, in turn, influenced the liking for this target.  This finding 
corroborates the perspective that these two dimensions are fundamental in interpersonal 
perception (Fiske et al., 2007). 
 Finally, some preliminary results regarding the influence of individual differences 
were found.  Self-monitoring exerted opposing effects for the similar and the dissimilar target 
in Study 1.  In this study, higher levels of self-monitoring were related to less liking for the 
similar target, but were positively related with liking for the dissimilar target.  These results 
are not in the same direction as those found by Jamieson et al. (1987), who found that low 
self-monitors expressed higher liking for the similar person than high self-monitors.  In my 
studies, the similar person was evaluated equally by low and high self-monitors.  Of course, 
the similar target expressed values identical to participants’ own values, so it may stand to 
reason that no differences were obtained in evaluations of this target.  Nonetheless, no firm 
conclusions can be drawn from the findings for self-monitoring until future research 
replicates this pattern, which was not the primary focus of the present studies. 
It is possible to rule out the hypothesis that results were produced by participants’ 
idiosyncrasies in scale use.  Study 2 followed a within-subjects design, which is generally 
more powerful and provides control of individual differences in answering the scales.  This 
study replicated the main findings of Study 1, providing evidence that different proportions of 
similarity affected liking, and not participants’ idiosyncratic use of the response scale.  Study 
2 also demonstrated that it is possible to manipulate actual similarity using different items or 
measures for the same construct.  This is probably a good strategy for future studies seeking 
to avoid suspicion. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although the desired sample sizes for the two experiments were based on a power-
analysis, participant availability was a constraint, and the observed power did not always 
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exceed the recommended .80.  On the one hand, Study 1 found a medium to large effect size 
for interpersonal attraction (Cohen’s d = .70), which resulted in an observed power of .84. 
However, the effect size for attitudes was small (Cohen’s d = .17), and the observed power 
for this effect was only .11.  Study 2 found a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = .48), but fell 
shortly on observed power, achieving only .61.  The observed power dropped even more for 
the individual variables.  For instance, the effect size for attitudes was d = .31, but the 
observed power was .22, and the effect size for interpersonal attraction was d = .41, and the 
observed power of .35.  Clearly, further studies need to be conducted with larger sample 
sizes. 
 The results from Study 1 showed a different mechanism between perceived global 
similarity and liking than between value similarity and liking.  Specifically, it was found that 
perceiving someone as similar to oneself leads to a more positive cognitive evaluation of this 
person, which in turn, positively influences attitudes to the individual.  Cognitive evaluation 
did not mediate the effect of value similarity on attitudes, but the evidence for perceived 
global similarity provides partial support for the model proposed by Montoya and Horton 
(2004).  This difference is interesting in light of evidence that the effects of manipulated 
similarity on liking are robust in no-interaction and short-interaction studies, whilst the effect 
of perceived similarity is strong for no-interaction, short-interaction, and studies considering 
existing relationships (Montoya et al., 2008).  It could be the case that cognitive evaluation 
matters more for the latter scenarios than for the former scenarios.  Nevertheless, there is a 
need for more research contrasting the effects of perceived similarity with effects of 
manipulated value similarity, across a range of relationships (e.g., no interaction, short-term, 
long-term).  
The biggest limitation of previous studies using the phantom-other paradigm is that 
the bogus answers are usually produced by the experimenter.  Therefore, the studies are not 
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double-blind.  In contrast, the first experiment presented here was double-blind, participants 
were assigned to the conditions before participating in the second session, and the 
experimenter had no knowledge of the condition to which they were assigned.  Therefore, it 
is not possible to rule out that stronger results from previous experiments were produced by 
the experimenter’s expectations.  It is important that any future testing of this paradigm adopt 
a double-blind procedure. 
Another important issue for future studies is to produce less artificial ways of 
manipulating value similarity.  As previously mentioned, manipulating value similarity can 
be difficult, because some value profiles might not seem plausible or credible.  To some 
extent, everyone shares similar values; thus, it is harder to produce large differences in value 
similarity in a plausible range – a range that might also be sufficiently large to shape 
interpersonal attitudes.  In the next chapter, I consider one important option for addressing 
this issue.  To foreshadow, this possibility entails using personality descriptors to express 
values.  People use adjectives on a daily basis to described themselves, and it is possible that 
impressions about one’s values can be formed based on such self-descriptions. 
Conclusions 
 Notwithstanding the need for further research, the present studies produced initial 
evidence of the importance of values for interpersonal evaluations.  Although most of the 
literature has focused on a direct influence of similarity in variables other than values, the 
present experiments show that effects of value similarity can be discerned.  The next chapter 
takes this issue a step further, searching for evidence of the role of value similarity using a 
more natural design.  
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Chapter 3 
The Role of Inferred Similarity of Self-Enhancement and  
Self-Transcendence Values on Liking 
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Chapter 3 Summary 
Values are putatively an important factor in relationships, but values are not directly 
observable: people must somehow infer values from other information, such as traits and 
attitudes.  For example, singles on dating sites often describe themselves using trait terms 
(e.g., creative, fun-loving).  Two experiments examined the effects of value-laden personality 
descriptors on interpersonal attitudes, testing whether the effects on liking relate to 
perceptions of the targets’ warmth and competence.  The experiments gave female 
participants a brief description of a male target, manipulating the presence or absence of traits 
representing self-transcendence values (having time for others, generous) and traits 
representing self-enhancement values (hardworking, competitive). Results indicated that the 
presence of the value-affirming traits increased liking for the target and perceived similarity 
to the target.  Furthermore, perceptions of the target’s warmth mediated the effect of the self-
transcendence manipulation on liking, and perceptions of the target’s competence mediated 
the effect of the self-enhancement manipulation on liking.  Overall, these findings support 
previously untested assumptions about the importance of values for interpersonal attitudes, 
while showing that this effect is partly mediated by perceptions of congruent traits. 
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 “Hello gents – thanks for stopping by. I’m a creative, fun-loving, energetic and active 
gal whose favourite words – in any language – are, ‘Please proceed to your gate for 
departure’. (…)” (eHarmony Dating Advice Site, 2014). 
 
“I am a conscientious person who works hard and pays attention to detail. I'm flexible, 
quick to pick up new skills and eager to learn from others. I also have lots of ideas and 
enthusiasm”. (Three excellent cover letter examples, 2014) 
 
We often seek to describe ourselves in ways that will make people like us.  This is 
important when we are trying to put ourselves forward for dating, as in the upper example of 
a profile featured in the dating website eHarmony.  It is also important when we are trying to 
put ourselves forward for a job, as in the lower example of text from application cover letters 
featured in the Guardian newspaper.  In diverse contexts, we want a few words to give a big 
and positive impression.  How can we safely make a positive impression?  
One approach is to emphasise attributes that we (likely) share with the people who we 
want to like us.  Over 70 years of research has shown that we like those who appear similar to 
us (e.g., Ajzen, 1976; Byrne, 1971), particularly in first encounters (Montoya et al., 2008). 
Such similarity could be perceived and made up of many aspects, such as interests, opinions, 
attitudes, personality, and values.  As described in Chapter 1, value similarity is often held up 
as being particularly important, but there is a lack of research on its effects.  In this chapter, I 
propose that brief trait descriptions can convey information about common human values.  In 
fact, the use of traits to convey information about values may be an efficient strategy because 
people do not dispute the importance of these values (Maio & Olson, 1998).  By emphasising 
traits that convey values, people make it likely that they are demonstrating a characteristic 
that is shared with the person they wish to impress (i.e., a common value). 
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This approach takes a slightly different direction than the research described in 
Chapter 2.  Its two studies provided evidence that value similarity increases attraction, but the 
studies used the artificial, phantom-other paradigm, which provides direct information about 
values.  In real life, people usually have to infer values from other information, such as 
personality descriptors.  People commonly use trait adjectives to impress others, as when they 
are trying to find a good match in a dating website or to win a job from a prospective 
employer.  The present chapter aims to describe a test of whether inferred values from such 
descriptions increase liking, and whether this effect is mediated by perceptions of target 
warmth and competence.  
Interpersonal Perception 
Theory and research on social cognition have demonstrated two universal dimensions 
that people use in social perception at individual and group level.  This model has been called 
the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007).  The primary 
dimension is often defined as warmth, capturing the other person’s intentions, friendliness, 
trustworthiness, and helpfulness.  The secondary dimension is referred to as competence, 
including perceptions of the other person’s ability, intelligence, efficacy, and skill.  Thus, 
warmth would be an indication of the other person’s intentions for good or ill, and 
competence would be this person’s capability for acting as such.  For this reason, warmth 
judgments have a primacy over competence ones, and they are dominant in affective and 
behavioural reactions (Fiske et al., 2007).  
The different levels of an individual’s or group’s warmth and competence can be 
shown in a four-quadrant structure:  high warmth and high competence, low warmth and high 
competence, high warmth and low competence, and low warmth and low competence.  For 
instance, past research examining stereotypes has found that people perceive middle class 
people to be high in warmth and competence, homeless people to be low in warmth and 
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competence, rich people to be low in warmth but high in competence, and the elderly or 
disabled to be high in warmth but low in competence.  The SCM has been replicated across 
the 20th and 21st century, and accounts for 82% of the variance in perceptions of everyday 
social behaviours (Wojciszke et al., 1998).  In this research, I test whether the perception of 
value similarity influences judgements of warmth and competence, which might in turn affect 
liking for the target. 
Social Values, Traits and Goals 
 As mentioned in Chapter 1, social values are guiding principles for a person or a 
group.  They serve to express needs and goals, varying in importance and transcending 
situations (Gouveia, 2013, Schwartz et al., 2012).  People not only have knowledge about 
their own values, they are also fairly accurate in inferring the values of an acquaintance 
(Dobell et al., 2014).   
Chapter 1 noted that manipulating value similarity can be challenging for two reasons. 
First, according to Gouveia (2013), people tend to attach similar levels of importance to all 
values.  In other words, value hierarchies across individuals can be somewhat similar, and 
any manipulation that asserts a high difference may lack mundane validity.  Second, it could 
be the case that even high value dissimilarity is not easily detectable, because all values tend 
to be desirable or ideal (Gouveia, Milfont, & Guerra, 2014).  Thus, notwithstanding the 
results from Chapter 2, it is difficult to manipulate value similarity in a way that is powerful 
while maintaining mundane validity. 
One possible strategy to overcome this difficulty is to use traits to express values.  
Traits and values are both conceptually related to motivational goals (Parks & Guay, 2009), 
which are relatively specific objectives that people seek in particular contexts (e.g., to be 
healthy, to work hard).  Traits and goals are related in the sense that traits are serve and guide 
goals.  McCabe and Fleeson (2016) demonstrated that the goals that people pursue can 
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explain approximately half of the variance in extraversion and conscientiousness traits, as 
rated by the person or by observers.  Similarly, there are strong conceptual and empirical 
links between motives, goals, and values, such that values help people chose the goals that 
will guide their actions (Grouzet et al., 2005).  Therefore, it is plausible that we can 
manipulate value similarity using traits that describe people’s actions. 
Personality can be defined as enduring dispositions that lead to patterns of interaction 
with the environment (Goldberg, 1993).  It is commonly represented by traits, which are 
“dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thoughts, 
feelings and actions” (McCrae & Costa, 1990, p. 23).  Values, however, are cognitive 
representation of needs, of desirable and abstract goals (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).  In 
a simpler distinction between the two concepts, the traits represent “who we are”, and values 
represent “what is important to us”.  Sometimes the same term can be used to represent either 
a trait or a value.  For instance, a person described as competent is expected to exhibit 
competent actions with certain frequency.  Nevertheless, this person might not necessarily 
value competence. Competence as a value means that the person values the demonstration of 
competence, but it does not mean that this person has the ability to be competent.  
But how does the common link to goals help us to identify which traits express which 
values?  Extant data do not help, because research has focused on broad trait dimensions.  
That is, past research examining relations between values and traits has found theoretically 
consistent but moderate relations between measures of values and scores on the dimensions 
in the Five Factor Model of Personality (e.g., Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2014).  
Unfortunately, none of the associations point to associations that are sufficiently strong to 
expect consistent interpretations of a trait as expressing a value dimension (i.e., rs < .39).  
However, a focus on more specific traits may be more fruitful.  Stronger, more 
consistent connections between traits and values may be evident if we focus on relatively 
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specific traits that more directly express values.  For instance, because hard work promotes 
self-enhancement motives, a person described as hard worker may be perceived as pursuing 
self-enhancement values.  In a similar way, because generosity promotes self-transcendence 
motivation, someone described as generous is probably perceived as pursuing self-
transcendence values.  It may be the case that relatively specific trait descriptions lead to 
more reliable inferences about values. 
Of importance, such descriptions might also lead to inferences about warmth and 
competence.  For instance, hard work conveys competence, and generosity conveys warmth.  
It could therefore be the case that the descriptions lead to inferences about values and 
inferences about these personality dimensions.  The potential links between values and the 
warmth and competence dimensions were raised by a recent model of values (Trapnell & 
Paulhus, 2012).  Specifically, Trapnell and Paulhus (2012) outline agency and communion as 
two superordinate dimensions that serve to explain human values, motives, traits, and 
behaviour.  Agency is related to competence, reflecting the motives of “getting ahead”, whilst 
communion is related to warmth and expresses motives of “getting along”.  The researchers 
demonstrated that these two dimensions emerged in four data sets with different measures of 
values.  They also developed a specific measure of values for their model, defining agency 
and communion as orthogonal dimensions in the measure.  Given the potential effects of 
specific traits on the warmth and competence dimensions and on perceptions of values, an 
interesting question for the present research was whether the effects of specific traits (e.g., 
hardworking) on liking are mediated by perceptions of the related values or perceptions of the 
related trait dimensions or both. 
Despite the existence of Trapnell and Paulhus’s (2012) alternative measure of values 
and a number of other alternative measures (e.g., Gouveia, 1998; Rokeach, 1967), the 
research in this thesis focuses on the values measured by Schwartz’s (1992) model.  As 
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described in Chapter 1, this model merits inclusion because of the evidence for cross-cultural 
replicability across more than 80 nations, with a variety of support from cross-sectional, 
longitudinal and experimental paradigms (Maio, 2010).  Focusing on this model, an 
interesting issue is whether the effects of the specific traits on liking are different between the 
higher-order values assessed in the model.  This is an interesting issue because the potential 
links between self-transcendence values and self-enhancement values, on the one hand, and 
warmth and competence traits, on the other hand, may be more direct than the potential links 
between the traits and openness and conservation values.  Because openness values involve 
following emotional and intellectual pursuits in uncertain directions, these values may or may 
not entail more warmth toward others or more competence.  Similarly, because conservation 
values involve protecting the status quo, these values may or may not entail more warmth and 
competence.  In fact, this issue is one additional reason why the present research utilises 
Schwartz’s (1992) model of values instead of Trapnell and Paulhus’s (2012) model of 
warmth and competence values.  The warmth and competence values conceptually and 
empirically resemble opposite ends of the dimension from self-transcendence values to self-
enhancement values (see Trapnell and Paulhus, 2012), whereas the dimension from openness 
to conservation values is more unique.  This arguably makes Schwartz’s model a broader 
conceptualization, with some values relating to warmth and competence while others do not.  
Consequently, it is possible for experimental designs to target specific personality traits that 
connect directly to one of the four Schwartz higher-order domains.  This methodology 
enables distinct tests of the magnitude of the effects relevant to each of the higher-order 
domains, while testing whether the effects for each higher-order domain differ in mechanism 
(e.g., with a role for perceptions of warmth for some domains but not others). 
The final issue I considered was the role of the situational context.  Montoya and 
Horton’s (2014) model indicates that a person’s interpersonal goals might depend on the 
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situation.  If one aims at finding a romantic partner, finding someone who is warm may be 
more important than finding someone who is competent.  The warm person might prioritize 
values such as family security and mature love over values like independence and pleasure, 
and this balance would help make the relationship work.  In contrast, if one has to choose a 
leader or a partner to work in a project, it may be most important to find a person who is 
highly competent.  The competent person might value success and power more than values 
like helpfulness and equality, but the person would help get the job done. In this manner, the 
context in which a person learns about another individual’s values may make a difference to 
how those values are used as a basis for the interpersonal attitude.  If the values match the 
situational context, then they may elicit more liking than if the values mismatch the 
situational context.   
This hypothetical role of context calls for an ordinal interaction between perceived 
values and context on attitudes, such that there is a positive effect of the target’s values on 
liking in all contexts, but it is greater role when there is a situational match.  Such ordinal 
interactions are more difficult to detect than disordinal (crossover) interactions, because they 
are conceptually half of the effect size as cross-over interactions.  My priority in this thesis 
was the demonstration of the direct effects of value similarity on liking, and therefore the 
studies described below were powered sufficiently to detect these effects.  The situational 
context hypothesis was nonetheless included as an exploratory issue.  
The Present Research 
 The present research included two experiments.  In each experiment, participants first 
reported their own values.  Participants then read a description of a fictional target containing 
two personality attributes, with each attribute relevant to a different target value.  The text 
described a low or high level of each trait.  As a result, each description subsumed one of four 
value profiles (high value A and value B, high value A and low value B, low value A and 
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high value B, low value A and value B).  Each attribute represented one of the four higher-
order value domains from Schwartz (1992) model.  Studies 3 and 4 focused on the self-
transcendence and self-enhancement domains. 
After reading the descriptions, participants were asked to indicate how much they 
liked the target and their perception of target’s warmth and competence.  Furthermore, for the 
exploratory test of an effect of context matching, I manipulated participants’ goals for the 
imagined interaction with the fictional character by asking them to imagine that this 
interaction would occur in different contexts (e.g., dating or working).  Finally, I asked 
participants to estimate the target’s value profile, which enabled the calculation of indices of 
participants’ inferred similarity to the target on the values.  
This design enabled me to test for influences of the trait descriptions on the inferred 
values, perceived similarity to the target’s values, and liking for the target.  I expected that 
descriptions defining a high level of a trait supporting a particular value would elicit higher 
perceptions of that value and of congruent traits (i.e., warmth or competence), more 
perceived similarity to the target’s values (especially those linked to the trait), and more 
liking.  My design treated the perceptions of the target’s traits and values both as putative 
mediators of the effects of the manipulation and liking.2  
Study 3 
Study 3 was my first experiment aimed at testing the effects of specific personality 
attributes on the perception of a target’s values and attitudes toward the target.  The 
descriptions included traits expressing high self-transcendence and high self-enhancement, 
high self-transcendence and low self-enhancement, low self-transcendence and high self-
enhancement, and low self-transcendence and low self-enhancement.  I expected that 
                                                
2 According to Tate (2015), conceptual timing of the variables is critical and superior to statistical analyses 
alone (Fiedler et al., 2011). That is, regardless of measurement timing, the mediator must be conceptually 
posterior to the predictor variable. In the present research, the exposure to a target (predictor), should influence 
judgement/perception of this target’s warmth/competence and values (mediators), finally influencing liking 
(outcome variable). 
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participants who were presented with descriptions expressing a high level of self-
transcendence (e.g., has a lot of time for others) would estimate higher self-transcendence 
values for the target than participants who were presented with descriptions expressing a low 
level of self-enhancement (e.g., does not have time for others).  Similarly, I expected that 
participants who were presented with descriptions expressing a high level of self-
enhancement (i.e., hardworking) would estimate higher self-enhancement values for the 
target than when the descriptions expressed a low level of self-enhancement (i.e., not very 
hardworking).  I also expected that perceptions of the target’s warmth would be influenced in 
the same directions as perceptions of the target’s self-transcendence values and that 
perceptions of the target’s competence would be influenced in the same directions as 
perceptions of the target’s self-enhancement values.  An open question was whether the trait 
warmth would mediate the relationship between a self-transcendence attribute and liking, and 
whether trait competence would mediate the relationship between a self-enhancement and 
liking.  
Regardless, I expected that perceived value similarity would increase liking.  That is, 
not only would the target’s estimated values predict liking, but similarity between the 
participants’ values and their estimates of the target’s values should also predict liking.  I 
expected this role to be more pronounced for similarity in those values that are linked to the 
manipulated attribute (e.g., self-transcendence values for the target who has time for others).  
Nonetheless, it was also plausible that broader inferences of value similarity would play a 
role, in addition to a potential impact of global subjective feelings of similarity to the target.  
These roles might emerge particularly if people make global inferences about the target’s 
whole value profile and personality based on the values that were manipulated.  Thus, for 
completeness, I examined the roles of these variables as well. 
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Method 
Participants   
Previous research on similarity-liking reliably reveals large effect sizes (Cohen’s d > 
0.8), especially in manipulating attitudes similarity with no interactions between the 
participant and target (Montoya et al., 2008).  Considering that I instead used personality 
traits to manipulate values similarity, I estimated only a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 
0.5).  Using g*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), and given the recommended 
power of .80, a sample of 158 participants would be advised.  Therefore, I established that 
data collection would finish when reaching 158 participants or after being advertised for the 
four-week time limit in the university notice board. 
Participants were 143 female staff and students recruited through the electronic 
noticeboard of a UK University for a prize draw.  Their ages ranged between 18 and 60 years 
(M = 27, SD = 9.62).  Most were single (76%) or in a civil union/married (13%). One 
participant was excluded from the analysis due to their failure to follow instructions. 
Design and Procedure  
The experiment followed a 2 (Time for Others: high vs. low) X 2 (Hardworking: high 
vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) design.  The dependent variable was liking for the 
target, which was assessed as a general attitude and as liking specific for each context (i.e., 
potential enjoyment working with or dating the target; see below).  Perceptions of the target’s 
warmth and competence were also assessed as potential mediators between the independent 
variables and liking.   
Participants took part online.  After consenting to participate, participants indicated 
their age and marital status.  They then completed the values measure.  Next, they were 
presented with the target description appropriate to their randomly assigned experimental 
condition.  After one minute, the next webpage loaded and liking for the target was assessed. 
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On subsequent screens, participants rated his warmth and competence, his values, and their 
degree of similarity to him.  These screens were followed by a screen asking them to describe 
things that he likes to do and his interactions with friends and family.  The final screen 
debriefed participants and thanked them for their participation.  On average, participants took 
ten minutes to complete the study. 
Experimental Manipulations 
Two of the manipulated factors were related to the target’s attributes: he was 
described either as finding time for other people or not finding time for other people or as 
hardworking or not very hardworking.  Each participant read a sentence describing one of the 
four possible combinations of the attributes, as described below.  
Jamie is a very hard worker, and finds a lot of time to dedicate to other people. 
Jamie is not a very hard worker, and finds a lot of time to dedicate to other people. 
Jamie is a very hard worker, and he doesn’t find a lot of time to dedicate to other 
people. 
Jamie is not a very hard worker, and he doesn’t find a lot of time to dedicate to other 
people. 
The final factor was a manipulation of the context in which participants were asked to 
imagine an interaction with the target.  Participants were asked to imagine either going on a 
date with Jamie or working on a project with him. 
Measures 
Personal values 
The study employed the 21-item Portrait Values Questionnaire used in the European 
Social Survey.  This measure was developed to tap the ten values types proposed by Schwartz 
(2003; Schwartz et al., 2001).  The aim was to provide a concrete measure of values, suitable 
for use in younger samples and low educational levels (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, 
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Burgess, & Harris, 2001).  Each item describes a person in terms of goals, aspirations or 
wishes regarding a single value (Schwartz, 2007).  Participants responded using a scale from 
1 (“not like me at all”) to 6 (“very much like me”).  Responses were averaged across the 
items for each of the ten value types, and the averages were centred around each individual’s 
mean rating following the recommendations of Schwartz (2005).  Reliability of the ten value 
dimensions in the present study were low but in accordance with prior findings (e.g., Bardi et 
al., 2014, Schwartz, 2005): αPower = .56, αAchievement = .78, αHedonism = .65, αStimulation = .79, αSelf-
direction = .03, αUniversalism = .41, αBenevolence = .72, αTradition = .44, αConformity = .72, αSecurity = .63; 
and the higher order dimensions: αSelf-enhancement = .75, αSelf-transcendence = .61, αOpenness = .65, 
αConservation = .63.  The reliability for the higher-order domains (calculated in the same manner 
as for the lower-order domains) was higher: αSelf-enhancement = .73, αSelf-transcendence = .61, αOpenness 
=.65, αConservation= .72.  The higher-order domains were also congruent with the theoretical 
aims of this research.  Therefore, my analyses focused on the higher-order domains. 
The target’s values 
Participants estimated the character’s values using a modified version of PVQ-21.  
Instead of asking how much the person in each item is like the respondent, this adaptation 
asked how much the person resembled the target person in the manipulation, Jamie.  The 
response scale labels therefore replaced the word “me” with “Jamie”.  The reliability of the 
target value measures for Jamie’s values varied from low to high: αPower = .55, αAchievement = 
.92, αHedonism = .72, αStimulation = .81, αSelf-direction = .44, αUniversalism = .87, αBenevolence = .92, 
αTradition = .45, αConformity = .87, αSecurity = .74; and the higher order dimensions: αSelf-enhancement = 
.86, αSelf-transcendence = .93, αOpenness = .68, αConservation = .73.  The reliability for the higher-order 
domains (calculated in the same manner as for the lower-order domains) was again higher: 
αSelf-enhancement = .86, αSelf-transcendence = .68, αOpenness =.93, αConservation= .77.  As noted above, the 
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higher-order domains were also congruent with the theoretical aims of this research.  
Therefore, my analyses focused on the higher-order domains. 
Value similarity 
The self-ratings of values and the ratings of Jamie’s values were used to form three 
indices of value similarity.  I calculated each index using the Fisher transformation of the 
correlations between participants’ values and the target’s estimated values.  This calculation 
was performed for the higher order dimensions of self-transcendence and self-enhancement, 
and for the whole values set. 
Liking 
Liking for Jamie were assessed with an individual item, “To what extent do you feel 
favourable towards Jamie?”, from -3 (Unfavourable) to +3 (Favourable), and three 7-point 
semantic differential items from -3 (Dislike/Bad/Negative) to +3 (Like/Good/Positive).  
Responses were averaged to form a total index of liking toward Jamie (α = .90). Two 
additional items also asked participants to rate the extent they would enjoy going on a date 
with Jamie and the extent to which they would enjoy working with him, from 1 (Not at all) to 
7 (Very much).  The order of presentation of these items was determined by the context 
condition: if the participant was asked to imagine going on a date with Jamie, the first 
question asked whether she would enjoy going on a date with him, and if the participant was 
asked to imagine working with Jamie, the first question asked whether she would like 
working with him. 
Warmth and competence 
Perception of the target’s warmth was evaluated with three semantic-differential 
items.  Participants responded to each item using a scale from -3 (cold/unfriendly/insincere) 
to +3 (warm/friendly/sincere).  The same approach was used to assess the target’s 
competence, using a scale from -3 (incompetent/incapable/unintelligent) to +3 
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(competent/capable/intelligent).  Good internal consistency was evident for both the warmth 
(α=.87) and competence (α=.93) scales. 
Overall similarity 
 Finally, participants rated the extent to which they were similar to the target using a 
scale from 0 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). 
Results 
Effects on Values 
 The importance of the target’s estimated values was analysed in a 2 (Time for others: 
high vs. low) X 2 (Hardworking: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA for each of the four higher-order value domains (self-transcendence, 
self-enhancement, openness, and conservation).  
Regarding the target’s estimated self-enhancement values, there were significant main 
effects of time for others, F(1, 141) = 114.58, p < .01, ηp2 = .46, hardworking, F(1, 141) = 
87.98, p < .01, ηp2 = .40, and context, F(1, 141) = 5.32, p < .023, ηp2 = .04. There were no 
significant interactions. Participants estimated higher self-enhancement values when the 
target was described as not finding time for others (M = .66, SD = .09) compared to finding 
time for others (M = -.74, SD = .10), when described as hardworking (M = .57, SD = .09) than 
when he was described as not very hardworking (M = -.66, SD = .09), and in the context of 
dating (M = .11, SD = .09) rather than of working (M = -.19, SD = .09). 
Whilst for target’s estimated self-transcendence values, there was a significant main 
effect of each attribute.  Specifically, when the character was described as finding time for 
others (M = 1.23, SD = .08) he was perceived as possessing higher self-transcendence values 
than when he was described as not finding time for others (M = -.98, SD = .08), F(1, 141) = 
421.04, p < .01, ηp2 = .76.  When he was described as hardworking, he was perceived as 
possessing lower self-transcendence values (M = .02, SD = .08) than when he was described 
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as not hardworking (M = .24 SD = .08), F(1, 141) = 4.46, p = .037, ηp2 = .03.  There was no 
significant effect of context or significant interactions. 
For comparison, I also tested the effects on the other value dimensions: openness and 
conservation. For the target’s estimated openness values, there was a significant main effect 
of the attributes time for others, F(1, 141) = 14.04, p < .01, ηp2 = .10), and hardworking, F(1, 
141) = 116.86, p < .01, ηp2 = .47. When the target was described as finding time for others (M 
= -.24, SD = .08) compared to when he was described as not finding time for others (M = .18, 
SD = .08), and when he was described as hardworking (M = -.65, SD = .08) he was perceived 
as possessing lower openness values than when he was described as not very hardworking (M 
= .59, SD = .08). 
Finally, there was a significant main effect of time for others, F(1, 141) = 14.80, p < 
.01, ηp2 = .10, and of hardworking, F(1, 141) = 34.37, p < .01, ηp2 = .20, on the target’s 
estimated conservation values. When the target was described as not finding time for others 
(M = .16, SD = .07) he was perceived as possessing higher conservation values than when he 
was described as finding time for others (M = -.22, SD = .07), and when he was described as 
hardworking (M = .26, SD = .07) compared to when he was described as not very 
hardworking (M = -.32, SD = .07). 
Therefore, although the two attributes intended to manipulate self-enhancement and 
self-transcendence values, participants also inferred openness and conservation values in a 
systematic manner.  Their inferences exhibited parallel changes in self-transcendence and 
openness values, which were in the opposite direction to changes in self-enhancement and 
conservation values.  
Effects on Liking 
A 2 (Time for others: high vs. low) X 2 (Hardworking: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: 
dating vs. working) between-participants ANOVA was conducted on the three measures of 
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liking for the target (general, working, dating)3.  General liking was affected by both 
attributes: finding time for others, F(1, 134) = 103.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, and hardworking, 
F(1, 134) = 59.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .31.  There was a significant three-way interaction between 
finding time for others, hardworking, and context, F(1, 134) = 6.43, p = .012, ηp2 = .05.  As 
shown in Figure 5, finding time for others (vs. not finding time) significantly increased liking 
in the dating context.  Moreover, when the target was described as not finding time for others, 
he was liked significantly more when he was also described as hardworking.  In the working 
context, finding time for others (vs. not finding time) also significantly increased liking when 
the target was described as hardworking compared to when he was described as not very 
hardworking.  The interaction appears to be carried by a larger impact of finding time for 
others when the target is not hardworking in the dating context than in the working context.  
Strikingly, however, the effects of both attributes are very consistent across both contexts. 
 
Figure 5. Three-way interaction on liking (general attitudes) 
When liking was assessed as potential enjoyment working with the target, there was a 
significant main effect of finding time for others, F(1, 134) = 14.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, of 
hardworking, F(1, 134) = 216.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .62, and a significant two-way interaction 
between hardworking and context, F(1, 134) = 22.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Specifically, when 
the target was described as hardworking (opposed to not very hardworking), there was no 
                                                
3 Considering that relationship status could also affect liking, another ANOVA was carried out adding it as 
fourth factor. Two 2-way interactions were found, as reported in the supplementary material.  
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difference in potential enjoyment working between both contexts.  In contrast, when he was 
described as not being very hardworking, higher potential enjoyment working was estimated 
in the working context. 
Regarding the potential enjoyment of going on a date with the target, there was a main 
effect of time for others, F(1, 134) = 57.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .30, and hardworking, F(1, 134) = 
20.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .13.  Higher potential enjoyment of going on a date was estimated for 
the target described as finding time for others (M = 4.3, SD = 1.70), compared to when he 
was described as not finding time for others (M = 2.4, SD = 1.37), and for the hardworking 
target (M = 4.0, SD = 1.87) than the not very hardworking target (M = 2.9, SD = 1.57). 
 
Figure 6. Two-way interaction on potential enjoyment working 
Effects on Value Similarity 
The importance of the target’s estimated values was analysed in a 2 (Time for others: 
high vs. low) X 2 (Hardworking: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA for perceived value similarity.  Results indicated only a main effect of 
time for others, F(1, 134) = 53.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .29.  When the target was described as 
finding time for others (M = .34, SD = .38), he was perceived with more similar values than 
when he was described as not finding time for others (M = -.10, SD = .29).  
Effects on Warmth and Competence 
Finally, the target’s estimated warmth and competence were analysed in a 2 (Time for 
others: high vs. low) X 2 (Hardworking: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) 
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between-participants ANOVA.  The target’s warmth was only affected by finding time for 
others, F(1, 141) = 88.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .40.  The target described as finding time for others 
(M = 5.5, SD = .14) was perceived as warmer than the target described as not finding time for 
others (M = 3.6, SD = .15).  The target’s competence was affected by the attribute 
hardworking, F(1, 141) = 143.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .52), with a two-way interaction between 
hardworking and having time for others, F (1, 141) = 7.55, p = .017, ηp2 = .05.  When the 
target was described as hardworking (M = 5.8, SD = .12) he was perceived as more 
competent than when he was described as not very hardworking (M = 3.7, SD = .13).  Not 
finding time for other people accentuated target’s competence when he was also described as 
hardworking, as seen in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Effects of hardworking and having time on competence 
 
Effects on Overall Similarity 
The importance of the target’s estimated values was analysed in a 2 (Time for others: 
high vs. low) X 2 (Hardworking: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA for perceived value similarity.  Results indicated a main effect of time 
for others, F(1, 134) = 52.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, and of hardworking, F(1, 134) = 58.21, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .30. The attribute finding time for others (M = 3.4, SD = 1.11) elicited higher 
perception of similarity than the attribute not finding time for others (M = 2.2, SD = 1.08). In 
the same direction, hardworking (M = 3.4, SD = 1.14) also led to higher similarity than not 
hardworking (M = 2.3, SD = 1.03). 
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Mediation Analyses 
Results of the above analyses showed that the target description significantly affected 
his estimated values, likability, warmth and competence.  Similar effects were observed 
across the different measures of liking (attitudes, potential enjoyment working, and potential 
enjoyment dating).  This pattern made it interesting and feasible to test whether the effects of 
the target descriptions were mediated by perceptions of values and traits.  Considering these 
results, a series of mediation analyses were conducted.  For simplification, context was not 
included in the analysis, because the effects of both attributes were in the same direction in 
each context.  Furthermore, only general attitudes were considered as outcome variable (as 
the other liking measures were exploratory and context dependent).  
The PROCESS procedure for SPSS (Hayes, 2013, model 4) was used for all the 
mediation analyses.  First, I tested the effect of the attributes (not hardworking vs. 
hardworking, and not finding time vs. finding time for others) on liking with two mediators 
(M1 = estimated target’s values or value similarity, and M2 = competence or warmth), as 
shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9.  Liking was the outcome variable in all analyses, assessed by 
the general attitudes.  The significance of the two indirect paths was determined using 95% 
bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstrap resamples. 
Target’s values as mediators of the relationship between attributes and liking 
 This group of preliminary mediation analyses aimed at testing the indirect effect of 
the manipulated attributes on liking, through the target’s estimated values, warmth, and 
competence.  Separate analyses were conducted for each attribute.  The attributes were 
dummy coded, with 0 for not hardworking vs 1 for hardworking, and 0 for not finding time 
for other people vs 1 for finding time.  The two main predicted models are shown in Figure 8, 
all results are shown in Table 5, and the main findings are detailed below. 
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Figure 8. Mediation models with estimated values 
The first mediation tested the indirect effect of being hardworking on liking through 
the target’s estimated self-enhancement values and competence.  Table 5 shows that being 
hardworking predicted the two mediators, and both mediators significantly predicted liking. 
Both the direct and total paths of hardworking on liking were significant.  The confidence 
intervals of the indirect effect through self-enhancement and through competence did not 
include zero, indicating significant mediation.  Specifically, when the target was presented as 
hardworking, he was perceived as possessing higher self-enhancement values and as more 
competent.  The target’s self-enhancement was associated with a decrease in liking, whilst 
competence was associated with an increase in liking. 
The second mediation tested the indirect effect of finding time for others on liking 
through the target’s estimated self-transcendence values and warmth.  Finding time for other 
people significantly explained target’s self-transcendence values and warmth.  The target’s 
self-transcendence values did not predict liking, whereas warmth did.  The direct effect of 
finding time for others on liking was not significant, but the indirect effect, when including 
the mediators, was significant.  Congruently, the confidence interval of the indirect effect of 
target’s self-transcendence values included zero, but the confidence interval of warmth did 
not.  These results indicate that, when the target was described as finding time for other 
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people, he was perceived as endorsing self-transcendence values and as warmer.  Both 
mediators were positively associated with liking, but only warmth significantly mediated the 
relationship between the target’s time for others and liking. 
Value similarity as a mediator between attributes and liking 
 I expected a significant indirect effect of being hardworking on liking through 
similarity in self-enhancement, and of finding time for others on liking through similarity in 
self-transcendence.  
As shown in Table 5, being hardworking predicted similarity in self-enhancement 
values, and had significant direct and indirect effects on liking.  Similarity in self-
enhancement also predicted liking.  The confidence interval with 5000 bootstrapping of the 
indirect effect of hardworking through similarity in self-enhancement did not include zero, 
indicating a significant mediation.  Thus, when the character was described as hardworking, 
he was perceived as more similar to the self and, consequently, liked more. 
 
Figure 9. Mediation models with similarity 
Contrary to my prediction, but consistent with the results for the target’s estimated 
values, the meditation analysis of the indirect effect of finding time on liking through 
similarity in self-transcendence values was not significant.  Finding time for others did not 
predict similarity in self-transcendence values, although it directly and indirectly predicted 
liking. Similarity in self-transcendence values did not predict liking.  Consequently, the 
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bootstrapping confidence intervals of the indirect effect included zero, and there was no 
mediation. 
Finally, I tested whether overall value similarity (correlation) and overall similarity 
(single-item) mediated the relationship between the target’s attributes (hardworking and 
finding time for other people) and liking.  Being hardworking did not predict overall value 
similarity.  However, overall value similarity predicted liking.  The direct and the indirect 
effects of being hardworking on liking were significant.  However, the confidence interval of 
the indirect effect included zero and the mediation was not significant. 
Finding time for other people significantly predicted overall value similarity. 
Although both the direct and the indirect effects of finding time for other people on liking 
were significant, overall value similarity did not explain liking.  Hence, the confidence 
interval of the indirect effect included zero, and the mediation was not significant. 
Participants were also asked in a single item how similar they were to the target.  This 
variable was entered as mediator of the relationship between target’s attributes and liking. 
Being hardworking significantly predicted similarity, and similarity predicted positive 
attitudes.  The direct and the indirect effect of being hardworking on attitudes were 
significant, and the bootstrapping of the indirect effect through similarity was significant. 
Thus, when the character was described as being hardworking he was perceived as more 
similar and, consequently, more positive.  
Similarly, finding time for others positively predicted similarity, and similarity 
predicted attitudes.  The direct and the indirect effect of finding time for others on attitudes 
were significant, and the confidence interval did not include zero.  Similarity significantly 
mediated the relationship between finding time for other people and attitudes, when the target 
was described as having time he was perceived as more similar and the attitudes toward him 
were more positive. 
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Table 5. Models of the indirect effect of the attributes on liking through target’s estimated values, and through value similarity 
Y X M1 M2 
B (SE) 
X on M1  
B (SE) 
X on M2 
B (SE) 
M1 on Y 
B (SE)  
M2 on Y 
B (SE) 
Direct effect 
X on Y 
B (SE) Total 
effect X on Y 
95% IC 
M11 
95%IC 
M21 
L HW SEe C 1.19 (.18)*** 2.06 (.18)*** -.67 (.07)*** .44 (.07)*** 1.12 (.24)*** 1.24 (.21)*** [-1.13, -.51] [.51, 1.33] 
L HT STe W 2.20 (.11)*** 1.86 (.20)***  .13 (.13) .49 (.07)*** .50 (.34) 1.64 (.19)*** [-.34, .96] [.43, 1.55] 
L HW SEc - .74 (.13)*** - .41 (.13)** - .94 (.23)*** 1.24 (.21)*** [.12, .55] - 
L HT STc - .21 (.12) - .06 (.13) - 1.63 (.19)*** 1.64 (.19)*** [-.04, .10] - 
L HW Vsim - .01 (.07) - 1.36 (.24)*** - 1.22 (.19)*** 1.24 (.21)*** [-.18, .20] - 
L HT Vsim - .47 (.06)*** - .29 (.29) - 1.51 (.24)*** 1.64 (.19)*** [-.18, .41] - 
L HW Sim - 1.19 (.18)*** - .57 (.09)*** - .56 (.21)** 1.24 (.21)*** [.42, 1.01] - 
L HT Sim - 1.15 (.18)*** - .47 (.08)*** - 1.10 (.19)*** 1.64 (.19)*** [.32, .84] - 
L = Liking W = Warmth, C = Competence, STe = Target’s estimated Self-transcendence values, SEe = Target’s estimated Self-enhancement values, STc = correlation between ST scores, SEc = correlation between SE 
scores, Vsim = correlation between all values, Sim = single-item similarity. 
1 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect with 5000 bootstrapping. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Discussion 
 Study 3 found that personality descriptors influenced liking.  As expected, targets 
whom were described as being more hardworking or as finding more time for others were 
liked more than targets whom were described as being lower on these attributes.  Both traits 
promote values that people tend to consider important guiding principles in their lives, 
including self-enhancement and self-transcendence values in particular.   Indeed, the 
descriptors led to predictable patterns of inferences about a person’s social values.  The target 
described as hardworking was considered to possess more self-enhancement values than the 
not very hardworking target, and higher self-transcendence values were estimated when the 
target was described as having time for others compared to not having time for others.  
Unexpectedly, there were also effects on openness and conservation values: higher openness 
values were estimated when the target was described as not hardworking, and as not having 
time for others; higher conservation values were estimated when the target was described as 
hardworking, and finding time for others.  This impact on a broad set of values may explain 
why participants also inferred higher value similarity when the target was described as being 
more hardworking or as having more time for others.  Not only did the pattern of effects for 
both value dimensions showed the reciprocal relations between self-transcendence and self-
enhancement values as predicted by Schwartz (1992), the enhancement of self-transcendence 
values and of openness values is consistent with the most common prioritization of values in 
nations around the world (Bardi et al., 2009).  Thus, the value shifts may have made the 
target seem more similar to the participants’ values as a set.  
At the same time, the target descriptions led to specific impressions of the target in 
terms of warmth and competence.  The target was considered warmer when described as 
finding time for other people, and perceived as more competent when described as 
hardworking.  Given these effects on top of the effects on perceptions of the target’s values 
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and value similarity, it is not surprising that the descriptions caused participants to see more 
similarity overall.  
Given this plethora of effects of the descriptions, an interesting question was whether 
the effects of the target descriptions on liking were mediated by perceptions of values, traits, 
value similarity, and/or overall similarity.  Mediational analyses of the perceptions of values 
alongside the perceived traits revealed that the hardworking target was perceived as 
endorsing more self-enhancement values, and this perception decreased liking for the target.  
Thus, there was good support for a mediating role of self-enhancement values (in the effect of 
information about the target’s work ethic), but no support for a mediating role of self-
transcendence values. 
The results of the analysis of similarity of the target to the self were mixed.  Although 
similarity in self-enhancement values mediated the relationship between the information 
describing the target as hardworking and liking the target, similarity in self-transcendence 
values did not mediate the relationship between the information describing the target as 
having time for others and liking.  When value similarity was considered as an overall index 
(correlation), it only mediated the relationship between having time for others and liking, but 
not between being hardworking and liking.  Both mediations were significant when overall 
self-target similarity was assessed through the single-item rating measure.  Therefore, the 
overall perception of similarity had stronger mediating role than specific similarity (value 
dimensions or value overall score).  
Of interest, there was little impact of asking the participants to imagine meeting the 
target either on a date or at work, although there was an interaction indicating that, in the 
dating context, the target was liked more when he had time for others, regardless of being 
hardworking or not.  Despite this interaction, the direction and magnitude of effects for the 
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attributes was remarkably similar across both contexts.  For this reason, the role of context 
was not examined in the mediational analyses described above. 
Study 4 
 This experiment aimed at replicating the effects of the previous experiment using 
different personality attributes for the target.  The experiment followed the same design and 
procedure of Study 3.  The only modification was a change in the attributes from having time 
for others to generosity (generous vs. not very generous) and from hardworking to 
competitiveness (very competitive vs. not very competitive).  These new traits were intended 
to elicit self-transcendence and self-enhancement values, as in Study 3.  The change in traits 
was therefore intended to help test the conceptual replicability of the effects in Study 3.   
The analyses also followed the same procedure.  After establishing the effects of the 
attributes and the context manipulation on general liking and all of the putative mediators 
(values, value similarity, overall similarity), a series of mediation analyses were conducted, 
using a multiple mediator model to test two pathways, one through either perception of 
warmth or perception of competence, and the other through either target’s estimated values or 
value similarity.  
Method 
Participants 
 To reach a medium effect size as was revealed in Study 3, I required 158 participants 
within four weeks of advertisement in the university notice board.  Exactly this number took 
part in return for a prize draw. However, 37 participants were excluded for not following the 
instructions, leaving a final sample of 121 participants.  Their ages ranged between 18 and 66 
years (M = 28, SD = 10.96), most were single (75%) or in a civil union/married (12%).  
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Design and materials 
 The same design and measures as in Study 3 were used.  The experiment followed a 2 
(Generous: high vs. low) X 2 (Competitive: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) 
design.   Each participant read one of the eight possible combinations between the attribute 
and value factors. 
Jamie is generous, and is very competitive. 
Jamie is not very generous, and is very competitive. 
Jamie is generous, and is not very competitive. 
Jamie is not very generous, and is not very competitive. 
Jamie is very competitive, and is generous. 
 Jamie is not very competitive, and is generous. 
Jamie is competitive, and is not generous. 
Jamie is not very competitive, and is not generous. 
As in Study 3, the internal consistency scores for the measures were lower for the 
participants’ value types in the PVQ-21 (Schwartz et al., 2001) (αPower = .37, αAchievement = .71, 
αHedonism = .66, αStimulation = .74, αSelf-direction = .47, αUniversalism = .41, αBenevolence = .57, αTradition = 
.48, αConformity = .73, αSecurity = .32) than for the participants’ higher-order value domains (αSelf-
enhancement = .68, αSelf-transcendence = .75, αOpenness = .61, αConservation = .71).  Reliability was also 
lower for the ratings of the target’s 10 value types (αPower = .72, αAchievement = .93, αHedonism = 
.71, αStimulation = .81, αSelf-direction = .67, αUniversalism = .85, αBenevolence = .88, αTradition = .48, 
αConformity = .59, αSecurity = .55) than for the target’s higher-order value domains (αSelf-enhancement 
= .91, αSelf-transcendence = .87, αOpenness = .91, αConservation = .73).  Along with my a priori focus on 
the higher-order values, this difference in reliability again justified the focus on the higher 
value domains.  Internal consistency was high for the measures of liking (α = .94), warmth (α 
= .90), and competence (α = .90). 
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Results 
Effects on Values 
 The importance of the target’s estimated values (self-transcendence, self-
enhancement, openness and conservation) was analysed in a 2 (Generous: high vs. low) X 2 
(Competitive: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants ANOVA.  
 Regarding the target’s estimated self-transcendence values, there were significant 
main effects of both attributes: generous, F(1, 113) = 194.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .63, and 
competitive, F(1, 113) = 80.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .42.  The target was perceived as endorsing 
more self-transcendence values when he was described as generous (M = .63, SD = .86) than 
when he was described as not very generous (M = -1.03, SD = .83), and when he was 
described as not very competitive (M = .36, SD = 1.08), compared to when he was described 
as competitive (M = -.72, SD = 1.04).  
For the target’s estimated self-enhancement values, there was a significant main effect 
of the attribute generous, F(1, 113) = 57.77, p < .001, ηp2 = .34, and of the attribute 
competitive, F(1, 113) = 248.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .69.  The target was perceived as endorsing 
self-enhancement values more strongly when he was described as not being very generous (M 
= .93, SD = 1.22) than generous (M = -.07, SD = 1.25).  He was also seen as endorsing these 
values more strongly when he was described as being competitive (M = 1.4, SD = .67), in 
comparison to being described as not very competitive (M = -.63, SD = 1.03), 
For target’s estimated openness values, there were main effects of the attribute 
generous, F(1, 113) = 10.97, p = .001, ηp2 = .09, and of the attribute competitive, F(1, 113) = 
79.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .41).  The target described as not very generous (M = .25, SD = .82) 
and competitive (M = .55, SD = .67) was perceived as possessing more openness values than 
the target described as generous (M = -.13, SD = .78) and not very competitive (M = -.47, SD 
= .61. 
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Finally, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of generous, F(1, 113) = 6.5, p 
= .012, ηp2 = .05, and of competitive, F(1, 113) = 193.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .63, on the target’s 
estimated conservation values. Higher conservation values were estimated when the target 
was described as not generous (M = -.03, SD = .91) and not competitive (M = .60, SD = .54), 
and lower conservation values were estimated when the target was described as generous (M 
= -.28, SD = .92) and competitive (M = -.84, SD = .61). 
Effects on Liking 
Liking for the target (general, working, dating) was analysed in a 2 (Generous: high 
vs. low) X 2 (Competitive: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA.   
 General liking was affected by the attribute generous, F(1, 113) = 252.59, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .69, by the attribute competitive, F(1, 113) = 6.46, p = .012, ηp2 = .05, and by context, 
F(1, 113) = 7.40, p = .008, ηp2 = .06.  The target was liked more when he was described as 
generous (M = 5.8, SD = .88) than when he was described as not generous (M = 3.4, SD = 
.86), when he was described as not competitive (M = 4.8, SD = 1.47) than when he was 
described as competitive (M = 4.4, SD = 1.47), and in the working context (M = 4.8, SD = 
1.53) than in the dating context (M = 4.4, SD = 1.42). 
Potential enjoyment of working was affected by the attribute generous, F(1, 113) = 
126.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .53, and by context, F(1, 113) = 4.58, p = .034, ηp2 = .04.  Higher 
potential enjoyment working was estimated when the target was described as generous (M = 
5.2, SD = 1.22) than when he was described as not generous (M = 2.8, SD = 1.25), and in the 
working context (M = 4.2, SD = 1.75) than in the dating context (M = 3.8, SD = 1.71). 
 Finally, potential enjoyment dating with the target was affected by the attribute 
generous, F(1, 113) = 159.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .59.  Higher potential enjoyment dating the 
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target was estimated when he was described as generous (M = 4.9, SD = 1.41) than when he 
was described as not generous (M = 2.1, SD = 1.00). 
Effects on Value Similarity 
The importance of the target’s estimated values was analysed in 2 (Generous: high vs. 
low) X 2 (Competitive: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants 
ANOVA for perceived value similarity.  Results indicated main effects of the attributes: 
generous, F(1, 113) = 45.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, and competitive, F(1, 113) = 4.91, p = .029, 
ηp2 = .04.  These effects were qualified by a two-way interaction between these two 
attributes, F(1, 113) = 16.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .12.  As shown in Figure 10, and tested through 
simple comparisons, the target described as generous and not competitive was perceived with 
more similar values than the target described as generous and competitive, F(1, 58) = 22.23, 
p < .001.  In contrast, when the target described as not generous, there was no significant 
difference in perceived value similarity whether he was also described as competitive or not 
competitive, F(1, 59) = 1.47, p = .230.   
 
Figure 10. Interaction between competitive and generous on value similarity 
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Effects on Warmth and Competence 
Finally, target’s estimated warmth and competence were analysed in a 2 (Generous: 
high vs. low) X 2 (Competitive: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA.   
 Target’s warmth was affected by the attribute generous, F(1, 120) = 188.15, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .63, and by the attribute competitive, F(1, 120) = 15.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .12.  The target 
was perceived as warmer when he was described as generous (M = 5.6, SD = .12) compared 
to when he was described as not very generous (M = 3.3, SD = .12), and as not very 
competitive (M = 4.8, SD = .12) than when he was described as competitive (M = 4.1, SD = 
.12).  There was also a significant two-way interaction between these two variables, F(1, 120) 
= 4.60, p = .034, ηp2 = .04.  As shown in Figure 11, when the target was described as not very 
generous, the differences between competitive and not competitive were smaller than when 
he was described as generous.  However, the figure shows that the main effects are large in 
comparison to this attenuation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Interaction of competitive and generous on warmth 
The target’s estimated competence was significantly affected by the attributes 
generous, F(1, 120) = 45. 38, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, and competitive, F(1, 120) = 23.59, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .17.  Participants estimated higher target competence following the attribute 
generous (M = 5.5, SD = .12) than not generous (M = 4.4, SD = .12), and competitive (M = 
5.4, SD = .12) than not competitive (M = 4.6, SD = .12). 
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Effects on Overall Similarity 
The importance of the target’s estimated values was analysed in a 2 (Generous: high 
vs. low) X 2 (Competitive: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA for perceived value similarity.  Results indicated only a main effect of 
generous, F(1, 113) = 106.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, and a significant two-way interaction 
between generous and context, F(1, 113) = 7.91, p = .006, ηp2 = .07.  As shown in Figure 12, 
the target described as generous was perceived as equally similar in both contexts, F(1, 58) = 
3.16, p = .080, whilst the target described as not generous was perceived as more similar in 
the working context than in the dating context, F(1, 59) = 4.48, p = .038.   
  
 
Figure 12. Interaction of competitive and generous on overall similarity 
Mediation analysis 
The PROCESS procedure for SPSS (Hayes, 2013, model 4) was used for all the 
analyses.  First, I tested the effect of the attributes (not very generous vs. generous and not 
very competitive vs. competitive) on liking with two mediators (M1 = estimated target’s 
value or value similarity, and M2 = warmth or competence).  The attributes were dummy 
coded: with 0 for not generous vs 1 for generous and 0 for not competitive vs 1 for 
competitive.  Liking was the outcome variable in all analyses, assessed by the general 
attitudes.  The significance of the two indirect paths was determined using 95% bias-
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corrected and accelerated confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstrap resamples.  The results 
from these analyses are shown in Table 6, and the main findings are summarised below. 
 The first mediation model tested the indirect effect of generous on liking through the 
target’s estimated self-transcendence values and warmth.  As shown in Table 6, the attribute 
generous significantly predicted both mediators, and these significantly predicted liking.  
Both the direct and the total effect were also significant.  Therefore, the confidence intervals 
of the indirect effects did not include zero, indicating significant mediation.  When the target 
was described as generous, he was perceived as giving more importance to self-
transcendence values and as warmer, increasing liking.  
 The attribute competitive significantly and positively predicted the target’s estimated 
self-enhancement values and perception of competence.  The target’s estimated self-
enhancement values negatively predicted liking, whilst target’s competence predicted liking 
in a positive direction.  The direct effect of the attribute competitive on liking was significant, 
but the total effect was not.  The confidence intervals of the indirect effects did not include 
zero.  The target was liked less when perceived with higher self-enhancement values, but 
liked more when perceived as competent. 
 Regarding the mediating role of value similarity in self-transcendence and self-
enhancement, they did not mediate the relationship between the attributes (generous or 
competitive) and liking.  However, similarity in self-transcendence values predicted liking, 
and similarity in self-enhancement did not. 
 Finally, four models tested whether overall similarity mediated the effect of the 
attributes on liking.  Overall value similarity based on the Fischer’s transformation of the 
correlation between participants’ values and the target’s estimated values only mediated the 
effect of the attribute generous on liking.  When the target was described as generous, he was 
perceived with a similar value profile and liked more.  Similar results were found for 
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subjective ratings of overall similarity (single item): the mediation was only significant for 
the attribute generous, and in the same direction as the mediating role of overall value 
similarity. 
Discussion 
 Using different personality descriptors to manipulate the target’s values, Study 4 
obtained results similar to those of the previous study.  In fact, the descriptors influenced a 
wider range of values than before, but in a manner consistent with Schwartz’s (1992) model 
of values.  For instance, participants saw the generous target as possessing stronger self-
transcendence values and weaker self-enhancement values than the target described as not 
generous.  Conversely, participants saw the competitive target as possessing weaker self-
transcendence values and stronger self-enhancement values than the target described as not 
competitive.  These reciprocal effects fit Schwartz’s model, but they also showed that each 
attribute affected two sets of values on opposing ends of the same dimension, while also 
influencing orthogonal values (openness and conservation) in Schwartz’s model.  Perceptions 
of warmth and competence influenced in a similar manner, and like Study 3, context did not 
have a strong moderating impact on impression formation and liking.  
Of interest, the participants’ estimates of the targets’ values were significant 
mediators of the effects of the attributes on liking, independently of the estimates of the 
target’s warmth and competence.  At the same time, Study 4 replicated the mediating effects 
of warmth and competence that were found in Study 3.  That is, when the target was 
described with a self-transcendence attribute, he was perceived as warmer, and this 
perception elicited more liking; when he was described with a self-enhancement attribute, he 
was perceived as more competent, and this perception elicited more liking.  
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Table 6. Models of the indirect effect of the attributes on liking through target’s estimated values, and through value similarity 
Y X M1 M2 
B (SE) 
X on M1  
B (SE) 
X on M2 
B (SE) 
M1 on Y 
B (SE)  
M2 on Y 
B (SE) 
Direct effect 
X on Y 
B (SE) Total 
effect X on Y 95% IC M1
1 95%IC M21 
L Ge STe W 1.66 (.15)*** 2.32 (.18)*** .25 (.07)** .50 (.06)*** .84 (.19)*** 2.39 (.16)*** [.11, .78] [.54, 1.86] 
L Co SEe C 2.03 (.16)*** .78 (.19)*** -.79 (.12)*** .58 (.10)*** .73 (.33)* -.42 (.27) [-2.19, -1.06] [.22, .76] 
L Ge STc - .48 (.32) - .09 (.04)* - 2.35 (.16)*** 2.39 (.16)*** [-.01, .10] - 
L Co SEc - .39 (.34) - .14 (.07) - -.47 (.27) -.42 (.27) [-.10, .13] - 
L Ge Vsim - .44 (.07)*** - .72 (.19)*** - 2.08 (.17) 2.39 (.16) *** [.16, .56] - 
L Co Vsim - -.15 (.08) - 1.84 (.26) - -.15 (.23) -.42 (.27) [-.58, .02] - 
L Ge Sim - 1.60 (.16)*** - .35 (.08) - 1.84 (.20) 2.39 (.16) *** [.30, .86] - 
L Co Sim - .02 (.22) - .87 (.08)*** - -.43(.19) -.42 (.27) [-.35, .40] - 
L =Liking, W = Warmth, C = Competence, STe = Target’s estimated Self-transcendence values, SEe = Target’s estimated Self-enhancement values, STc = correlation between ST scores, SEc = correlation between SE 
scores, Vsim = correlation between all values, Sim = single-item similarity. 
1 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect with 5000 bootstrapping. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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The mediating role of perceived value similarity differed from Study 3, however.  In 
Study 3, similarity on self-enhancement values and overall perception of similarity mediated 
the effects of the attributes on liking, but in this experiment, similarity in self-transcendence 
values mediated the effects, but similarity in self-enhancement did not.  Overall value 
similarity and the overall perception of similarity mediated the effect of the self-
transcendence attribute (generous) on liking, but the mediation for the self-enhancement 
values were not significant.   
It may be the case that the mediating role of the values varied because of the strong 
reciprocal effects of the attributes on the opposing ends of the self-transcendence-self-
enhancement value dimension.  This reciprocal impact was not as marked in Study 3, which 
used different trait attributes.  The attributes used in Study 3 (time for others, hardworking) 
may not have been as powerful in conveying self-transcendence and self-enhancement as the 
traits used in Study 4 (generous, competitive), resulting in more covariance between the 
effects on values in Study 4.  Of course, this suggestion is speculative and requires further 
testing, but it is useful that Study 4 provided a conceptual replication capable of revealing this 
possibility.  
Notwithstanding this difference in the role of self-transcendence and self-
enhancement values, the principal findings of Study 4 replicate those in Study 3.  The value-
related attributes elicited more liking, perceptions of target values and value similarity 
elicited more liking, and the perceptions of trait warmth and competence mediated the effects 
of the attributes on liking (independently of the role of values).  Together, these results affirm 
the importance of modelling the effects of specific trait attributes on values and on the 
warmth and competence trait dimensions. 
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Chapter Discussion 
The research presented in this chapter investigated the role of inferred value similarity 
on liking and potential mediators of this relationship.  Warmth and competence were selected 
as mediators due to their importance for social perception.  Another tested mediator was 
perceived similarity.  The main findings of the studies are discussed below. 
Effects of Inferred Values 
Using personality attributes to express higher order values proved to be a valid and 
efficient strategy.  First of all, when manipulating attributes to represent high and low levels 
of self-transcendence and self-enhancement, participants inferred the target’s values 
according to the predicted patterns of Schwartz (1992) model.  In both studies, the attributes 
representing self-transcendence values led to higher estimation of the target’s self-
transcendence values, and the attributes representing self-enhancement values led to higher 
estimation of the target’s self-enhancement values.  Schwartz (1992) argues that these two 
higher order values serve opposing motives: people guided by self-transcendence values are 
concerned about welfare and wellbeing of others, whereas people oriented by self-
enhancement values pursuit self-interests.  This opposition was clearly observed in both 
studies.  For instance, when the high level of a self-transcendence attribute was presented, 
participants estimated that this target had high self-transcendence and low self-enhancement 
values.  Similarly, when the high level of a self-enhancement attribute was presented, the 
target was perceived with higher self-enhancement values, and lower self-transcendence 
values.  These results also challenge Trapnell and Paulhus’s (2012) model, which assumes 
that these values do not oppose each other. 
Although I was not interested in the effect of the attributes in the openness and 
conservation values, results indicated that they were also affected, although in a different way 
in each study.  Considering that Schwartz (1992) assumed that values are organised in a 
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quasi-circumplex structure representing a motivational continuum, it is not a surprise that 
openness and conservation values were affected, because they are both located between self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values, thus sharing common motivations with both.  In 
Study 3, higher openness values were estimated for the target described as finding time for 
others (high self-transcendence) and not very hardworking (low self-enhancement).  In Study 
4, higher openness values were estimated for the target described as not generous (low self-
transcendence) and not competitive (high self-enhancement).  Regarding conservation values, 
results were also different across the two studies.  The target described as not having time for 
others (low self-transcendence) and hardworking (high self-enhancement) was perceived as 
endorsing more conservation values in Study 3.  In Study 4, higher conservation values were 
inferred for the target described as not very generous (low self-transcendence) and not 
competitive (low self-enhancement).  Thus, the results regarding the values that were not 
manipulated did not follow the pattern of oppositions predicted by Schwartz (1992) model.  
However, this result should not be considered a limitation of the theory without direct testing 
using appropriate attributes to represent openness and conservation values. 
Finally, regarding the effects of inferred values on liking, the target’s estimated self-
transcendence values did not mediate the relationship between finding time for others and 
liking (Study 3), but mediated the relationship between generous and liking.  The target 
described as generous was perceived as endorsing more self-transcendence values and was 
liked more.  Whereas target’s estimated self-enhancement values mediated the relationship 
between hardworking and liking (Study 3), and between competitive and liking (Study 4).  In 
both studies, when the target was described with the high level of the self-enhancement 
attribute, he was perceived as endorsing more such values, and this perception decreased 
liking.  This result contradicts assumptions that all values are positive (Gouveia et al., 2014, 
Parks & Guay, 2009), at least in terms of interpersonal perception.  It would be interesting to 
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investigate whether people would like themselves less when confronted with their own self-
enhancement values, or if this is the case only for perceiving others, because this has an 
implication in terms of perceived warmth and competence. 
Effects of Perceived Similarity 
 In line with expectations, both studies found that perceived similarity increases liking. 
Similarity was measured in three ways: similarity in the relevant value dimension (self-
enhancement, self-transcendence, openness, or conservation), overall value similarity, and 
overall perception of similarity.  Study 3 found that similarity in self-enhancement mediated 
the effect between the self-enhancement attribute (hardworking) and liking; similarity in self-
transcendence did not mediate the relationship between the self-transcendence attribute 
(finding time for others) and liking.  Overall, value similarity was not a significant mediator 
for either attribute, but it significantly predicted liking.   
 Results of Study 4 were slightly different regarding the effect of similarity, but still 
congruent with the findings of Study 3.  Similarity in the specific value dimensions was not a 
significant mediator of the relationship between the attribute and liking, and only similarity in 
self-transcendence predicted liking, whilst in Study 3, perceived similarity in self-
enhancement was a significant mediator.  Regarding the effect of overall value similarity, it 
only mediated the effect between the self-transcendence attribute (generous) and liking, but it 
was not significant for the self-transcendence attribute (competitive) and liking.  
Studies 3 and 4 found the same results for overall perception of similarity: it 
consistently mediated the relationship between the attributes and liking.  Results of these first 
two experiments indicated that a global evaluation of similarity appears to be stronger than a 
specific evaluation.  These results showed that a global perception of similarity has stronger 
effects for liking than a more specific similarity, such as in one value dimension, even if this 
dimension is relevant.  It is important to highlight that this result is not a statistical artefact 
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due to different set sizes.  Although this artefact could explain the role of overall value 
similarity, because it is more precisely estimated through 21 value items than the specific 
value domain estimates relying on only 4 items, it cannot explain the more consistent 
findings from the single-item measure of global subjective overall similarity.  The key 
difference is the role of participants’ own inferences about similarity in the latter item, 
whereas the experimenter calculates the value similarity estimates.  Thus, the role of 
participants may be drawing upon information more closely related to their attitudes when 
judging similarity. 
Byrne (1971) would argue that actual similarity is critical for attraction (liking).  
However, the results presented in this chapter favour the claim that the belief about the degree 
to which one is considered to be similar suffices to produce liking (e.g., Hoyle, 1993; Ptacek 
& Dodge, 1995).  Although the results cannot be extrapolated to real life interactions or 
existing relationships, they reinforce the importance of perceived similarity in interpersonal 
liking.  For instance, Buunk and Bosman (1986) observed nonsignificant correlations 
between actual similarity and attraction in married couples.  Hence, researchers should 
always consider assessing perceived similarity both in no-interaction and interaction designs, 
either for existing or non-existing relationships. 
The Role of Warmth and Competence 
 Warmth and competence are two dimension that play an important role in person and 
group perception (Fiske et al., 2007).  It is vital to identify a person’s intention and capacity 
to do us good or harm.  Therefore, it was expected that, when the target was perceived as 
warmer or as more competent, he would be liked more than a colder and incompetent target. 
This is exactly what was found across both experiments.  
 These results are not a surprise, considering the extant research demonstrating warmth 
and competence as two dimensions that emerge in social perception (e.g., Asch, 1946; Bales, 
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1950; Rosenberg et al., 1968).  However, the present experiments are the first to test these 
effects alongside a manipulation of perceived values.  Some past research has found that 
values are more important than traits in political judgments (Maio, 2016), but there has been 
no evidence about their relative role in person judgments.  The SCM provides two universal 
dimensions on social cognition, and Trapnell and Paulhus (2012) showed that these 
dimensions are relevant to values.  
The Role of Context 
The role of the situational context was also explored in these studies, because, as 
indicated by Montoya and Horton (2014), a person’s interpersonal goals might depend on the 
situation.  Participants were asked to imagine that they could either work with the target on a 
project or go on a date with him.  Results for this manipulation were not very consistent. In 
Study 3’s dating context, general liking was not affected by whether the target was described 
as hardworking or not hardworking when he had time for others.  In Study 4, only a main 
effect was found, and the target was liked more in the working context.  In both studies, the 
main effects of the attributes were far more robust than the interactions, which failed to 
reduce the main effects to nonsignificant simple effects. 
On the surface, these results may seem to contradict evidence that goal 
instrumentality shapes the evaluation of others (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008, Fitzsimons & 
Shah, 2009).  Fitzsimons and Shah (2009), for instance, demonstrated that people 
spontaneously categorize others in terms of their instrumentality to a goal.  “Instrumental” 
people are useful for an active goal, whereas “noninstrumental” people are not useful for the 
active goal.  The studies presented in this chapter intended to activate different goals, either 
going on a date or working with the person.  This enabled me to test whether, when the dating 
goal was activated, some traits would be preferred (e.g., self-transcendence traits), whilst for 
a working goal, different traits would be liked more (e.g., self-transcendence).  The results 
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revealed no consistent impact of these goals on the similarity-liking effect, but this may be 
due to the design of the studies.  In particular, the goal was imagined and not real for the 
participants.  As this test was just an exploratory element of the studies, I did not attempt to 
create vivid, real-life dating and working situations.  If the context had been important in the 
imagined contexts, there would have been provocative evidence to pursue this design.  As it 
stands, this realistic design still merits pursuit, but the present findings show that the direct 
and powerful role of values in perceived similarity, person perception (warmth and 
competence) and liking merits consideration independent of the role of context.  Future 
studies could design experiments focusing specifically on the influence of active goals for the 
values-similarity-liking effect.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
The results presented in this chapter showed interesting evidence of the similarity-
liking effect for human values, and provided an alternative paradigm to study this 
phenomenon.  The paradigm is more natural than the one used by Byrne (1971), and proved 
itself to be extremely useful to manipulate value similarity without falling into the issue of 
creating value profiles that are not plausible, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, some limitations should be taken in consideration.  Perhaps the most 
prominent limitation concerns the sample used.  Both studies included female participants 
and no male participants.  Montoya and Horton’s (2012) meta-analysis found that, for 
women, the similarity-liking effect tends to be stronger when the target has the same gender.  
This was not the case in these studies, although the gender (male) of the target was only made 
explicit in Study 3.  Hence, the effects found might have been influenced by the gender of the 
participant and the target.  Moreover, some of the participants reported being in a 
relationship.  Although removing them from the analyses did not change the results in any 
significant way, it would be ideal to consider only single participants when a dating context is 
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part of the manipulation.  There is also room to further examine the effects of value similarity 
on liking using a sample of participants in existing relationships or relationships that are just 
starting.   
 It is also not possible to disentangle the similarity effects from possible positivity 
effects in this design.  There is an inherent positivity with which people consider themselves 
(Montoya & Horton, 2004) thus, it is reasonable to assume that people would infer favourable 
information about a similar target, because they see themselves in a positive way (Ajzen, 
1974).  By focusing on values, my studies did not attempt to vary the positivity of the 
information implied by the traits.  Part of the effects of value similarity may arise because of 
shared positive attributes.  To me, this shared positivity is an interesting conceptual 
component of potential similarity effects and not one I wished to isolate at this stage.  
Nonetheless, further investigation could examine the role of shared positivity by examining 
perceiver’s self-esteem and their perceptions of the valence of the targets’ values.  
 Another issue was the reliability of the values measure.  Past research has already 
noted that the reliability can be low because most dimensions are evaluated only with two 
items (see Schwartz, 2005; Versakalo, Lonqvist, Lipsanen, & Helkama, 2009).  Apart from 
the reliability of self-direction in Study 3, the other dimensions’ reliabilities were congruent 
with previous findings (e.g., Versakalo et al., 2009).  Future research could include 
Schwartz’s revised values model as a way of attempting to boost measurement reliability. 
 Moreover, the studies only focused on the self-transcendence and self-enhancement 
opposition of Schwartz (1992) model, because they are directly relevant for the warmth and 
competence dimensions.  The effects found for the openness and conservation dimensions are 
an indication that they could also be relevant and provide information regarding warmth and 
competence.  This issue should also be explored in future studies. 
 
112 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, the studies presented in this chapter provide novel evidence for the role of 
values in interpersonal attitudes, while demonstrating a mechanism that has not been 
explored previously.  Combining the use of personality descriptors to manipulate value 
similarity appears to be an efficient means to study the effects of values.  Moreover, it is 
important to take in consideration that similarity in values is not the only element in 
interpersonal perception; the consideration of warmth and competence provides a clearer 
picture of the underlying mechanism.  
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Chapter 4 
The Role of Inferred Similarity of Conservation and Openness Values on Liking 
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Chapter 4 Summary 
Chapter 3 manipulated the presence or absence of traits representing self-transcendence and 
self-enhancement values in order to examine the effects of these descriptors on interpersonal 
attitudes, as well as perceptions of target warmth and competence.  This focus on self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values was a useful starting point for looking at effects 
of values on interpersonal attitudes, but it is also important to examine the effect of value-
laden personality descriptors representing conservation and openness values.  Two studies 
addressed this issue using the same design and procedure as for Studies 3 and 4.  Results in 
both studies again indicated that the presence of the value-affirming traits increased liking for 
the target and perceived similarity to the target.  Both studies also found that the descriptors 
of openness and conservation affected warmth and competence, although warmth was 
affected only by the conservation attribute in Study 6.  There was no consistent evidence for a 
mediating role of value similarity in the relationship between the attribute and liking across 
studies, but the overall perception of similarity did act as a mediator between the attribute and 
liking.  These findings support and extend the results from the previous experiments, and 
provide further evidence of how values are related to the dimensions of warmth and 
competence.  
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The studies presented in Chapter 3 extended the findings regarding the similarity-
liking effect for values.  They demonstrated that the manipulation of personality attributes to 
represent the opposition of self-transcendence and self-enhancement values produced 
impressions of the target’s values and traits and that these perceptions predicted inferred 
similarity and liking for the target.  Considering the results from Studies 1 and 2, which 
showed that value similarity elicited judgments of greater warmth and competence, Studies 3 
and 4 tested the values that are most directly relevant for these two dimensions.  Of interest, 
however, the manipulations of self-transcendence and self-enhancement attributes produced 
impressions of conservation and openness values as well.  The present chapter aims to further 
investigate how conservation and openness attributes affect perceptions of a target.  The 
chapter describes two studies examining the effects of these attributes on perceptions of the 
target’s values, traits (warmth and competence), and how these perceptions affect inferred 
value similarity and liking for the target.  
Conservation and Openness Values 
Schwartz’s (1992) theory of basic human values defines them as trans-situational 
goals that guide individuals’ actions.  As described in Chapter 1, the content of values refers 
to the motivational goals that they express.  Two dimensions contrast different motivational 
goals between higher-order value domains: self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement, and 
openness vs. conservation.  Chapter 3 explored the opposition between self-transcendence 
and self-enhancement values.  The present chapter investigates the opposition between 
conservation and openness values. 
According to Schwartz et al. (2012), openness values represent the pursuit of new 
ideas and experience, and are comprised of self-direction, stimulation, and to a lesser degree, 
hedonism values.  Self-direction values represent the need for independency and autonomy.  
Schwartz et al. (2012) propose dividing self-direction into independence of thought and 
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action.  Autonomy of thought refers to the use of one’s own intellectual competence, and the 
autonomy of action refers to the ability to attain self-chosen goals.  Individuals guided by 
self-direction do not rely on other people’s judgments, because their own sense of 
competence is intrapersonal.  They like to form their own opinion and make their own 
choices, and often will engage in activities that express creativity.   
Self-direction values share common motivations with stimulation values.  Stimulation 
values are located in between self-direction and hedonism values, having compatible 
motivations with both.  Stimulation values express the desire for excitement, novelty, and 
challenge (Schwartz, 2012).  People endorsing these values seek an exciting and varied life.  
It is expected that people higher on these values are more likely to exhibit risk taking 
behaviours and higher levels of the personality characteristic of sensation seeking 
(Zuckerman, 1994).  Typically, individuals endorsing these values are looking for activities 
to provide the level of arousal to satisfy the need for stimulation.   
This aspect of stimulation values is similar to the functioning of hedonism values, 
which share elements of openness and self-enhancement (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005; Schwartz 
& Sagie, 2000).  They represent the need for pleasure and gratification.  Hence, people who 
endorse these values normally will engage in activities aiming at life enjoyment and personal 
satisfaction.  These aims are compatible with stimulation and achievement values. 
 In contrast, conservation values serve the maintenance of status quo and avoidance of 
threat.  This value domain encompasses the value types of security, tradition, and conformity 
(Schwartz et al. 2012).  Security values refer to motivational goals of safety, harmony, and 
stability, involving either the individual or the group (see also Schwartz et al., 2012).  These 
values are located between power and tradition.  Tradition values express respect for and 
acceptance of customs and ideas from the culture or religion, whereas conformity values 
represent the control of impulses and restraint of actions in order to avoid upsetting others or 
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violating expectations and norms.  People who attach high importance to conformity values 
will try to behave properly and to comply with rules, law, and authority.  
Relationship of Conservation and Openness Values with Warmth and Competence 
 In the previous studies, I focused on the self-transcendence values linked to 
communion and the self-enhancement values linked to agency.  I briefly discussed Trapnell 
and Paulhus’s (2012) proposition that there are two superordinate dimensions that organize 
values, traits, motives, and behaviour.  One dimension is called community, and it is 
associated with the maintenance of positive relationships.  The other dimension, called 
agency, is associated with self-advancement.  In their analysis of four data sets examining 
values, they found that these two dimensions are adequate to represent values.  Relevant to 
the present chapter, communion comprised the values of conformity, tradition, security, 
universalism and benevolence, whereas agency comprised the values of achievement, power, 
hedonism, and stimulation.  Thus, conservation values were related to communion, or 
warmth, whereas openness values were related to agency, and, therefore, competence.  
 This model of Trapnell and Paulhus (2012), although pertinent, assumes that 
communion and agency are orthogonal dimensions, whereas Schwartz’s (1992) model 
considers them opposite ends of the same dimension, opposing self-transcendence versus 
self-enhancement.  The prior chapter focused on these two higher-order value domains, 
which are not controversial in their connection to warmth and competence.  However, the 
effects on both conservation and openness values in Studies 3 and 4 brings Trapnell and 
Paulhus’s (2012) model back into focus.  They commented that their framework was not 
motivated by a disagreement with the model proposed by Schwartz, it only represents a 
different way of theoretically representing values.  Congruent with the previous chapter, the 
inclusion of the Schwartz (1992) model is justified considering the evidence for cross-cultural 
replicability, and support from cross-sectional, longitudinal and experimental paradigms 
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(Maio, 2010).  However, considering Trapnell and Paulhus’s evidence of the relationship 
between conservation and openness values with warmth and competence, it is interesting to 
further consider the potential connection between conservation and openness attributes and 
warmth and competence.  
Prior research on personality is relevant to this issue.  Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, and 
Knafo (2002) investigated the relationship between Schwartz (1992) values and the Five 
Factor Model of personality, which includes neuroticism, extroversion, openness, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness as trait dimensions.  Results indicated a positive 
relationship between (a) extroversion and achievement and stimulation values, (b) 
agreeableness and benevolence and tradition values, of openness to change with self-direction 
and universalism values, and (c) conscientiousness with achievement and conformity values.  
However, more detailed inspection of the results showed that trait warmth, which was an 
extraversion item, only correlated with benevolence values (r = .20).  Trait competence, 
which is a facet of trait conscientiousness, was only related to achievement values (r = .12), 
and with values created to represent conscientiousness (r = .22).  These findings support the 
conceptual link between self-transcendence (e.g., benevolence) and self-enhancement values 
(e.g., achievement) and warmth and competence traits, respectively. 
On the other hand, a different pattern was recently obtained in a meta-analysis by 
Fischer and Boer (2015).  They examined 26 samples of participants from studies that used 
any of the measures developed for the Schwartz (1992) model and a measure of the Big Five 
personality traits.  Results indicated that neuroticism only showed weak associations, 
compared to the other traits.  Extraversion was positively related to openness values and 
negatively to conservation values.  These investigators also observed a positive association 
between extraversion and self-enhancement values.  In addition, openness to experience was 
negatively related to conservation values and positively related to openness to change values, 
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while being positively associated with universalism and benevolence values, and negatively 
with power values.  Agreeableness was positively related with tradition and conformity 
values, and conscientiousness was positively related with conservation values and negatively 
with openness to change.  Unlike the results from Roccas et al. (2002), this meta-analyses 
indicated that extraversion and conscientiousness have associations with both conservation 
and openness values. 
Extrapolating from these results, it could be expected that conservation values are 
negatively related to warmth and positively related to competence, whilst openness values are 
positively related to warmth and negatively related to competence.  However, these 
expectations contradict Trapnell and Paulhus’s findings, because they observed that 
conservation values belonged to communion (i.e., warmth), and openness values belonged to 
the agency dimension (i.e., competence).   Giving these contradictions, the relationship 
between conservation and openness values and warmth and competence remains an important 
issue.  In the context of my paradigm, this entails looking at the impact of openness and 
conservation-related traits on perceptions of warmth and competence, while looking 
simultaneously at perceived value similarity and interpersonal attitudes. 
The Present Research 
Following up on the studies presented in Chapter 3, the present research included two 
experiments.  Both used the same design and procedure as in Studies 3 and 4.  Participants 
first reported their own values, then read a description of a fictional target containing two 
personality attributes, with each attribute relevant to a different target value.  The text 
described a low or high level of each trait.  As a result, each description subsumed one of four 
value profiles (high value A and value B, high value A and low value B, low value A and 
high value B, low value A and value B).  Each attribute in these experiments represented 
either the openness or conservation value domain. 
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That is, the descriptions included traits expressing high conservation and high 
openness, high conservation and openness, low conservation and high openness and low 
conservation and low openness.  I expected that participants who were presented with 
descriptions expressing a high level of conservation (i.e., humble) would estimate higher 
conservation values for the target than when the descriptions expressed a low level of 
conservation (i.e., not very humble).  Similarly, I expected that participants who were 
presented with descriptions expressing a high level of openness (e.g., adventurous) would 
estimate higher openness values for the target than participants who were presented with 
descriptions expressing a low level of openness (e.g., not very adventurous).  Considering 
mixed patterns in the literature, I did not make any predictions regarding warmth and 
competence.  Following the previous studies, I expected that perceived value similarity would 
increase liking.  That is, not only would the target’s estimated values predict liking, but 
similarity between the participants’ values and their estimates of the target’s values should 
also predict liking. 
Study 5 
Study 5 was my first study aimed at testing the effects of specific personality 
attributes relevant to conservation and openness on the perception of a target’s values and 
attitudes toward the target. I chose the attribute humble to represent conservation and the 
attribute adventurous to represent openness, because humility and adventurousness appear as 
values in these domains, respectively.   
The analyses also followed the same procedure as in Studies 3 and 4.   After 
establishing the effects of the attributes and the context manipulation on general liking and all 
of the putative mediators (values, value similarity, overall similarity), a series of mediation 
analyses were conducted, using a multiple mediator model to test two pathways, one through 
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either perception of warmth or perception of competence, and the other through either 
target’s estimated values or value similarity.  
Participants 
To reveal a medium effect size, as was found in Studies 3 and 4, I sought 158 
participants within four weeks of advertisement in the university notice board.  Exactly this 
number took part in return for a prize draw.  Their ages ranged between 18 and 50 years (M = 
22, SD = 5.66).  Most were single (90%).  
Design and procedure 
 The experiment followed a 2 (Humble: high vs. low) X 2 (Adventurous: high vs. low) 
X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) design.  Each participant read one of the four possible 
combinations between the attribute and value factors, as described below.  The order of the 
attributes was counterbalanced, thus generating another four combinations where the attribute 
humble appeared first.  The gender of the character was not explicit, allowing participants to 
imagine Sam as either a female or a male.  
Sam is adventurous, and is humble. 
Sam is not very adventurous, and is humble. 
Sam is adventurous, and is not very humble. 
Sam is not very adventurous, and is not very humble. 
Sam is humble, and is adventurous. 
Sam is not very humble, and is adventurous. 
Sam is humble, and is not very adventurous. 
Sam is not very humble, and is not very adventurous. 
As in Study 3 and Study 4, the internal consistency scores for the measures in the 
PVQ-21 (Schwartz et al., 2001) were lower for the participants’ value types (αPower = .37, 
αAchievement = .71, αHedonism = .66, αStimulation = .74, αSelf-direction = .47, αUniversalism = .41, αBenevolence 
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= .57, αTradition = .48, αConformity = .73, αSecurity = .32) than for the participants’ higher-order 
value domains (αSelf-enhancement = .70, αSelf-transcendence = .59, αOpenness = .71, αConservation = .69).  
Reliability was also lower for the ratings of the target’s 10 value types (αPower = .70, 
αAchievement = .83, αHedonism = .72, αStimulation = .97, αSelf-direction = .72, αUniversalism = .81, αBenevolence 
= .78, αTradition = .49, αConformity = .86, αSecurity = .82) than for the target’s higher-order value 
domains (αSelf-enhancement = .87, αSelf-transcendence = .87, αOpenness = .91, αConservation = .85).  Along 
with my a priori focus on the higher-order values, this difference in reliability again justified 
the focus on the higher value domains.  Internal consistency was high for the measures of 
liking (α = .89), warmth (α = .82), and competence (α = .88).  These are congruent with the 
reliabilities reported in previous studies (Schwartz, 2005; Versakalo et al., 2009). 
Results 
Effects on Values 
 The importance of each of the target’s estimated higher-order values (conservation, 
openness, self-transcendence, self-enhancement) was analysed in a 2 (Humble: high vs. low) 
X 2 (Adventurous: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants 
ANOVA.  For the target’s estimated openness values, there were significant main effects of 
the attributes humble, F(1, 150) = 51.19, p < .01, ηp2 = .25, and adventurous, F(1, 150) = 
445.94, p < .01, ηp2 = .75.  The target was perceived as endorsing more openness values when 
he was described as not humble (M = .64, SD = 1.30) compared to when he was described as 
humble (M = -.12, SD = 1.32), and when he was presented as adventurous (M = 1.35, SD = 
.74) than when he was presented as not adventurous (M = -.90, SD = .78). 
There were significant main effects of humble, F(1, 150) = 121.49, p < .01, ηp2 = .45, 
and adventurous, F(1, 150) = 407.04, p < .01, ηp2 = .73, on the target’s estimated 
conservation values. Participants estimated higher conservation values for the humble target 
(M = .26, SD = 1.18) than for the not humble target (M = -.83, SD = 1.17).  When the target 
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was described as adventurous (M = -1.25, SD = .78), participants estimated lower 
conservation values, compared to when he was described as not adventurous (M = .74, SD = 
.86).  
For the target’s estimated self-transcendence values, there were significant main 
effects of humble, F(1, 150) = 173.34, p < .01, ηp2 = .54, and adventurous, F(1, 150) = 6.68, p 
= .011, ηp2 = .04.  When the target was described as humble (M = .63, SD = .53) he was 
perceived as having more self-transcendence values compared to when he was described as 
not humble (M = -.62, SD = .67).  When the target was described as adventurous (M = -.11, 
SD = .83), he was perceived as giving less importance to self-transcendence values than when 
he was described as not adventurous (M = .14, SD = .90). 
Finally, regarding the target’s estimated self-enhancement values, there was only a 
significant main effect of the attribute humble, F(1, 150) = 285.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .66.  When 
the character was described as humble (M = -.97, SD = .67), he was perceived as endorsing 
less self-enhancement values than when he was described as not humble (M = 1.11, SD = 
.86). 
Effects on Value Similarity 
The inferred similarity between participant’s and target’s values was analysed in a 2 
(Humble: high vs. low) X 2 (Adventurous: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) 
between-participants ANOVA.  Results indicated main effects of humble, F(1, 150) = 5.75, p 
= .018, ηp2 = .04, and adventurous, F(1, 150) = 6.40, p = .012, ηp2 = .04.  The target was 
perceived as more similar when he was described as humble (M = .17, SD = .39) and 
adventurous (M = .17, SD = .34), compared to when he was described as not humble (M = 
.03, SD = .38) and not adventurous (M = .02, SD = .42). 
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Effects on Liking 
Liking for the target were analysed in a 2 (Humble: high vs. low) X 2 (Adventurous: 
high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants ANOVA.  Results 
revealed main effects of humble, F(1, 150) = 117.02, p = .001, ηp2 = .44, and adventurous, 
F(1, 150) = 38.72, p = .001, ηp2 = .21.  The target was liked more when he was described as 
humble (M = 5.6, SD = .85) compared to when he was described as not humble (M = 4.0, SD 
= 1.20).  The adventurous target (M = 5.3, SD = 1.16) was liked more than the not 
adventurous target (M = 4.4, SD = 1.30). 
Effects on Warmth and Competence 
Targets perceived warmth and competence were analysed in a 2 (Humble: high vs. 
low) X 2 (Adventurous: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants 
ANOVA.  Regarding the perception of warmth, there were main effects of humble, F(1, 150) 
= 84.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, and adventurous, F(1, 150) = 22.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .13.  The 
character was perceived as warmer when he was described as humble (M = 5.5, SD = 1.04) 
than when he was described as not humble (M = 4.1, SD = 1.05), and when he was described 
as adventurous (M = 5.2, SD = 1.17) than as not adventurous (M = 4.4, SD = 1.26).   
Regarding perceptions of the target’s competence, there was also main effects of 
humble, F(1, 150) = 17.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, and adventurous, F(1, 150) = 28.59, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .16. The target was perceived as more competent when he was humble (M = 5.3, SD = 
1.14), than when he was not humble (M = 4.6, SD = 1.15), and when he was adventurous (M 
= 5.4, SD = 1.00) than when he was not adventurous (M = 4.5, SD = 1.22).                                        
Effects on Overall Similarity 
The importance of overall similarity was analysed in a 2 (Humble: high vs. low) X 2 
(Adventurous: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants ANOVA 
for perceived value similarity.  Results indicated main effects of humble, F(1, 149) = 16.35, p 
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< .001, ηp2 = .10, and adventurous, F(1, 149) = 9.50, p = .002, ηp2 = .06.  The target was 
perceived as more similar when he was described as humble (M = 3.3, SD = .95) or 
adventurous (M = 3.2, SD = 1.07), compared to when he was described as not humble (M = 
2.6, SD = 1.12) or not adventurous (M = 2.7, SD = 1.04). 
Mediation analysis 
The PROCESS procedure for SPSS (Hayes, 2013, model 4) was used for all of the 
mediation analyses. Separate analyses were conducted for each attribute. The attributes were 
dummy coded: with 0 for not humble vs 1 for humble and 0 for not adventurous vs 1 for 
adventurous. The first two models had three mediators (M1 = estimated target’s value, 
conservation for the attribute humble and openness for the attribute adventurous; M2 = 
warmth; M3 = competence), because both attributes had an effect on warmth and competence. 
The four remaining models tested whether value similarity and overall similarity mediated 
the effect of the attribute on liking. The significance of the two indirect paths was determined 
using 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals with 5,000 bootstrap 
resamples.  
 Regarding the results for target’s estimated conservation values, the extent to which 
the target was described as humble significantly predicted perceptions of his conservation 
values (B = 1.09, SE =.19, p < .001), but target’s estimated conservation values did not 
predict liking (B = -.06, SE =.05, p > .05).  Humble predicted estimated warmth (B = 1.44, SE 
=.17, p < .001) and competence (B = .71, SE =.19, p < .001), and both predicted liking, 
respectively, B = .49, SE =.06, p < .001, and B = .32, SE =.06, p < .001.  Both the direct effect 
of humble on liking (B = .73, SE =.17, p < .001), and the total effect were significant (B = 
1.59, SE =.17, p < .001).  Thus, the confidence interval of the indirect effect through target’s 
openness values included zero, 95% CI [-.22, .08], but the indirect effects through warmth, CI 
95% [.45, 1.02], and competence, CI 95% [.10, .43], were significant.  These results indicate 
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that when the target was described as humble, he was perceived as warmer and more 
competent, and these trait perceptions increased liking. 
The extent to which the target was described as adventurous significantly and 
positively predicted his estimated openness values (B = 2.25, SE =.12, p < .001), warmth (B = 
.74, SE =.19, p < .001) and competence (B = .80, SE =.18, p < .001).  The target’s estimated 
openness values were negatively related with liking (B = -.27, SE =.02, p < .001), whilst 
warmth (B = .60, SE =.05, p < .001) and competence (B = .33, SE =.06, p < .001) were 
positively related with liking.  The direct effect of adventurous on liking was positive and 
significant (B = .77, SE =.22, p < .001), and the total effect was also significant (B = .91, SE 
=.20, p < .001).  Therefore, the confidence intervals of the three indirect effects did not 
include zero, indicating significant mediation: 95% CI Target’s openness values [-1.04, -.23], 
warmth [.21, .74], and competence [.14, .49].  When the target was described as adventurous, 
he was perceived as endorsing more openness values, as warmer and more competent.  
Whilst warmth and competence increased liking, the perception of openness decreased liking.  
Table 7. Mediation models of the indirect effect of the attributes on liking through target’s 
estimated values, and through value similarity. 
X M1 
B (SE) 
X on M1 
B (SE) 
M1 on Y 
B (SE) 
Direct effect 
X on Y 
B (SE) Total 
effect X on 
Y 
95% IC M11 
Adv OPc .03(.10)*** .37 (.15)* .90 (.19)*** .91(.20)*** [-.06, .11] 
Hum COc .48(.24)* .04(.05) 1.57(.17)*** 1.59(.17)*** [-.06, .06] 
Adv Vsim .15(.06)* .94(.25)*** .76(.19)*** .91(.20)*** [.04, .31] 
Hum Vsim .15 (.06)* .78(.21)*** 1.48(.16)*** 1.59(.17)*** [.03, .24] 
Adv Sim .50(.17)** .57(.08)*** .60(.18)*** .89(.20)*** [.10, .52] 
Hum Sim .65(.17)*** .46(.07)*** 1.28(.15)*** 1.58(.17)*** [.15, .49] 
Adv = Adventurous, Hum = Humble, OPe = similarity in openness values, COe = similarity in conservation values, Vsim = correlation 
between all values, Sim = single-item similarity. 
1 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect with 5000 bootstrapping. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Table 7 shows the results for the mediation analyses testing the effect of similarity. 
Although similarity in openness values positively predicted liking, the mediation was not 
significant.  In addition, similarity in conservation values was not a significant mediator of 
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the effect of humble on liking.  The four mediation models examining overall similarity, 
either based on the value correlations or on the single-item general measure, were significant.  
Thus, when the target was described as adventurous or humble, he was perceived as more 
similar and liked more. 
Discussion 
 This experiment used descriptors of conservation and openness values to manipulate 
value similarity and impression formation.  Results showed that the descriptors affected the 
target’s estimated values not only in the two manipulated value domains, but also in the self-
transcendence and self-enhancement value domains.  Unlike the first two experiments, where 
the self-transcendence descriptor only affected warmth, and the self-enhancement descriptor 
only affected competence, the descriptors of openness and conservation each affected both 
warmth and competence in this study.  For the effect of the openness attribute (adventurous) 
on liking, there were three significant mediators: the target’s estimated openness values, 
warmth and competence (although perceptions of increased openness values decreased 
liking).  In contrast, the effect of the conservation attribute (humble) on liking was mediated 
only by warmth and competence.  Neither similarity in conservation or openness values 
mediated the effect of the attributes (humble or adventurous) and liking.  Finally, it was 
found that both estimates of overall similarity (based on the overall values correlations or on 
the single-item general measure) were significant mediators of the effect of the attributes on 
liking.  Put simply, the target who was described as humble or adventurous was perceived as 
more similar to the participant than the target who was described as not humble or not 
adventurous, and this perception of similarity predicted increased liking. 
Of interest, there were no significant interactions with context.  As in the studies 
reported in the prior chapter, this pattern indicates that the role of context in this paradigm 
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matters much less than the attributes themselves.  Nonetheless, I will re-examine this 
conclusion after considering the results of Study 6. 
Study 6 
As is evident throughout this thesis, I am reluctant to interpret evidence from a single 
study without an additional replication.  Study 5 was my first study aimed at testing the 
effects of specific personality attributes relevant to conservation and openness on the 
perception of a target’s values and attitudes toward the target.  To follow-up this study, I 
conducted a conceptual replication in Study 6.  This replication simply replaced the attributes 
used to represent conservation and openness values, in order to test whether the findings of 
Study 5 are replicable for different exemplars of the values.   
For Study 6, I chose the attribute responsible to represent conservation, and the 
attribute independent to represent openness, because responsible and independent are values 
in each of these value domains, respectively, within Schwartz’s (1992) model.  The analyses 
followed the same procedure as in the previous studies.  After establishing the effects of the 
attributes and the context manipulation on general liking and all of the putative mediators 
(values, value similarity, overall similarity), a series of mediation analyses were conducted, 
as in Studies 3 through 5. 
Participants 
Participants were 159 female staff and students recruited through the electronic 
noticeboard of a UK University for a prize draw.  Thirty-one participants were excluded due 
to not following the instructions.  Their ages ranged between 18 and 79 years (M = 34, SD = 
17.33), and most were single (63%). 
Design and Procedure 
 The experiment followed a 2 (Responsible: high vs. low) X 2 (Independent: high vs. 
low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) design.  Each participant read one of the four possible 
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combinations between the attribute and value factors, as described below. The order of the 
attributes was counterbalanced, thus generating another four combinations where the attribute 
independent appeared first. The gender of the character was not explicit, allowing participants 
to imagine Sam as either a female or a male. 
Sam is responsible, and is independent. 
Sam is not very responsible, and is independent. 
Sam is responsible, and is not very independent. 
Sam is not very responsible, and is not very independent. 
Sam is independent, and is responsible. 
Sam is not very independent, and is responsible. 
Sam is independent, and is not very responsible. 
Sam is not very independent, and is not very responsible. 
The internal consistency scores for the measures in the PVQ-21 (Schwartz et al., 
2001) were lower for the participants’ value types (αPower = .56, αAchievement = .74, αHedonism = 
.74, αStimulation = .73, αSelf-direction = .40, αUniversalism = .48, αBenevolence = .66, αTradition = .48, 
αConformity = .79, αSecurity = .64) than for the participants’ higher-order value domains (αSelf-
enhancement = .77, αSelf-transcendence = .65, αOpenness = .70, αConservation = .75).  Reliability was also 
lower for the ratings of the target’s 10 value types (αPower = .47, αAchievement = .84, αHedonism = 
.71, αStimulation = .86, αSelf-direction = .81, αUniversalism = .71, αBenevolence = .63, αTradition = .56, 
αConformity = .81, αSecurity = .78) than for the target’s higher-order value domains (: αSelf-
enhancement = .82, αSelf-transcendence = .82, αOpenness = .87, αConservation = .88).  Along with my a priori 
focus on the higher-order values, this difference in reliability again justified the focus on the 
higher value domains.  Internal consistency was high for the measures of liking (α = .88), 
warmth (α = .85), and competence (α = .91). 
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Results 
Effects on Values 
 The importance of the target’s estimated values (openness, conservation, self-
transcendence, self-enhancement) was analysed in a 2 (Responsible: high vs. low) X 2 
(Independent: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants ANOVA.  
For the target’s estimated openness values, there were significant main effects of the 
attributes responsible, F(1, 120) = 97.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .45, and independent, F(1, 120) = 
56.93, p < .01, ηp2 = .32.  The target was perceived as endorsing more openness values when 
he was described as not responsible (M = .75, SD = 1.14) than when presented as responsible 
(M = -.64, SD = .78), and when described as independent (M = .57 SD = 1.10) than as not 
independent (M = -.46, SD = 1.07). 
There were significant main effects of responsible, F(1, 120) = 42.09, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.26, and independent, F (1, 120) = 79.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, on the target’s estimated 
conservation values.  Participants estimated higher conservation values when the target was 
described as responsible (M = .52, SD = .97) than when he was described as not responsible 
(M = -.39, SD = 1.10).  Participants also estimated higher conservation values for the not 
independent target (M = .69, SD = .97) than for the independent target (M = -.56, SD = .90), 
For the target’s estimated self-transcendence values, there were significant main 
effects of responsible, F(1, 120) = 14.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, and independent, F(1, 120) = 
6.25, p = .014, ηp2 = .05.  When the target was described as responsible (M = .14, SD = .77), 
he was perceived as giving more importance to self-transcendence values than when he was 
described as not responsible (M = -.33, SD = .59).  When the target was described as 
independent (M = -.23, SD = .78), he was perceived as having less self-transcendence values 
compared to when he was described as not independent (M = .05, SD = .64).  
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Regarding the target’s estimated self-enhancement values, there was only a significant 
main effect of the attribute independent, F(1, 120) = 24.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .17.  When the 
character was described as independent (M = .29, SD = .90), he was perceived as endorsing 
more self-enhancement values than when he was described as not independent (M = -.41, SD 
= .67).  However, there was also a significant interaction between independent and context, 
F(1, 120) = 5.12, p = .025, ηp2 = .04.  Simple effects testing revealed that, in the working 
context, the target was perceived as endorsing self-enhancement values more strongly when 
he was described as independent (M = .49, SD = .91) than as not independent (M = -.51, SD = 
.70), F(1, 61) = 24.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .28.  In the dating context, the target was also perceived 
as endorsing more self-enhancement values when he was described as independent (M = .10, 
SD = .85) than as not independent (M = -.30, SD = .62), F(1, 61) = 4.53, p = .037, ηp2 = .07, 
although the difference was markedly smaller than in the working context.  
Effects on Value Similarity 
The importance of the target’s perceived value similarity was analysed in a 2 
(Responsible: high vs. low) X 2 (Independent: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. 
working) between-participants ANOVA.  Results indicated main effects of independent, F(1, 
120) = 8.33, p = .005, ηp2 = .07, and a significant interaction between independent and 
context, F(1, 120) = 4.47, p = .035, ηp2 = .04.  As shown in Figure 13, in the dating context, 
simple effects comparisons revealed that the independent target was perceived as having 
more similar values to the participant than the not independent target.  In the working 
context, there was no difference between the independent and the not independent targets.   
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Figure 13. Interaction effect between independent and context on overall value similarity 
Effects on Liking 
Liking the target were analysed in a 2 (Responsible: high vs. low) X 2 (Independent: 
high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants ANOVA.  There were 
main effects of responsible, F(1, 120) = 67.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, and independent F(1, 120) 
= 15.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .12.  There were also two 2-way interactions between context and 
independent, F(1, 120) = 6.57, p = .012, ηp2 = .05, and between responsible and independent, 
F(1, 120) = 3.98, p = .048, ηp2 = .03.  Regarding the first interaction, the independent target 
(M = 5.2, SD = 1.24) was liked more than the not independent one (M = 3.8, SD = 1.23), F(1, 
61) = 17.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .23, in the dating context.  This difference was not significant in 
the working context, F(1, 61) = .34, p = .560, ηp2 = .01, as shown in Figure 14.  
Figure 14. Interaction between independent and context on attitudes 
Regarding the second interaction, when the target was described as not responsible, 
liking was unaffected by whether he was also described as independent or not independent, 
F(1, 61) = 2.15, p = .148, ηp2 = .03.  In contrast, when the target was described as responsible, 
the target was liked significantly more when he was described as independent (M = 5.8, SD = 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Dating	context Working	context
Not	independent Independent
0
2
4
6
Dating	context Working	context
Not	independent Independent
133 
 
 
.82) than as not independent (M = 4.8, SD = 1.29), F(1, 61) = 14.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, as 
shown in Figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Interaction between responsible and independent on attitudes 
 
Effects on Warmth and Competence 
Targets’ perceived warmth and competence were analysed in a 2 (Responsible: high 
vs. low) X 2 (Independent: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-
participants ANOVA.  Regarding the perception of warmth, there was a main effect of 
responsible, F(1, 120) = 16.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, and a significant interaction between 
context and independent, F(1, 120) = 6.92, p = .01, ηp2 = .0.6.  Generally, the character was 
perceived as warmer when he was described as responsible (M = 5.0, SD = 1.24) than as not 
responsible (M = 4.2, SD = .85).  Simple effects analyses of the interaction indicated that, in 
the dating context, the target’s perceived warmth was not influenced by whether he was 
described as independent (M = 4.8, SD = 1.03) or not independent (M = 4.2, SD = 1.20), as 
shown on Figure 16. However, in the working context, the target was perceived as 
significantly warmer when he was described as not independent (M = 5.0, SD = 1.21) than 
when he was described as independent (M = 4.5, SD = .94). 
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Figure 16. Interaction between independent and context on warmth 
Regarding perceptions of the target’s competence, there were main effects of 
responsible, F(1, 120) = 39.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, and independent, F(1, 120) = 56.05, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .32.  The target described as responsible (M = 5.1, SD = 1.58) was perceived as 
more competent than the target described as not very responsible (M = 3.8, SD = 1.24).  The 
target described as independent (M = 5.3, SD = 1.36) was also perceived as more competent 
than the target described as not very independent (M = 3.7, SD = 1.38).  There was also a 
significant two-way interaction between these two attributes, F(1, 120) = 10.37, p = .002, ηp2 
= .08.  When the target was described as not responsible, he was perceived as more 
competent if he was also described as independent (M = 4.3, SD = 1.11) than if he was 
described as not independent (M = 3.4, SD = 1.21), F(1, 61) = 9.15, p = .004, ηp2 = .13.  
These differences were accentuated when the target was described as responsible: the 
independent target was perceived as even more competent (M = 6.2, SD = .74) than the not 
independent target (M = 4.1, SD = 1.47), as shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Interaction between responsible and independent on competence 
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Effects on Overall Similarity 
The importance of overall similarity was analysed in 2 (Responsible: high vs. low) X 
2 (Independent: high vs. low) X 2 (Context: dating vs. working) between-participants 
ANOVA for perceived value similarity.  Results indicated main effects of responsible, F(1, 
119) = 28.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, and independent, F(1, 119) = 10.27, p = .002, ηp2 = .08.  
The target was perceived as more similar when he was described as responsible (M = 3.1, SD 
= 1.13) and independent (M = 2.9, SD = 1.11), than when he was described as not responsible 
(M = 2.1, SD = .87) and not independent (M = 2.3, SD = 1.05). 
Mediation Analyses 
 For the attribute responsible, a model with three mediators was tested, where M1 = 
target’s estimated conservation values, M2 = warmth, and M3 = competence.  Results 
indicated that the target whom was described as responsible was perceived as endorsing more 
conservation values than the target described as not responsible (B = .91, SE = .18, p < .001), 
but the estimation of conservation values did not predict liking (B = -.05, SE = .07, p > .05).  
However, the responsible target was perceived as warmer than the not responsible target (B = 
.79, SE = .19, p < .001), and as more competent (B = 1.36, SE = .25, p < .001), and each of 
these perceptions increased liking, B = .33, SE = .06, p < .001, and B = .42, SE = .05, p < 
.001, respectively.  Both the direct effect of responsible on liking (B = .72, SE = .16, p < 
.001), and the total effect (B = 1.51, SE = .19, p < .001) were significant.  The confidence 
interval of the indirect effect through the target’s estimated conservation values included 
zero, CI95% [-.19, .09], but the indirect effects through warmth, CI95% [.13, .47], and 
competence did not, CI95% [.34, .88].  These results indicate that responsible target was 
perceived as warmer and as more competent than the not responsible target, and these traits 
led participants to like the target more. 
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For the attribute independent, a model with three mediators was again tested, where 
M1 = target’s estimated openness values, M2 = warmth, and M3 = competence.  Results 
indicated that the target whom was described as independent was perceived as possessing 
stronger openness values (B = 1.03, SE = .19, p < .001), and as being more competent (B = 
1.58, SE = .24, p < .001) than the target described as not independent.  The target’s openness 
values predicted lower liking (B = -.16, SE = .08, p < .05), whereas the target’s competence 
predicted higher liking (B = .63, SE = .03, p < .001).  The direct effect of independent on 
liking was not significant (B = -.09, SE = .21, p > .05), but the total effects were significant (B 
= .73, SE = .22, p < .001).  As a result, the confidence intervals of the indirect effects did not 
include zero, and both the target’s openness values, CI95% [-.36, -.02], and competence, 
CI95% [.66, 1.43], mediated the relationship between independent and liking.  Thus, when 
the target was described as independent, he was perceived as endorsing more openness values 
and as more competent.  The perception of endorsement of openness values reduced liking, 
whereas the perception of competence increased it.  
As shown in Table 8, similarity in conservation values did not mediate the 
relationship between responsible and liking, whereas similarity in openness values mediated 
the relationship between independent and liking.  The role of overall value similarity varied: 
it was not a significant mediator of the relationship between responsible and liking, but it was 
a significant mediator of the relationship between independent and liking.  The overall 
perception of similarity was a significant mediator in both models examining this variable.  
Thus, when the target was described as responsible or as independent, he was perceived as 
more similar and, consequently, liked more than when he was described as not responsible or 
as not independent. 
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Table 8. Models of the indirect effect of the attributes on liking through target’s estimated 
values, and through value similarity.  
X M1 
B (SE) 
X on M1 
B (SE) 
M1  on Y 
B (SE) 
Direct effect 
X on Y 
B (SE) Total 
effect X on 
Y 
95% IC M11 
In OPc .51(.11)*** .55 (.17)** .45 (.23)ns .73(.22)** [.10, .54] 
Re COc .04(.10)ns .06(.16)ns 1.51(.19)*** 1.51(.19)*** [-.02, .07] 
In Vsim .19(.07)** 1.11(.28)*** .52(.22)* .73(.22)** [.06, .47] 
Re Vsim .07 (.07)ns 1.11(.22)*** 1.43(.17)*** 1.51(.19)*** [-.06, .27] 
In Sim .59(.19)** .75(.08)*** .26(.18) .71(.22)** [.16, .77] 
Re Sim .97(.18)*** .60(.08)*** .91(.18)*** 1.49(.19)*** [.34, .89] 
In= Independent, Re =Responsible, OPe = similarity in openness values, COe = similarity in conservation values, Vsim = correlation between 
all values, Sim = single-item similarity. 
1 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect with 5000 bootstrapping. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Discussion 
As in all the experiments described in this chapter and the prior chapter, participants 
were able to estimate the whole value profile based on just two attributes.  Similar to Study 5, 
this study used two attributes that described conservation and openness values. The 
conservation attribute affected perceptions of the target’s warmth, and both the conservation 
and the openness attributes affected perceptions of the target’s competence.  The effect of the 
conservation attribute (responsible) on liking was mediated by perceptions of the target’s 
warmth and competence.  Similarity in conservation values did not mediate the relationship 
between responsible and liking.   
The effect of the openness attribute (independent) on liking was mediated by target’s 
estimated openness values and competence.  The perception of endorsement of openness 
values reduced liking, whereas the perception of competence increased it.  Similarity in 
openness values also mediated the relationship between independent and liking.  When 
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overall value similarity was entered as mediator, it was only significant for the relationship 
between independent and liking.   
As in previous studies, the overall perception of similarity had stronger and more 
consistent effects: Both attributes led participants to view the target as more similar to the 
participant, which led to increased liking.  However, unlike Study 5 and the studies reported 
in the prior chapter, there were a number of interactions between the attributes presented and 
the context. Most of these interactions revealed smaller effects of one attribute (e.g., 
independent) when the context involved work than when it involved dating.  This pattern may 
have arisen because overall value similarity and liking (attitudes) might be of less relevance 
when one is considering a colleague to work on a project.  Perhaps this would not be the case 
if a longer period of interaction was expected.  Nonetheless, aside from one interaction 
wherein the effect of this attribute reversed (in the analysis of warmth), these interactions are 
again relatively minor in proportion to the main effects, as in the prior studies.  At the very 
least, these interactions would require replication before being regarded as significant caveats 
to the findings, especially in light of the weak role of context in Study 5. 
Chapter Discussion 
The research presented in this chapter investigated the role of perceived values and 
value similarity on liking, and potential mediators of these relations.  As in the prior chapter, 
the paradigm used here presented brief descriptions of an individual, similar to those you 
might see applications for jobs and self-descriptions for online dating.  I examined the impact 
of these descriptions on perceptions of the warmth and competence of the target individual.  
These traits were selected as mediators due to their importance for social perception, even 
though their relationship with conservation and openness values was difficult to ascertain 
from the prior literature.  As discussed below, the findings provided an important replication 
and extension of the results described in the prior chapter. 
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Effects on Inferred Values 
 In the previous chapter, participants inferred the target’s values based on attributes to 
represent high and low levels of self-transcendence and self-enhancement.  Their inferences 
were according to the predicted patterns of Schwartz (1992) model.  Hence, the attributes 
representing self-transcendence values had a main effect in the target’s estimated self-
transcendence values in both studies.  The same was observed for the attributes representing 
self-enhancement values, they led to higher estimation of target’s self-enhancement values.  
The effects of the openness and conservation values were not the focus of those studies; 
nevertheless, results indicated that they were also affected.  In the present chapter, two 
studies investigated the effects of manipulating attributes to represent conservation and 
openness values.  In Study 5, humble was the attribute for conservation and adventurous for 
openness.  In Study 6, the attribute used for conservation was responsible, and the attribute 
used for openness was independent.  As in the previous chapter, the effects of these attributes 
in inferred values were in accordance to Schwartz (1992) model. 
 In Study 5, participants perceived the target described as humble or as not 
adventurous as possessing higher conservation values, whereas higher openness values were 
inferred for the target described as not humble and as adventurous.  In Study 6, higher 
conservation values were estimated for the target described as responsible and as not 
independent.  Higher openness values were estimated for the target described as not 
responsible and as independent.  Therefore, both studies replicated the opposition pattern 
proposed by Schwartz (1992). 
 The expected opposing patterns were not corroborated for the estimated self-
transcendence and self-enhancement values.  In Study 5, higher self-transcendence values 
were estimated for the target described as humble, and as not adventurous.  Although higher 
self-enhancement values were estimated for the target described as not humble (showing the 
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opposite of the effect on self-transcendence values), there was no effect of the attribute 
adventurous on inferred self-enhancement values.  Results of Study 6 were similar.  Higher 
self-transcendence values were estimated for the target described as responsible, and as not 
independent.  Although higher self-enhancement values were estimated for the target 
described as independent (revealing the expected opposition), there was no effect of the 
attribute responsible on inferred self-enhancement values. 
 In both studies, inferred conservation values did not mediate the relationship between 
the attribute and liking.  However, inferred openness values mediated the relationship 
between the attributes (adventurous or independent) and liking.  When the target was 
perceived as endorsing higher openness values, he was liked less.  Congruent with the results 
for inferred self-enhancement values in Chapter 3, these findings fail to support assumptions 
that all values are viewed as positive personal characteristics (Gouveia et al., 2014, Parks & 
Guay, 2009).  Although values are usually assumed to be desirable, these studies provide 
consistent evidence that some values lead to less favourable perception of those who endorse 
them. 
 This tendency for some values to elicit less favourable perceptions makes it difficult 
to explain the lack opposing effects of the attributes on the opposite ends of each value 
dimension.  If people were more favourable to individual targets possessing any or all of the 
values, then it could be claimed that the lack of opposition is due to a general process wherein 
people merely ascribe positive values to anyone who possesses a single positive attribute.  As 
described below, this type of effect may be operating in this paradigm.  Nonetheless, it does 
not explain the lack of value oppositions because at least some values (especially openness 
values) negatively predicted liking. 
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Effects of Perceived Similarity 
 Both studies found evidence that perceived similarity increases liking.  Similarity was 
measured in three ways: similarity in the relevant value dimension (self-enhancement, self-
transcendence, openness, or conservation), overall value similarity, and overall perception of 
similarity.  In Study 5, similarity in the specific dimensions did not mediate the relations 
between the manipulated target attributes and liking.  However, both overall value similarity 
and overall perceived similarity were significant mediators.  In Study 6, similarity in 
openness values mediated the relationship between the openness attribute and liking.  Overall 
value similarity did not mediate the relation between the conservation attribute and liking, but 
it did mediate the relationship between the openness attribute and liking.  Finally, overall 
perception of similarity was a significant mediator for both attributes.  Thus, the global 
perception of similarity consistently mediated the effect between the personality attribute and 
liking across both Study 5 and Study 6, congruent also with Study 3 and Study 4. 
 These results indicate that a global perception of similarity has stronger effects on 
liking than a more specific similarity, such as in one value dimension, even if this specific 
dimension is relevant.  If global perceived similarity is the key moderator, it is possible that 
in first encounters people rely on unspecific and general clues to form a more general 
impression, suppressing the effects of more specific dimensions. 
The Role of Warmth and Competence 
 Warmth and competence have been found to be universal dimensions in person and 
group perception (Fiske et al., 2007), because these traits provide information about a 
person’s intention and capacity to do us good or harm.  When a target is perceived as warmer 
or as more competent, he or she should be liked more than a colder and incompetent target.  
The findings in both Study 5 and Study 6 supported this conclusion, consistent with Study 3 
and Study 4.  
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However, the key question was whether the conservation and openness attributes 
would influence perceptions of the target’s warmth and competence.  As discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter, prior research sets up different expectations about the links 
between these two value domains and the trait dimensions.  In these studies, the conservation 
attributes elicited greater perceptions of warmth, and the openness attributes elicited greater 
perceptions of competence.  At the same time, in both studies, perceptions of the target 
warmth tended to be negatively correlated with the target’s inferred openness values, and 
positively correlated with the target’s inferred conservation values.  Furthermore, perceptions 
of the target’s competence positively correlated with the target’s inferred openness values.  
These findings are broadly congruent with Trapnell and Paulhus’s (2012) model, who found 
that conservation values were linked to the communion (i.e., warmth) dimension of 
personality, and openness values were linked to the agency dimension (i.e., competence).  
These effects make the overall pattern somewhat more complex, but they are 
consistent with prior research on halo effects in person perception.  When people perceive a 
single positive or negative attribute of an individual, there is a tendency to ascribe other 
similarly valenced attributes to the person (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wetzel, Wilson, & Kort, 
1981).  For instance, in Study 5, only main effects were observed for estimations of warmth 
and competence, indicating that the presence of a positive attribute favoured more positive 
evaluations.  This type of halo effect is also congruent with the aforementioned evidence for a 
reliable role of global perceptions of similarity to the self across all of the studies reported in 
this chapter and in the prior chapter.  People may jump from the level of specific information 
to global impressions, which have consequences for attitudes. 
The Role of Context 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is plausible that a person’s interpersonal goals might 
depend on the situation (Montoya & Horton, 2014).  We tend to evaluate others and 
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categorize them in terms of “instrumental” and “noninstrumental”, that is, whether a person is 
useful or not for an active goal.  Previous studies have found that goal instrumentality shapes 
the evaluation of others (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008, Fitzsimons & Shah, 2009).  In order to 
explore how situational goals can affect impression formation, participants were asked to 
imagine that they could either work with the target on a project or go on a date with him.  
Similar to the studies presented in the previous chapter, results were not very consistent.  In 
Study 5 context had no effect, and in Study 6 it was found that, in the dating context, the 
independent target was liked more than the not independent one, but, in the working context, 
there was no difference whether the target was described as independent or not independent.  
In Study 6, the effect of the attribute independent on warmth also depended on context.  In 
the working context, the not independent target was perceived as warmer than the 
independent target, but, in the dating context, there was no difference in perceived warmth 
whether the target was described as independent or not independent.  Thus, although the 
effect of context was not consistent across the two studies, there is some support for the 
assumption that active goals influence person perception.   
Nevertheless, these effects did not eliminate the consistent and robust effects of the 
attributes on the formation of impressions of warmth, competence, and attitudes.  The robust 
nature of these effects suggests that attributes matter a great deal, even when presented only 
briefly in single-sentence descriptions.  At the same time, however, it is possible that a real-
life manipulation of context (e.g., involving real work or a real date) would yield a more 
powerful impact of this variable.  Thus, it is unwise to use these results to argue against an 
impact of context. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The main limitations of the studies presented in Chapter 3 can be cited for the present 
studies.  All participants in the studies were women, who might exhibit different effects than 
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men (Montoya & Horton, 2012).  It is important to replicate the value similarity effect in 
future studies with both male and female participants, while also manipulating the gender of 
the target.   
As noted above, the effects of context were once again weak and inconsistent. Future 
studies could address this issue with a design that could explore the effect of context more 
directly, possibly including other scenarios of interaction that are not working or dating 
related.  Such studies may also be more impactful if they include targets who are known to 
the perceiver.  By studying actual relationships, the mundane validity of the findings would 
be enhanced. 
 Finally, just as the perception of self-enhancement values predicted lower liking in 
Studies 3 and 4, perceptions of openness values decreased liking for the target in Studies 5 
and 6.  These results challenge previous assumptions that all values are desirable and positive 
(Gouveia et al., 2014, Schwartz, 1992).  The traits used to represent the values were intended 
to represent the content of the dimensions proposed by Schwartz (1992), whose model has 
been proved to be adequate across different designs, cultures, and measures (Maio, 2010; 
Schwartz et al., 2012).  It would be interesting to further investigate whether some values 
lead to negative evaluations. 
Conclusion 
In sum, the studies presented in this chapter provide additional evidence for the 
similarity liking-effect by demonstrating a mechanism that has not been explored previously.  
When participants are presented with two value-laden personality descriptors, they are able to 
infer value priorities for diverse values and use this inference to form interpersonal attitudes.  
Perhaps the most significant contribution of this chapter was the investigation of the 
relationship of warmth and competence with conservation and openness values, which 
corroborated an alternative framework for the study of values in interpersonal relationships. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
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Aims 
 This dissertation presented two sets of studies testing the similarity-liking effect for 
human values.  The first set adapted the classical phantom-other paradigm, testing the effect 
of actual value similarity on liking.  The second set of studies investigated how perceived 
value similarity affects liking, and manipulated personality attributes to achieve different 
levels of perceived similarity.  Both research programmes were designed in parallel.  Each 
programme took in consideration variables that could contribute to understanding the 
similarity-liking effect.  
Particular attention was paid to two issues.  First, previous literature indicated that 
similarity implies information, which is used for the formation of attitudes (Kaplan, 1981).  
Building on this idea, Montoya and Horton (2004) suggested that similarity indirectly 
influences liking via the cognitive evaluation of a person.  Thus, this indirect influence was 
one mechanism explored in this thesis. 
Second, prior literature on person perception indicates that people naturally categorize 
others in terms of their intention and capacity to do us good or harm (Fiske et al., 2007; 
Montoya & Horton, 2002).  In this model, the first dimension is often defined as warmth, 
capturing the other person’s intentions, friendliness, trustworthiness, and helpfulness.  Whilst 
the second dimension is referred as competence, including perceptions of the other person’s 
ability, intelligence, efficacy, and skill.  For this reason, I also assessed perceptions of 
warmth and competence to examine their role in the similarity-liking effect.  This enabled me 
to test whether information about a person’s values conveys information about warmth and 
competence, which in turn predicts liking.   
Chapter 1 described how the similarity-liking effect has been studied for over 70 
years in more than 200 studies, showing that values have been almost completely neglected 
in investigations, despite frequent claims in the public forum and academic literature that 
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value similarity is personal for interpersonal attitudes.  Chapter 1 described how, consistent 
with this view, there is ample evidence that the effect of similarity on liking is not direct, 
justifying the inclusion of other variables in the studies.  This chapter outlined a model of 
values that I used to help examine the role of value similarity in liking.  Specifically, 
Schwartz’s (1992; Schwartz et al., 2012) model describes values as trans-situational and 
desirable goals that guide individuals’ actions.  Four higher-order value domains represent 
two dimensions of motivational goals: self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement and openness 
vs. conservation.  The position of these value domains along the circle determines their 
compatibilities and conflicts.  Adjacent values share common motivations and are positively 
related, whilst values on opposing sides of the circle have conflicting motivations and are 
negatively correlated. 
 Chapter 2 presented the first two studies testing the effect of actual value similarity on 
liking.  Some difficulties in adapting the phantom-other paradigm were anticipated, such as 
the artificiality of an extremely dissimilar profile, but the two studies successfully replicated 
the similarity-liking effect.  An exploratory aim of the studies was to examine the effect of 
individual differences in self-monitoring, which is a trait reflecting the extent to which people 
monitor the connection between their behaviour and their external context (Snyder, 1974).  
Research on this construct has found that low self-monitors are more likely than high self-
monitors to use their values as the basis for attitudes and behaviour (e.g., DeBono, 2000).  
Therefore, I tested whether the effect of value similarity was stronger for low than high self-
monitors.  Contrary to expectations, the effect was stronger for high than low self-monitors. 
 Chapter 3 described two studies that tested the effect of value similarity on liking 
using a novel paradigm, using personal descriptions based on just two attributes.  People 
frequently use adjectives to describe themselves and their values, making this design more 
realistic and natural.  As in Studies 1 and 2, perceptions of warmth and competence were 
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assessed.  In addition, the studies presented in Chapter 3 examined the role of context. 
Previous literature indicated that people’s goals may depend on the situational context that 
they are experiencing at the moment (Fitzimons & Shah, 2009; Montoya & Horton, 2012). 
Consequently, the studies investigated whether situational context (going on a date vs 
working on a project) moderated the impact of the value-relevant attributes on liking for the 
target.  The results of Study 3 showed a larger impact of finding time for others when the 
target is not hardworking in the dating context than in the working context.  In Study 4, only 
a main effect was found, and the target was liked more in the working context.  In both 
studies, the main effects of the attributes were far more robust than the interactions, which 
failed to reduce the main effects to nonsignificant simple effects. 
Chapter 4 described two studies that are similar to those described in Chapter 3.  The 
key difference is that Chapter 3 presented personality attributes relevant to self-transcendence 
and self-enhancement values, whereas Chapter 4 presented personality attributes relevant to 
conservation and openness values.  Despite this change, the results again revealed a 
consistent effect of similarity on liking, especially for global evaluations (overall value 
similarity or general perceived similarity).  Results also showed some support for the 
assumption that active goals influence person perception, but effect of context was not 
consistent across the two studies.  Interactions between context and liking, and context and 
warmth were observed only in Study 6.   In the dating context, the independent target was 
liked more than the not independent one, but, in the working context, there was no difference 
whether the target was described as independent or not independent.  Regarding the 
perception of warmth, in the working context, the not independent target was perceived as 
warmer than the independent target, but, in the dating context, there was no difference.  The 
most significant contribution of this chapter was the investigation of the relationship of 
warmth and competence with conservation and openness values. 
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Together, the findings have a range of implications for understanding the role of 
similarity in liking and for understanding values.  Moreover, the research presented in this 
thesis is at the same time congruent and complementary to the extant literature about the 
similarity-liking effect.  The adaptation of the phantom-other paradigm makes the results 
comparable to those obtained by the reinforcement and by the information processing model 
(e.g., Byrne, 1965, 1971; Montoya & Horton, 2004).  The main difference is that the studies 
presented in this thesis were double-blind, but they still replicated the main finding that the 
perception of similarity increases liking.  The proposition of a new paradigm, using 
descriptors to express values is another contribution to the literature.  These descriptors help 
to enrich non-interaction studies of similarity and liking, which represent the majority of 
studies on the similarity-liking effect.  In the remainder of this final chapter of the thesis, I 
discuss these implications, limitations across the studies, and directions for future research. 
Implications for the Similarity-liking Literature 
One of the innovations in this research was the adaptation of the phantom-other 
paradigm for examining the role of value similarity on liking.  This adaptation was useful 
partly because it helps to illustrate conceptual reasons why the effect of value similarity is not 
as straightforward as often presumed.  In particular, to manipulate value similarity in this 
paradigm, a balance must be struck between presenting dissimilar values and presenting 
realistic values.  There is a range of values that most people tend to regard as being highly 
important, including self-transcendence and openness values in particular.  If a person is 
identified as not considering these values to be important, the description will lack realism 
and plausibility.  In the classic phantom-other paradigm, the researcher creates the dissimilar 
targets simply by putting items in the other side of the scale; thus, if the participant gave an 
answer towards the favourable side of the scale, the dissimilar phantom-other answered the 
same item on the other side of the scale. Using this strategy for values would probably 
150 
 
 
produce unrealistic value profiles, especially for dimensions like self-transcendence and 
openness, because it seems unlikely that people would show low endorsement of these 
values.  For this reason, the highest level of dissimilarity in my designs entailed value 
descriptions that were more similar to the participant than dissimilar (i.e., the 64% similarity 
condition).  This level of similarity is higher than those implemented in studies of attitude 
similarity, where opposing attitudes can be presented.   
Despite this alteration, I found that value similarity predicts increased liking.  Even 
though the manipulation of Study 1 was less extreme than in past experiments, where the 
answers of the phantom-other are placed on the other side of the scale (Byrne, 1971), the 
similarity-liking effect was corroborated.  Furthermore, Study 1 introduced a double-blind 
design to the phantom-other paradigm.  This provides an important control for effects of 
experimenter bias and demand on attitudes.  Thus, the study’s adaptation of the phantom-
other paradigm provided a more robust and conservative test of the role of similarity in liking 
than has been present in past research.  
Of interest, the proportion of similarity seems to be the key element for manipulating 
different levels of similarity, as opposed to the simple number of agreements or 
disagreements (Byrne & Nelson, 1965).  For instance, Ulrich, Krueger, Brod, and Groschupf 
(2013) observed that participants’ liking for a target did not correlate with the number of 
(randomly drawn) traits that they shared with a target, but did correlate with the percentage of 
shared traits.  In Study 1, the 82% identical target did not elicit different attitudes than the 
identical and the 64% identical targets.  Some participants in the 82% condition thought that 
the target was identical in values to themselves.  For this reason, Study 2 included only two 
levels of similarity, identical and 62% similar.  This proportion was strong enough for 
participants to perceive one target as more similar than the other.  In fact, Study 2 presented 
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participants with less than half of the items that were shown to participants in Study 1, but the 
proportion was kept virtually the same.  Yet, the results were very similar. 
The studies were also important to demonstrate that similarity may have an indirect 
effect on liking.  Montoya and Horton (2004) proposed a mediation model where cognitive 
evaluation mediates the relationship between similarity and liking.  These authors argued that 
cognitive evaluation is the primary determinant of attraction, and they demonstrated this role 
through mediational analyses that were only significant when cognitive evaluation preceded 
attraction, and were not significant when interpersonal attraction preceded cognitive 
evaluation.  Although this role of cognitive evaluation was not directly tested in any of the 
studies, findings from Studies 3 to 4 indicated that similarity in two traits were extrapolated 
for another two value domains that were not manipulated.  Thus, people can use traits to infer 
other information about a person, which may in turn predict attitudes in a manner distinct 
from similarity per se. 
An interesting finding across studies is that similarity in value domains appeared to 
have a weaker influence on liking than global perceptions of similarity.  Across the four 
experiments that presented pairs of value-relevant attributes, eight models tested the roles of 
specific domains.  Similarity in one value domain predicted liking in only two of the models.  
This was the case for self-enhancement values in Study 3 and openness values in Study 6.  In 
contrast, overall value similarity, that is, the Fisher transformation of the correlation between 
participant’s and target’s values, was a more consistent predictor of liking, but it was a 
significant mediator in only half of the models that were tested.  In contrast, participants’ 
ratings of perceived similarity to the target were significant mediators of the effects of the 
attributes in all of the models tested.  This pattern indicates that, if perceived value similarity 
plays a role, this role is only part of the similarity judgment that relates to liking.  In other 
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words, value similarity may matter, but only insofar as it relates to other perceptions of the 
target.  
This pattern extends other evidence that overall or general similarity might be more 
relevant than specific similarity.  Effects of general similarity were found by Luther et al. 
(2016), who manipulated similarity only using pictures of a hospital roommate whom was 
pre-tested to either be similar or dissimilar to the participants.  The researchers did not 
specify any dimension or make similarity salient.  As a consequence, participants could 
extrapolate or imagine similarity based on any dimension, such as age or ethnicity.  The 
results indicated that participants who saw the picture of the similar target expressed more 
positive feelings towards the target than participants who saw the picture of the dissimilar 
target.  Related to these findings, Amber (2004) found that perceived similarity was 
positively related to projection to other domains.  Therefore, the perception of similarity in 
one aspect appears to lead people to assume an overall similarity, which may produce 
stronger effects in social judgments.  By finding this same type of effect when value 
similarity was manipulated, the present research shows that this pattern holds even when 
similarity is manipulated through a few attributes that are putatively high in self-relevance 
and centrality to attitudes and behaviour (Rokeach, 1973; Verplanken & Holland, 2002). 
Additionally, as already mentioned, the effect of similarity on liking is indirect, and it 
does not happen in isolation from other phenomena.  Considerable research has demonstrated 
that impressions of others are arrayed along the dimensions of warmth and competence (e.g., 
Fiske, 2015, Fiske et al., 2007, Montoya & Horton, 2014).  Thus, the studies conducted here 
tested the hypothesis that interpersonal liking is determined by inferences about a target’s 
warmth and competence.  The results robustly supported this hypothesis.  When the target 
was perceived as more similar, participants inferred that the target was warmer and more 
competent, and this evaluation led to more positive attitudes.  This evidence not only supports 
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the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2007), it also provides support for the information 
processing model of attraction.  Similarity provides information to infer whether a person has 
benevolent or malevolent intent and whether this person is capable of living up to these 
intentions. 
Of interest, these effects shed some light on the role of familiarity with a target and 
the similarity-liking effect.  McAdams and Pals (2006) argued that values are too privately 
held for accurate inferences about another’s values.  In contrast, Dobell et al. (2014) observed 
substantial levels of convergence when examining self-other agreement in judgments of 
values and personality.  These scientists also observed that familiarity with the target played 
an important role in the accuracy of the judgment.  I would suggest that, although familiarity 
is certainly important, the four studies presented in Chapter 3 demonstrated that familiarity is 
not essential for making judgments about someone else’s values.  Even in the absence of a lot 
of information about a target or high familiarity with the target, people can make inferences 
about the person’s values, traits, and develop attitudes toward them. 
One caveat to this observation about people’s ability to utilise value-relevant 
attributes is that different values may not all operate in the same way.  Values are frequently 
defined as ideals that desirable or important to people (Gouveia et al., 2014; Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992).  If this is correct, perceiving someone as endorsing more of any type of 
value should increase liking.  This was not the case for self-enhancement values.  In Studies 3 
and 4, when the target was perceived as endorsing more self-enhancement values, he was 
liked less.  However, liking was higher when self-enhancement values were more similar to 
the self-ratings of the values in Study 3.  It is plausible that self-enhancement values, by 
themselves, imply a level of egocentricity that is disliked by others, and this dislike is 
attenuated only when it reinforces one’s own values.  Of course, this hypothesis is post hoc 
and requires more investigation.  One factor working against this explanation is my choice of 
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the attribute hardworking for Study 3.  Dwiggings and Lewandowski (2015) found that a 
hardworking target was considered a better dating partner than a not hardworking partner. 
Competitive, which was used in Study 4, also appears to be a fairly desirable trait.  In a study 
investigating the desirability of 110 traits, competitive ranked 53, with a mean desirability of 
4.2 in a 7 points scale (Bochner & Van Zyl, 1985).  It is therefore unlikely that the traits used 
in Studies 3 and 4 have negative valence individually.   
It may be the case that pairing the self-enhancement values with self-transcendence 
values changed the perception of self-enhancement.  Past research has found that pairing 
opposing values in a description of an individual elicits ambivalence (Maio, 2010), and this 
ambivalence may affect the way in which the self-enhancement traits are understood.  An 
interesting issue is whether the same type of effect arose for openness values, which 
predicted lower liking in my studies.  It may be the case that openness values take on a 
different valence when put alongside conservation values.  This issue could be explored in 
future studies that manipulate the value-relevant attributes independently.  In the interim, this 
pattern of findings suggests that self-enhancement and openness values operate in a unique 
manner in this interpersonal context.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Methodological Issues 
There were a number of methodological aspects of this research that helped to 
progress beyond past research in the area.  For instance, the phantom-other paradigm was 
made into a double-blind procedure, and the measurement of values included a scoring 
procedure that helped to control for idiosyncratic scale use in Studies 3 to 6.  In these studies, 
participants’ mean score on all values was subtracted from each item, in a procedure called 
within-subjects centring.  This procedure has been recommended by Schwartz (2005) because 
people use the value scale differently: some might use just one extreme of the scale, reporting 
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all values as important, while others might have a tendency to answer in the middle of the 
scale.  This procedure provides the relative importance of each value, considering trade-offs 
that people do in an intra-individual level to organize their values.  This procedure was 
implemented both for participants’ own values and for the values that they estimated for the 
target.  Therefore, the results reflect the relative importance of the values for each participant.  
Although these and other procedures were useful, there remain a number of 
limitations worth noting.  Perhaps the most evident limitation is the artificiality of the studies, 
which did not consider real life interaction. The similarity-liking effect has been found both 
in no-interaction studies and in short- or long-term interactions.  The effects appear to be 
stronger for no-interaction situations (Montoya et al., 2008).  Further research exploring the 
role of values on the similarity-liking effect could focus in more realistic settings, such as 
online dating or getting acquainted situations, evaluating the impact of initial perceived 
similarity on the relationship, and whether the perception of similarity changes once people 
get more familiar with each other.  It would also be interesting to have a study examining 
perceived value similarity, relationship satisfaction, and well-being in couples, comparing 
short (two months or less), and longer relationships (one year or more). 
In fact, the artificiality of the setting may help to explain why the specific nature of 
the interpersonal context (e.g., working vs dating) made no apparent difference to the role of 
values on liking.  Fitzsimons and Shah (2008; 2009) found that we form representations of 
people who are instrumental or useful to achieve a certain goal, and people who are 
“noninstrumental” or not useful for an active goal.  To the extent that some of a person’s 
values may match a current goal more than others (e.g., when working with someone who 
values hard work), then it is intuitive to also assume that we would feel more positive toward 
that person.  It could be the case that studies looking at actual ongoing goal pursuits are more 
likely to discover this goal congruence effect than the kind of paradigm employed here.  It is 
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important to design studies with actual goal pursuits to gather more evidence about whether 
the situational context or activated goals can influence attitudes towards a similar or 
dissimilar target, or whether the similarity-liking effect is so powerful that it overrules the 
effect of goal activation. 
Another potential effect of the artificiality is an increase in participants’ suspicion.  In 
Study 1, many participants were able to guess that the study involved perception of similarity 
and liking for the target.  In many cases, participants thought they were evaluating their own 
value profile instead of a stranger’s, assuming that the study was about liking themselves. 
Study 2 successfully addressed suspicion, but it was only possible because the cover story 
was credible, and participants could check part of the information on Google.  It might be 
more difficult to replicate this study in an institution that does not have a real partnership with 
another university, and participants would not be able to check the information.  Thus, the 
phantom-other paradigm is problematic in terms of representing real life situations, and 
providing a credible cover story. 
Nonetheless, the paradigm was useful for concretely showing the difficulties in 
achieving a plausible range of value similarity.  As mentioned above, a balance had to be 
struck between presenting dissimilar values and presenting realistic values.  The restricted 
range in manipulating value similarity may help to explain why the observed effect was 
medium to large, whilst the effects in the previous literature tended to be large (Montoya & 
Horton, 2008; Montoya & Horton, 2012).  This slight decrease in the effect size, if reliable, 
could also be due to the fact that the study was double-blind, making experimenter 
expectations less likely to influence the results.  At the same time, it is conceivable that the 
reason for the difference is simply that values were used instead of attitudes.  However, being 
a broader construct than attitudes, values enable people to infer more information than 
relatively specific attitudes.  For example, a person who strongly values the environment is 
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likely to be favourable toward a range of sustainable behaviours and policies, whereas 
attitudes towards any one specific sustainable policy provide less information (Weigel & 
Newman, 1976).  Values also have a strong affective component (Maio & Olson, 1998), 
making them powerful signals for attitudes. (Maio & Olson, 2000).  Both of these differences 
would make values exert a stronger effect on liking, rather than a weaker impact.  Direct 
comparisons of values and attitudes in future research would help to discern the ways in 
which they share common and distinct mechanisms in shaping interpersonal attitudes. 
Of course, sample size is always an important consideration.  A relevant study by 
Boer et al. (2011) manipulated music preference and asked participants to estimate the targets 
values and attraction.  Their index of value similarity was based on the correlation between 
participants’ and targets’ values, and this index significantly mediated the relationship 
between similarity in music preference and social attraction.  However, this study included 
more than twice as many participants as in the four studies presented here.  The larger sample 
could have contributed for the significant mediation of value similarity in Boer study.  I had 
planned for medium effect sizes, but planning for small effect sizes may be more appropriate 
in future research. 
Theoretical Issues 
Perhaps the most important theoretical issue is how value similarity relates to other 
forms of similarity.  It has been shown that attitude similarity has stronger effects than 
personality similarity.  It would be interesting to know where values fit, testing a possible 
hierarchy personality-values-attitudes.  According to Byrne et al. (1967), any type of 
similarity should produce attraction, because it is a validation of the self.  Based on the 
information processing perspective, the amount of information that can be implied by 
attitudes, personality or values similarity is different.  Attitude studies were related with 
larger effect size than personality studies (Montoya & Horton, 2012).  In the future, a study 
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comparing the effects of value, attitude, and personality similarity would be useful for 
identifying their relative informativeness for interpersonal judgments. 
Other theoretical issues pertain to the psychological nature of values, their 
interrelations, and normativeness.  For instance, although only two value domains were 
manipulated in each experiment in chapters 3 and 4, they were sufficient to provide 
information about a target’s whole value profile.  It would be useful to test whether these two 
attributes must represent two value domains or whether two attributes from the same domain 
would produce the same effects.  If the spread of the attributes matters, then presenting two 
attributes from the same value domain will weaken the impact on overall value similarity. 
However, prior research on the Halo effect (see Chapter 4) indicates that one characteristic 
can affect global evaluations of a person.  Thus, overall value similarity might be inferred 
from just one value domain, and this finding may suggest a simpler, quicker judgment 
process than if a conceptual range of attributes was necessary.   
It is important to highlight that people may experience similarity in different ways 
depending on whether the person they are thinking about is a stranger, an acquaintance or a 
close person.  Wortman, Wood, Furr, Fanciullo, and Harm (2014) observed that, when people 
were evaluating similarity with acquaintances (e.g., students living on the same floor of a 
student accommodation, or other fraternity members), those with a normative profile were 
seen as more similar.  A normative profile corresponds to a profile representing the average 
of endorsement of any particular traits or dimensions, which also tends to be considered as a 
desirable profile.  However, when people evaluated a close person (e.g., parents or close 
friend), the perception of similarity was increased by the distinctive traits.  A distinctive 
profile is the score after discounting for the average (normative) person.  For instance, if the 
average person has a score of 3 in the trait agreeableness, any participant with a score 3 
would be considered normative, and participants with a score higher or lower than 3 would be 
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considered distinctive for this dimension.).  It is usually worth considering the whole profile 
(e.g., personality, values, attitudes) of normativeness and distinctiveness.  These results 
suggest that normativeness is a cue for similarity when people are not very familiar with the 
target, whilst distinctiveness is more relevant to similarity to close others. 
 This issue of normativeness is also called the normative-desirability confound (NDC, 
Wood & Furr, 2016).  This spurious effect of having a normative psychological profile is 
likely to always be a problem for values studies.  All values assessed in contemporary 
measures are desirable to some extent (Gouveia et al., 2014), and people tend to endorse 
values from a moderate to high level of importance (Gouveia, 2013).  As argued in previous 
chapters, even values of relatively low importance may be considered desirable, which would 
predispose people to always show a positive evaluation about someone else’s values. 
In the two studies presented in Chapter 2, the target profile was created based on 
participants’ own values.  Therefore, if a participant had a normative profile and was in the 
similar condition, the target was equally normative; if a participant had a normative profile 
and was in the dissimilar condition, the target had a distinctive profile.  Considering that 
distinctiveness and normativeness were not controlled, it is not possible to disentangle the 
effects of similarity from the effects of distinctiveness and normativeness.  Moreover, 
participants evaluated a fictional target; based on Wortman et al.’s (2014) results, it is likely 
that normativeness played a stronger role than distinctiveness when participants made their 
evaluations.  Thus, I cannot yet rule out the possibility that liking was elicited by the 
desirable normative profile rather than actual similarity between participants and target, and 
this is an important issue for future research to consider. 
It is also important to establish the limits of the similarity-liking effect.  For instance, 
Aron, Steele, Kashdan, and Perez (2006) investigated conditions where the similarity-liking 
effect might be annulled.  Specifically, based on self-expansion model of motivation (Aron, 
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Aron, & Norman, 2001), which proposes that we seek relationships that will help us to extend 
personal efficacy, these researchers assumed that dissimilar people have more potential to aid 
our self-expansion than similar people.  In order to test this model, the researchers proposed 
that the similarity-liking effect occurs when there is no expectation about continuing the 
relationship with the target afterwards and that the similarity-liking effect is reduced when 
someone believes that the relationship with the other person is likely to continue.  They tested 
this hypothesis in two experiments manipulating similarity in interests.  In the first 
experiment, half of the participants were led to believe that the phantom-other was very likely 
to get along with them; for the other half of the participants, the likelihood of the relationship 
was not mentioned.  In each condition, half of the participants were presented with a similar 
other, and the other half of the participants were presented with a dissimilar other.  Results 
indicated that similarity increased attraction when the likelihood of the relationship was 
unknown, but the dissimilar other was liked more when the likelihood of the relationship was 
known, supporting the self-expansion hypothesis.  In the studies presented in this thesis, the 
likelihood of the relationship was unknown, and it could have increased the effects of 
similarity.   
However, Aron et al.’s effects were qualified by an interaction with gender, which 
indicated that these effects were actually not significant for women.  This finding raises the 
broader issue of gender.  Montoya and Horton’s (2012) meta-analysis reported that the 
similarity-liking effect is stronger when participant and target have the same gender than 
when they have the opposite gender. Moreover, the effect was stronger for female than for 
male participants.  To avoid mixing these gender effects, the studies in the chapters 3 and 4 
only recruited female participants, and only the first study made explicit the gender of the 
target.  The other three studies did not specify the gender, and they used a gender neutral 
name. Because participants were asked to imagine going on a date with the target, it was 
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important to not specify the target’s gender, enabling the participation of both heterosexual 
and homosexual women.  However, this was not controlled, and it is not possible to speculate 
whether participants’ sexual orientation had any effect on the results.  Ideally, only single 
participants would have been included in the studies, because half of them were asked to 
imagine going on a date with the target, and this could be more difficult for participants in a 
relationship.  Nonetheless, the results were not affected by this variable, except in Study 3, 
where participants who reported being in a relationship also reported that they would enjoy 
more going on a date with the target. 
All of this does not preclude the need to examine value similarity again in a sample of 
male participants.  In my research, it was not possible to run the set of sequential, 
programmatic lab studies with men due to the substantively higher cost in recruiting this 
sample (for pay) from the general population.  Experiments with male participants may reveal 
different effects if the mechanism underlying similarity effects is indeed different for men 
and women, as implied by Aron et al.’s research.  Alternatively, Montoya and Horton’s meta-
analysis suggests that effects of similarity on liking may merely be weaker in male 
participants.  In addition, it could emerge that any effects of gender depend on which values 
are analysed, consistent with evidence showing sex differences in value priorities (Rubel & 
Schwartz, 2006).  Future research on this issue would help to clarify the generalizability of 
the findings reported here.  
There is also room to further examine the influence of individual differences in the 
similarity-liking effect.  There is evidence that the similarity-liking effect is affected by self-
esteem (e.g., Brown & Brown, 2015), self-ideal discrepancy (Griffitt, 1966; LaPrelle, Hoyle, 
Insko, & Bernthal (1990); Wetzel & Insko, 1982), preference for consistency (Greenhalgh 
and Watt, 2014), and self-monitoring (e.g., Jamieson et al., 1987).  It was not the main 
objective of this dissertation to analyse the role of individual differences in the similarity-
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liking effect.  It was more important to first establish whether and how value similarity 
influences liking.  Notwithstanding this objective, Study 1 included a supplementary 
examination of self-monitoring.  Unexpectedly, value similarity played a larger role in 
interpersonal attitudes for low self-monitors than for high self-monitors in this study. In 
contrast, Jamieson et al. (1987) observed that low self-monitors expressed more attraction for 
a target with similar attitudes than high self-monitors.  One potential explanation for the 
unexpected finding is that the interpersonal nature of these attitudes leads high self-monitors 
to use value-relevant information, because this helps them to anticipate the potential for 
conflict with hypothetical individuals (which matters more to high self-monitors than low 
self-monitors; Snyder, 1974).  It could be the case that real, expected interactions would yield 
a different pattern, wherein the values are ignored in order to pragmatically function in the 
relationships.  Nevertheless, this explanation is post hoc and requires future research.  This 
avenue of investigation is important because research has not acknowledged the potential role 
of individual differences in the value-similarity effect, and the present findings support the 
assumption that self-monitoring is relevant.  However, there is some debate regarding the 
construct validity of self-monitoring (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000) and, therefore, future 
research should consider testing other individual difference variables like the ones cited 
above. 
 Finally, most of the focus of research about the similarity-liking effect has considered 
fictional characters, intimate relationships, and friendships.  It is important to extend this 
research for other societal issues.  The applications of the similarity-liking effect can be much 
broader. It can have serious implications in intergroup perception (Chen & Kenrick, 2002; 
Greenhalgh & Watt, 2015), students’ (Sortheix & Lonnqvist, 2015) and patients’ well-being 
(Luther, Luther, Benkenstein, & Rummelhagen, 2016), recruitment decisions in academia 
(Roebken, 2010), and recruitment of immigrants (Almeida, Fernando, Hannif, & Dharmage, 
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2015).  Given the implications of values for many aspects of social life, it was an important 
step to provide an adaptation of the similarity-liking effect for this construct.  When the 
perceptions of dissimilarity are generalized for whole groups and their interactions, the 
consequences may be even greater. 
Conclusions 
Popular psychology and common sense have been conjecturing for a long time 
whether opposites attract, or whether birds of a feather flock together.  Over 70 years of 
research has shown we find ourselves liking those who appear similar to us more than those 
who appear dissimilar.  Such similarity could be made up of many aspects, such as interests, 
opinions, attitudes, personality, and values.  The present research was particularly interested 
in the latter: value similarity.  It was found that both actual and perceived similarity increase 
liking. Moreover, similarity influences perceptions of a person’s warmth and competence, 
which influences attitudes towards the person.  This pattern supports the information 
processing model, suggesting that similarity does not merely provide validation of our self-
concept, but adds to our knowledge about a person.  
In sum, although a lot of research has examined the similarity-liking effect, value 
similarity has been understudied.  This series of studies provides the first direct examination 
of the role of value similarity, while providing provocative evidence about the mechanisms 
for its impact.  Given the implications of values for many aspects of social life, further 
examination of the effects of value similarity is an important topic for future study. 
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